From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com> To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com> Subject: [PATCH v10 37/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 11:35:16 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201125093600.2766-38-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201125093600.2766-1-alazar@bitdefender.com> These commands are used to check what introspection commands and events are supported (kernel) and allowed (device manager). These are alternative methods to KVMI_GET_VERSION in checking if the introspection supports a specific command/event. As with the KVMI_GET_VERSION command, these two commands can never be disallowed by the device manager. Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com> --- Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h | 16 ++++- .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c | 45 ++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c | 19 ++++++ virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h | 2 + virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c | 40 +++++++++++- 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst index d3d672a07872..13169575f75f 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst @@ -250,3 +250,65 @@ larger messages. The introspection tool should use this command to identify the features supported by the kernel side and what messages must be used for event replies. + +2. KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND +------------------------ + +:Architectures: all +:Versions: >= 1 +:Parameters: + +:: + + struct kvmi_vm_check_command { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; + }; + +:Returns: + +:: + + struct kvmi_error_code; + +Checks if the command specified by ``id`` is supported and allowed. + +This command is always allowed. + +:Errors: + +* -KVM_ENOENT - the command specified by ``id`` is unsupported +* -KVM_EPERM - the command specified by ``id`` is disallowed +* -KVM_EINVAL - the padding is not zero + +3. KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT +---------------------- + +:Architectures: all +:Versions: >= 1 +:Parameters: + +:: + + struct kvmi_vm_check_event { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; + }; + +:Returns: + +:: + + struct kvmi_error_code; + +Checks if the event specified by ``id`` is supported and allowed. + +This command is always allowed. + +:Errors: + +* -KVM_ENOENT - the event specified by ``id`` is unsupported +* -KVM_EPERM - the event specified by ``id`` is disallowed +* -KVM_EINVAL - the padding is not zero diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h index 77dd727dfe18..0c2d0cedde6f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ enum { #define KVMI_VCPU_MESSAGE_ID(id) (((id) << 1) | 1) enum { - KVMI_GET_VERSION = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(1), + KVMI_GET_VERSION = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(1), + KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(2), + KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(3), KVMI_NEXT_VM_MESSAGE }; @@ -53,4 +55,16 @@ struct kvmi_get_version_reply { __u32 max_msg_size; }; +struct kvmi_vm_check_command { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; +}; + +struct kvmi_vm_check_event { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_KVMI_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c index 30acd3a2d030..cd8f16a3ce3a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c @@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static void hook_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) do_hook_ioctl(vm, Kvm_socket, EEXIST); set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_GET_VERSION, disallow, EPERM); + set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, disallow, EPERM); + set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, disallow, EPERM); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, allow_inval, EINVAL); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, disallow, 0); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, allow, 0); @@ -241,6 +243,47 @@ static void test_cmd_get_version(void) pr_debug("Max message size: %u\n", rpl.max_msg_size); } +static void cmd_vm_check_command(__u16 id, int expected_err) +{ + struct { + struct kvmi_msg_hdr hdr; + struct kvmi_vm_check_command cmd; + } req = {}; + + req.cmd.id = id; + + test_vm_command(KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, &req.hdr, sizeof(req), NULL, 0, + expected_err); +} + +static void test_cmd_vm_check_command(void) +{ + __u16 valid_id = KVMI_GET_VERSION, invalid_id = 0xffff; + + cmd_vm_check_command(valid_id, 0); + cmd_vm_check_command(invalid_id, -KVM_ENOENT); +} + +static void cmd_vm_check_event(__u16 id, int expected_err) +{ + struct { + struct kvmi_msg_hdr hdr; + struct kvmi_vm_check_event cmd; + } req = {}; + + req.cmd.id = id; + + test_vm_command(KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, &req.hdr, sizeof(req), NULL, 0, + expected_err); +} + +static void test_cmd_vm_check_event(void) +{ + __u16 invalid_id = 0xffff; + + cmd_vm_check_event(invalid_id, -KVM_ENOENT); +} + static void test_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) { setup_socket(); @@ -248,6 +291,8 @@ static void test_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) test_cmd_invalid(); test_cmd_get_version(); + test_cmd_vm_check_command(); + test_cmd_vm_check_event(); unhook_introspection(vm); } diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c index 520be9478697..9125e6c92ded 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define KVMI_MSG_SIZE_ALLOC (sizeof(struct kvmi_msg_hdr) + KVMI_MAX_MSG_SIZE) static DECLARE_BITMAP(Kvmi_always_allowed_commands, KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS); +static DECLARE_BITMAP(Kvmi_known_events, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); static struct kmem_cache *msg_cache; @@ -55,15 +56,33 @@ bool kvmi_is_command_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id) return id < KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS && test_bit(id, kvmi->cmd_allow_mask); } +bool kvmi_is_event_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id) +{ + return id < KVMI_NUM_EVENTS && test_bit(id, kvmi->event_allow_mask); +} + +bool kvmi_is_known_event(u16 id) +{ + return id < KVMI_NUM_EVENTS && test_bit(id, Kvmi_known_events); +} + static void kvmi_init_always_allowed_commands(void) { bitmap_zero(Kvmi_always_allowed_commands, KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS); set_bit(KVMI_GET_VERSION, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); + set_bit(KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); + set_bit(KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); +} + +static void kvmi_init_known_events(void) +{ + bitmap_zero(Kvmi_known_events, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); } int kvmi_init(void) { kvmi_init_always_allowed_commands(); + kvmi_init_known_events(); return kvmi_cache_create(); } diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h index 206aaf93f8ba..1e1d1fad4035 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h @@ -23,5 +23,7 @@ bool kvmi_msg_process(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi); void *kvmi_msg_alloc(void); void kvmi_msg_free(void *addr); bool kvmi_is_command_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id); +bool kvmi_is_event_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id); +bool kvmi_is_known_event(u16 id); #endif diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c index 57708da2af20..6538c7af710a 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ typedef int (*kvmi_vm_msg_fct)(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, const void *req); +static bool is_vm_command(u16 id); + bool kvmi_sock_get(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, int fd) { struct socket *sock; @@ -114,11 +116,47 @@ static int handle_get_version(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, 0, &rpl, sizeof(rpl)); } +static int handle_vm_check_command(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, + const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, + const void *_req) +{ + const struct kvmi_vm_check_command *req = _req; + int ec = 0; + + if (req->padding1 || req->padding2) + ec = -KVM_EINVAL; + else if (!is_vm_command(req->id)) + ec = -KVM_ENOENT; + else if (!kvmi_is_command_allowed(kvmi, req->id)) + ec = -KVM_EPERM; + + return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, ec, NULL, 0); +} + +static int handle_vm_check_event(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, + const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, + const void *_req) +{ + const struct kvmi_vm_check_event *req = _req; + int ec = 0; + + if (req->padding1 || req->padding2) + ec = -KVM_EINVAL; + else if (!kvmi_is_known_event(req->id)) + ec = -KVM_ENOENT; + else if (!kvmi_is_event_allowed(kvmi, req->id)) + ec = -KVM_EPERM; + + return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, ec, NULL, 0); +} + /* * These commands are executed by the receiving thread. */ static kvmi_vm_msg_fct const msg_vm[] = { - [KVMI_GET_VERSION] = handle_get_version, + [KVMI_GET_VERSION] = handle_get_version, + [KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND] = handle_vm_check_command, + [KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT] = handle_vm_check_event, }; static kvmi_vm_msg_fct get_vm_msg_handler(u16 id)
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com> To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Adalbert Lazăr" <alazar@bitdefender.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Subject: [PATCH v10 37/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 11:35:16 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201125093600.2766-38-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201125093600.2766-1-alazar@bitdefender.com> These commands are used to check what introspection commands and events are supported (kernel) and allowed (device manager). These are alternative methods to KVMI_GET_VERSION in checking if the introspection supports a specific command/event. As with the KVMI_GET_VERSION command, these two commands can never be disallowed by the device manager. Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com> --- Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h | 16 ++++- .../testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c | 45 ++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c | 19 ++++++ virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h | 2 + virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c | 40 +++++++++++- 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst index d3d672a07872..13169575f75f 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst @@ -250,3 +250,65 @@ larger messages. The introspection tool should use this command to identify the features supported by the kernel side and what messages must be used for event replies. + +2. KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND +------------------------ + +:Architectures: all +:Versions: >= 1 +:Parameters: + +:: + + struct kvmi_vm_check_command { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; + }; + +:Returns: + +:: + + struct kvmi_error_code; + +Checks if the command specified by ``id`` is supported and allowed. + +This command is always allowed. + +:Errors: + +* -KVM_ENOENT - the command specified by ``id`` is unsupported +* -KVM_EPERM - the command specified by ``id`` is disallowed +* -KVM_EINVAL - the padding is not zero + +3. KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT +---------------------- + +:Architectures: all +:Versions: >= 1 +:Parameters: + +:: + + struct kvmi_vm_check_event { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; + }; + +:Returns: + +:: + + struct kvmi_error_code; + +Checks if the event specified by ``id`` is supported and allowed. + +This command is always allowed. + +:Errors: + +* -KVM_ENOENT - the event specified by ``id`` is unsupported +* -KVM_EPERM - the event specified by ``id`` is disallowed +* -KVM_EINVAL - the padding is not zero diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h index 77dd727dfe18..0c2d0cedde6f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvmi.h @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ enum { #define KVMI_VCPU_MESSAGE_ID(id) (((id) << 1) | 1) enum { - KVMI_GET_VERSION = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(1), + KVMI_GET_VERSION = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(1), + KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(2), + KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT = KVMI_VM_MESSAGE_ID(3), KVMI_NEXT_VM_MESSAGE }; @@ -53,4 +55,16 @@ struct kvmi_get_version_reply { __u32 max_msg_size; }; +struct kvmi_vm_check_command { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; +}; + +struct kvmi_vm_check_event { + __u16 id; + __u16 padding1; + __u32 padding2; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_KVMI_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c index 30acd3a2d030..cd8f16a3ce3a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/kvmi_test.c @@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ static void hook_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) do_hook_ioctl(vm, Kvm_socket, EEXIST); set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_GET_VERSION, disallow, EPERM); + set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, disallow, EPERM); + set_command_perm(vm, KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, disallow, EPERM); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, allow_inval, EINVAL); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, disallow, 0); set_command_perm(vm, all_IDs, allow, 0); @@ -241,6 +243,47 @@ static void test_cmd_get_version(void) pr_debug("Max message size: %u\n", rpl.max_msg_size); } +static void cmd_vm_check_command(__u16 id, int expected_err) +{ + struct { + struct kvmi_msg_hdr hdr; + struct kvmi_vm_check_command cmd; + } req = {}; + + req.cmd.id = id; + + test_vm_command(KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, &req.hdr, sizeof(req), NULL, 0, + expected_err); +} + +static void test_cmd_vm_check_command(void) +{ + __u16 valid_id = KVMI_GET_VERSION, invalid_id = 0xffff; + + cmd_vm_check_command(valid_id, 0); + cmd_vm_check_command(invalid_id, -KVM_ENOENT); +} + +static void cmd_vm_check_event(__u16 id, int expected_err) +{ + struct { + struct kvmi_msg_hdr hdr; + struct kvmi_vm_check_event cmd; + } req = {}; + + req.cmd.id = id; + + test_vm_command(KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, &req.hdr, sizeof(req), NULL, 0, + expected_err); +} + +static void test_cmd_vm_check_event(void) +{ + __u16 invalid_id = 0xffff; + + cmd_vm_check_event(invalid_id, -KVM_ENOENT); +} + static void test_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) { setup_socket(); @@ -248,6 +291,8 @@ static void test_introspection(struct kvm_vm *vm) test_cmd_invalid(); test_cmd_get_version(); + test_cmd_vm_check_command(); + test_cmd_vm_check_event(); unhook_introspection(vm); } diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c index 520be9478697..9125e6c92ded 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define KVMI_MSG_SIZE_ALLOC (sizeof(struct kvmi_msg_hdr) + KVMI_MAX_MSG_SIZE) static DECLARE_BITMAP(Kvmi_always_allowed_commands, KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS); +static DECLARE_BITMAP(Kvmi_known_events, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); static struct kmem_cache *msg_cache; @@ -55,15 +56,33 @@ bool kvmi_is_command_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id) return id < KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS && test_bit(id, kvmi->cmd_allow_mask); } +bool kvmi_is_event_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id) +{ + return id < KVMI_NUM_EVENTS && test_bit(id, kvmi->event_allow_mask); +} + +bool kvmi_is_known_event(u16 id) +{ + return id < KVMI_NUM_EVENTS && test_bit(id, Kvmi_known_events); +} + static void kvmi_init_always_allowed_commands(void) { bitmap_zero(Kvmi_always_allowed_commands, KVMI_NUM_COMMANDS); set_bit(KVMI_GET_VERSION, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); + set_bit(KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); + set_bit(KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT, Kvmi_always_allowed_commands); +} + +static void kvmi_init_known_events(void) +{ + bitmap_zero(Kvmi_known_events, KVMI_NUM_EVENTS); } int kvmi_init(void) { kvmi_init_always_allowed_commands(); + kvmi_init_known_events(); return kvmi_cache_create(); } diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h index 206aaf93f8ba..1e1d1fad4035 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_int.h @@ -23,5 +23,7 @@ bool kvmi_msg_process(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi); void *kvmi_msg_alloc(void); void kvmi_msg_free(void *addr); bool kvmi_is_command_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id); +bool kvmi_is_event_allowed(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, u16 id); +bool kvmi_is_known_event(u16 id); #endif diff --git a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c index 57708da2af20..6538c7af710a 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c +++ b/virt/kvm/introspection/kvmi_msg.c @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ typedef int (*kvmi_vm_msg_fct)(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, const void *req); +static bool is_vm_command(u16 id); + bool kvmi_sock_get(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, int fd) { struct socket *sock; @@ -114,11 +116,47 @@ static int handle_get_version(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, 0, &rpl, sizeof(rpl)); } +static int handle_vm_check_command(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, + const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, + const void *_req) +{ + const struct kvmi_vm_check_command *req = _req; + int ec = 0; + + if (req->padding1 || req->padding2) + ec = -KVM_EINVAL; + else if (!is_vm_command(req->id)) + ec = -KVM_ENOENT; + else if (!kvmi_is_command_allowed(kvmi, req->id)) + ec = -KVM_EPERM; + + return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, ec, NULL, 0); +} + +static int handle_vm_check_event(struct kvm_introspection *kvmi, + const struct kvmi_msg_hdr *msg, + const void *_req) +{ + const struct kvmi_vm_check_event *req = _req; + int ec = 0; + + if (req->padding1 || req->padding2) + ec = -KVM_EINVAL; + else if (!kvmi_is_known_event(req->id)) + ec = -KVM_ENOENT; + else if (!kvmi_is_event_allowed(kvmi, req->id)) + ec = -KVM_EPERM; + + return kvmi_msg_vm_reply(kvmi, msg, ec, NULL, 0); +} + /* * These commands are executed by the receiving thread. */ static kvmi_vm_msg_fct const msg_vm[] = { - [KVMI_GET_VERSION] = handle_get_version, + [KVMI_GET_VERSION] = handle_get_version, + [KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND] = handle_vm_check_command, + [KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT] = handle_vm_check_event, }; static kvmi_vm_msg_fct get_vm_msg_handler(u16 id) _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-25 9:42 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 192+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-11-25 9:34 [PATCH v10 00/81] VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 01/81] KVM: UAPI: add error codes used by the VM introspection code Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 02/81] KVM: add kvm_vcpu_kick_and_wait() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 03/81] KVM: add kvm_get_max_gfn() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 04/81] KVM: doc: fix the hypercalls numbering Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 05/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_get_regs() and kvm_arch_vcpu_get_sregs() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 06/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_regs() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 07/81] KVM: x86: avoid injecting #PF when emulate the VMCALL instruction Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 08/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.bp_intercepted() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 09/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.control_cr3_intercept() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 10/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.cr3_write_intercepted() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 11/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.desc_ctrl_supported() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 12/81] KVM: svm: add support for descriptor-table VM-exits Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 13/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.control_desc_intercept() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 14/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.desc_intercepted() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 15/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.msr_write_intercepted() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 16/81] KVM: x86: svm: use the vmx convention to control the MSR interception Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 17/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.control_msr_intercept() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 18/81] KVM: x86: vmx: use a symbolic constant when checking the exit qualifications Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 19/81] KVM: x86: save the error code during EPT/NPF exits handling Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` [PATCH v10 20/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gla() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:34 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 21/81] KVM: x86: add kvm_x86_ops.control_singlestep() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 22/81] KVM: x86: export kvm_arch_vcpu_set_guest_debug() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 23/81] KVM: x86: extend kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system() with the 'access' parameter Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 24/81] KVM: x86: export kvm_inject_pending_exception() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 25/81] KVM: x86: export kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 12:19 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:19 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:19 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 26/81] KVM: x86: export kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave() Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 27/81] KVM: x86: page track: provide all callbacks with the guest virtual address Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 28/81] KVM: x86: page track: add track_create_slot() callback Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 29/81] KVM: x86: page_track: add support for preread, prewrite and preexec Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 30/81] KVM: x86: wire in the preread/prewrite/preexec page trackers Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 31/81] KVM: x86: disable gpa_available optimization for fetch and page-walk SPT violations Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 32/81] KVM: introduce VM introspection Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 12:45 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:45 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:45 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 13:41 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 13:41 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 13:41 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 16:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 16:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 16:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 33/81] KVM: introspection: add hook/unhook ioctls Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 11:49 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 11:49 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 34/81] KVM: introspection: add permission access ioctls Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 35/81] KVM: introspection: add the read/dispatch message function Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 36/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_GET_VERSION Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr [this message] 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 37/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_CHECK_COMMAND and KVMI_VM_CHECK_EVENT Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 38/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_GET_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 39/81] KVM: introspection: add KVM_INTROSPECTION_PREUNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 40/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_EVENT_UNHOOK Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 41/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 42/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_READ_PHYSICAL/KVMI_VM_WRITE_PHYSICAL Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 43/81] KVM: introspection: add vCPU related data Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 44/81] KVM: introspection: add a jobs list to every introspected vCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 45/81] KVM: introspection: handle vCPU introspection requests Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 46/81] KVM: introspection: handle vCPU commands Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 47/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_INFO Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 48/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_PAUSE_VCPU Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 49/81] KVM: introspection: add support for vCPU events Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 50/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_PAUSE Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 51/81] KVM: introspection: add the crash action handling on the event reply Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 52/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_CONTROL_EVENTS Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 53/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 54/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_SET_REGISTERS Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 55/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_CPUID Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 56/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_HYPERCALL Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 57/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_BREAKPOINT Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 58/81] KVM: introspection: add cleanup support for vCPUs Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 59/81] KVM: introspection: restore the state of #BP interception on unhook Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 60/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_CONTROL_CLEANUP Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 61/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_CONTROL_CR and KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_CR Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 62/81] KVM: introspection: restore the state of CR3 interception on unhook Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 63/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_INJECT_EXCEPTION + KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_TRAP Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 12:57 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 12:57 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 64/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_GET_MAX_GFN Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 65/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_XSETBV Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 66/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_XCR Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 15:22 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 15:22 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 15:22 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 67/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 13:50 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 13:50 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 68/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_SET_XSAVE Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 69/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_GET_MTRR_TYPE Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 70/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_DESCRIPTOR Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 71/81] KVM: introspection: restore the state of descriptor-table register interception on unhook Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 72/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_CONTROL_MSR and KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_MSR Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 73/81] KVM: introspection: restore the state of MSR interception on unhook Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 74/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VM_SET_PAGE_ACCESS Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 75/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_PF Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 14:44 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 14:44 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 76/81] KVM: introspection: extend KVMI_GET_VERSION with struct kvmi_features Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 77/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_CONTROL_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 78/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_EVENT_SINGLESTEP Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 79/81] KVM: introspection: add KVMI_VCPU_TRANSLATE_GVA Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 15:46 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 15:46 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-25 9:35 ` [PATCH v10 80/81] KVM: introspection: emulate a guest page table walk on SPT violations due to A/D bit updates Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:35 ` Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:36 ` [PATCH v10 81/81] KVM: x86: call the page tracking code on emulation failure Adalbert Lazăr 2020-11-25 9:36 ` Adalbert Lazăr
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