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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 11/40] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 09:43:03 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211210154332.11526-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The SEV-SNP guest is required by the GHCB spec to register the GHCB's
Guest Physical Address (GPA). This is because the hypervisor may prefer
that a guest use a consistent and/or specific GPA for the GHCB associated
with a vCPU. For more information, see the GHCB specification section
"GHCB GPA Registration".

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h   |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c     |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c        | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 5 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index e37451849165..0df508374a35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)
 
 	return rc;
 }
+void sev_snp_register_ghcb(void);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
 static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
 static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
 static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; }
 static inline int rmpadjust(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, unsigned long attrs) { return 0; }
+static inline void sev_snp_register_ghcb(void) { }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0663642d6199..1146e8920b03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
 #include <asm/sigframe.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
@@ -1988,6 +1989,9 @@ void cpu_init_exception_handling(void)
 
 	load_TR_desc();
 
+	/* Register the GHCB before taking any VC exception */
+	sev_snp_register_ghcb();
+
 	/* Finally load the IDT */
 	load_current_idt();
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index b01f64e8389b..fa02402dcb9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -588,6 +588,7 @@ void early_setup_idt(void)
 
 	bringup_idt_descr.address = (unsigned long)bringup_idt_table;
 	native_load_idt(&bringup_idt_descr);
+	sev_snp_register_ghcb();
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index e9ff13cd90b0..3aaef1a18ffe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static u64 get_hv_features(void)
 	return GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP_VAL(val);
 }
 
-static void __maybe_unused snp_register_ghcb_early(unsigned long paddr)
+static void snp_register_ghcb_early(unsigned long paddr)
 {
 	unsigned long pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	u64 val;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index a0cada8398a4..17ad603f62da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -162,55 +162,6 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void)
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *(unsigned long *)ist);
 }
 
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
-	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
-	WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
-	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
-	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
-	if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
-		/* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
-		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
-			/*
-			 * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
-			 * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
-			 * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
-			 * can be printed out.
-			 */
-			data->ghcb_active        = false;
-			data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
-			instrumentation_begin();
-			panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
-			instrumentation_end();
-		}
-
-		/* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
-		data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
-		state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
-
-		/* Backup GHCB content */
-		*state->ghcb = *ghcb;
-	} else {
-		state->ghcb = NULL;
-		data->ghcb_active = true;
-	}
-
-	return ghcb;
-}
-
 static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
 {
 	return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
@@ -484,6 +435,55 @@ static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt
 /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
 #include "sev-shared.c"
 
+/*
+ * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
+ * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
+ *
+ * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
+ */
+static noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+	if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+		/* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+		if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+			/*
+			 * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+			 * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+			 * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+			 * can be printed out.
+			 */
+			data->ghcb_active        = false;
+			data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+			instrumentation_begin();
+			panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+			instrumentation_end();
+		}
+
+		/* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+		data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+		state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+		/* Backup GHCB content */
+		*state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+	} else {
+		state->ghcb = NULL;
+		data->ghcb_active = true;
+	}
+
+	return ghcb;
+}
+
 static noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
 {
 	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
  * This function runs on the first #VC exception after the kernel
  * switched to virtual addresses.
  */
-static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
+static bool __init setup_ghcb(void)
 {
 	/* First make sure the hypervisor talks a supported protocol. */
 	if (!sev_es_negotiate_protocol())
@@ -667,6 +667,10 @@ static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void)
 	/* Alright - Make the boot-ghcb public */
 	boot_ghcb = &boot_ghcb_page;
 
+	/* SEV-SNP guest requires that GHCB GPA must be registered. */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP))
+		snp_register_ghcb_early(__pa(&boot_ghcb_page));
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -758,6 +762,20 @@ static void __init init_ghcb(int cpu)
 	data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
 }
 
+void sev_snp_register_ghcb(void)
+{
+	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+	snp_register_ghcb_early(__pa(ghcb));
+}
+
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
@@ -1400,7 +1418,7 @@ bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	enum es_result result;
 
 	/* Do initial setup or terminate the guest */
-	if (unlikely(boot_ghcb == NULL && !sev_es_setup_ghcb()))
+	if (unlikely(boot_ghcb == NULL && !setup_ghcb()))
 		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
 
 	vc_ghcb_invalidate(boot_ghcb);
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-12-10 15:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 183+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-10 15:42 [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:47   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 19:23     ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-13 19:09   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-13 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-14 17:46       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 19:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15  0:14           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 11:57             ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 14:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-15 17:49               ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 18:17                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:17                     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 20:38                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 21:22                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-03 19:10                           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:34                             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 20:46                               ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 21:17                                 ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-10 21:38                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:43                   ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 19:54                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:58               ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 17:51             ` Michael Roth
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 02/40] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:36   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 03/40] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 04/40] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:13   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 22:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 05/40] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:32   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 06/40] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 15:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 16:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 16:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 19:01   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 07/40] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:20   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 08/40] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:24   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-16 23:39     ` Mikolaj Lisik
2021-12-17 22:19       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 22:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-20 18:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:23             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 09/40] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-17 23:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 18:43       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-21 13:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 10/40] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 19:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-12-22 13:16   ` [PATCH v8 11/40] x86/sev: " Borislav Petkov
2021-12-22 15:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-12-23 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 23:28   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:22     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 21:51       ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:57         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 22:42           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 13/40] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 17:56   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 20:27       ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-05 21:39         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 17:40           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 19:06             ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-06 20:16               ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:50                 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 14/40] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 15/40] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-12-29 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 22:31   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 16/40] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-01-04 22:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 17/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-05  1:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 18/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:41   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 19/40] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:50   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-12 16:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-31 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-03 18:10     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-01-12 16:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-12 17:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-13 12:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-13 12:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 21/40] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 16:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 22/40] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-04 20:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 23:36     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 18:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:21     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 20:36       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 23/40] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 18:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 24/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:47     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-13 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 18:00         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-11  8:59       ` Chao Fan
2022-01-05 23:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 19:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 25/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:33   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 26/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 27/40] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:30       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 14:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 15:08           ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:55             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 11:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 22:48   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 28/40] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 13:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-01-13 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-13 16:39     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-14 16:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18  4:35         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 14:23             ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:32               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:37                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 16:34                   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 17:20                     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 17:41                       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 18:49                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19  1:18                           ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19 11:17                             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-19 16:27                               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-27 17:23                                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-28 22:58                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 30/40] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-01-17 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 31/40] x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-19 12:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 32/40] x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-20 12:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 33/40] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:52   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 17:54     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-25 13:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 34/40] x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-25 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 35/40] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-26 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-01-27 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-27 17:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 10:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-29 11:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 12:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 37/40] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 38/40] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 39/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 22:27   ` Liam Merwick
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 40/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:20   ` Brijesh Singh

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