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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 14:16:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YeAmFePcPjvMoWCP@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211210154332.11526-30-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 09:43:21AM -0600, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> +/*
> + * Individual entries of the SEV-SNP CPUID table, as defined by the SEV-SNP
> + * Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9, Section 7.1, Table 14. Note that the XCR0_IN
> + * and XSS_IN are denoted here as __unused/__unused2, since they are not
> + * needed for the current guest implementation,

That's fine and great but you need to check in the function where you
iterate over those leafs below whether those unused variables are 0
and fail if not. Not that BIOS or whoever creates that table, starts
becoming creative...

> where the size of the buffers
> + * needed to store enabled XSAVE-saved features are calculated rather than
> + * encoded in the CPUID table for each possible combination of XCR0_IN/XSS_IN
> + * to save space.
> + */
> +struct snp_cpuid_fn {
> +	u32 eax_in;
> +	u32 ecx_in;
> +	u64 __unused;
> +	u64 __unused2;
> +	u32 eax;
> +	u32 ebx;
> +	u32 ecx;
> +	u32 edx;
> +	u64 __reserved;

Ditto.

> +} __packed;
> +
> +/*
> + * SEV-SNP CPUID table header, as defined by the SEV-SNP Firmware ABI,
> + * Revision 0.9, Section 8.14.2.6. Also noted there is the SEV-SNP
> + * firmware-enforced limit of 64 entries per CPUID table.
> + */
> +#define SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX 64
> +
> +struct snp_cpuid_info {
> +	u32 count;
> +	u32 __reserved1;
> +	u64 __reserved2;
> +	struct snp_cpuid_fn fn[SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX];
> +} __packed;
> +
>  /*
>   * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot
>   * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed
> @@ -23,6 +58,20 @@
>   */
>  static u16 ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
>  
> +/* Copy of the SNP firmware's CPUID page. */
> +static struct snp_cpuid_info cpuid_info_copy __ro_after_init;
> +static bool snp_cpuid_initialized __ro_after_init;
> +
> +/*
> + * These will be initialized based on CPUID table so that non-present
> + * all-zero leaves (for sparse tables) can be differentiated from
> + * invalid/out-of-range leaves. This is needed since all-zero leaves
> + * still need to be post-processed.
> + */
> +u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init;
> +u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init;
> +u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init;

All of them: static.

>  static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
>  {
>  	if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
> @@ -246,6 +295,244 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static const struct snp_cpuid_info *

No need for that linebreak here.

> +snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr(void)
> +{
> +	void *ptr;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * This may be called early while still running on the initial identity
> +	 * mapping. Use RIP-relative addressing to obtain the correct address
> +	 * in both for identity mapping and after switch-over to kernel virtual
> +	 * addresses.
> +	 */

Put that comment over the function name.

And yah, that probably works but eww.

> +	asm ("lea cpuid_info_copy(%%rip), %0"
> +	     : "=r" (ptr)

Why not "=g" and let the compiler decide?

> +	     : "p" (&cpuid_info_copy));
> +
> +	return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool snp_cpuid_active(void)
> +{
> +	return snp_cpuid_initialized;
> +}

That looks useless. That variable snp_cpuid_initialized either gets set
or the guest terminates, so practically, if the guest is still running,
you can assume SNP CPUID is properly initialized.

> +static int snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, u32 base_size,
> +				     u32 *xsave_size, bool compacted)
> +{
> +	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
> +	u32 xsave_size_total = base_size;
> +	u64 xfeatures_found = 0;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
> +		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
> +
> +		if (!(fn->eax_in == 0xD && fn->ecx_in > 1 && fn->ecx_in < 64))
> +			continue;

I guess that test can be as simple as

		if (fn->eax_in != 0xd)
			continue;

or why do you wanna check ECX too? Funky values coming from the CPUID
page?

> +		if (!(xfeatures_en & (BIT_ULL(fn->ecx_in))))
> +			continue;
> +		if (xfeatures_found & (BIT_ULL(fn->ecx_in)))
> +			continue;

What is that test for? Don't tell me the CPUID page allows duplicate
entries...

> +		xfeatures_found |= (BIT_ULL(fn->ecx_in));
> +
> +		if (compacted)
> +			xsave_size_total += fn->eax;
> +		else
> +			xsave_size_total = max(xsave_size_total,
> +					       fn->eax + fn->ebx);
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Either the guest set unsupported XCR0/XSS bits, or the corresponding
> +	 * entries in the CPUID table were not present. This is not a valid
> +	 * state to be in.
> +	 */
> +	if (xfeatures_found != (xfeatures_en & GENMASK_ULL(63, 2)))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	*xsave_size = xsave_size_total;
> +
> +	return 0;

This function can return xsave_size in the success case and negative in
the error case so you don't need the IO param *xsave_size.

> +}
> +
> +static void snp_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
> +			 u32 *edx)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * MSR protocol does not support fetching indexed subfunction, but is
> +	 * sufficient to handle current fallback cases. Should that change,
> +	 * make sure to terminate rather than ignoring the index and grabbing
> +	 * random values. If this issue arises in the future, handling can be
> +	 * added here to use GHCB-page protocol for cases that occur late
> +	 * enough in boot that GHCB page is available.
> +	 */
> +	if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && subfunc)
> +		sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV);
> +
> +	if (sev_cpuid_hv(func, 0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx))
> +		sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV);
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +snp_cpuid_find_validated_func(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,

snp_cpuid_get_validated_func()

> +			      u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)
> +{
> +	const struct snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info = snp_cpuid_info_get_ptr();
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) {
> +		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i];
> +
> +		if (fn->eax_in != func)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && fn->ecx_in != subfunc)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		*eax = fn->eax;
> +		*ebx = fn->ebx;
> +		*ecx = fn->ecx;
> +		*edx = fn->edx;
> +
> +		return true;
> +	}
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool snp_cpuid_check_range(u32 func)
> +{
> +	if (func <= cpuid_std_range_max ||
> +	    (func >= 0x40000000 && func <= cpuid_hyp_range_max) ||
> +	    (func >= 0x80000000 && func <= cpuid_ext_range_max))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
> +				 u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)

I'm wondering if you could make everything a lot easier by doing

static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)

and marshall around that struct cpuid_leaf which contains func, subfunc,
e[abcd]x instead of dealing with 6 parameters.

Callers of snp_cpuid() can simply allocate it on their stack and hand it
in and it is all in sev-shared.c so nicely self-contained...

...

> +/*
> + * Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other return value should be
> + * treated as fatal by caller.
> + */
> +static int snp_cpuid(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx,
> +		     u32 *edx)
> +{
> +	if (!snp_cpuid_active())
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

And this becomes superfluous.

> +
> +	if (!snp_cpuid_find_validated_func(func, subfunc, eax, ebx, ecx, edx)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Some hypervisors will avoid keeping track of CPUID entries
> +		 * where all values are zero, since they can be handled the
> +		 * same as out-of-range values (all-zero). This is useful here
> +		 * as well as it allows virtually all guest configurations to
> +		 * work using a single SEV-SNP CPUID table.
> +		 *
> +		 * To allow for this, there is a need to distinguish between
> +		 * out-of-range entries and in-range zero entries, since the
> +		 * CPUID table entries are only a template that may need to be
> +		 * augmented with additional values for things like
> +		 * CPU-specific information during post-processing. So if it's
> +		 * not in the table, but is still in the valid range, proceed
> +		 * with the post-processing. Otherwise, just return zeros.
> +		 */
> +		*eax = *ebx = *ecx = *edx = 0;
> +		if (!snp_cpuid_check_range(func))
> +			return 0;

Do the check first and then assign.

> +	}
> +
> +	return snp_cpuid_postprocess(func, subfunc, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
>   * page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
> @@ -253,16 +540,26 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
>   */
>  void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
>  {
> +	unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32);
>  	unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32);
>  	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	/* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */
>  	if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID)
>  		goto fail;
>  
> +	ret = snp_cpuid(fn, subfn, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (ret == 0)

	if (!ret)

> +		goto cpuid_done;
> +
> +	if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> +		goto fail;
> +
>  	if (sev_cpuid_hv(fn, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx))
>  		goto fail;
>  
> +cpuid_done:
>  	regs->ax = eax;
>  	regs->bx = ebx;
>  	regs->cx = ecx;
> @@ -557,12 +854,35 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static int vc_handle_cpuid_snp(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = snp_cpuid(regs->ax, regs->cx, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +	if (ret == 0) {

	if (!ret)

> +		regs->ax = eax;
> +		regs->bx = ebx;
> +		regs->cx = ecx;
> +		regs->dx = edx;
> +	}
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
>  				      struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>  {
>  	struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
>  	u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
>  	enum es_result ret;
> +	int snp_cpuid_ret;
> +
> +	snp_cpuid_ret = vc_handle_cpuid_snp(regs);
> +	if (snp_cpuid_ret == 0)

	if (! ... - you get the idea.



-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-13 13:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 183+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-10 15:42 [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:47   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 19:23     ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-13 19:09   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-13 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-14 17:46       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 19:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15  0:14           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 11:57             ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 14:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-15 17:49               ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 18:17                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:17                     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 20:38                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 21:22                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-03 19:10                           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:34                             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 20:46                               ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-10 21:17                                 ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-10 21:38                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-15 20:43                   ` Michael Roth
2021-12-15 19:54                 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 18:58               ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-15 17:51             ` Michael Roth
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 02/40] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:36   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 03/40] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 04/40] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:13   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-14 22:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 05/40] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-14  0:32   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 06/40] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 15:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 16:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 16:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-16 19:01   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v8 07/40] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:20   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 08/40] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-12-16 20:24   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-16 23:39     ` Mikolaj Lisik
2021-12-17 22:19       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 22:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-20 18:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:23             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 09/40] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-12-17 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-17 23:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 18:43       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-21 13:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 10/40] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 19:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 11/40] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-22 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-22 15:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 22:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-12-23 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 15:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 23:28   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:22     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 21:51       ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-11 21:57         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-11 22:42           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 13/40] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 17:56   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-05 19:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 20:27       ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-05 21:39         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 17:40           ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 19:06             ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-06 20:16               ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:50                 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 14/40] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-28 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 15/40] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-12-29 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 22:31   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 16/40] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-01-04 22:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 17/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 12:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-05  1:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 18/40] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:41   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 19/40] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-01-05 18:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:50   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-12 16:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-31 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-03 18:10     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-01-12 16:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-12 17:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2022-01-13 12:23         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-13 12:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 21/40] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Brijesh Singh
2022-01-03 16:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 22/40] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-12-30 18:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-04 20:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 23:36     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 18:38   ` Venu Busireddy
2022-01-06 20:21     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-06 20:36       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 23/40] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 18:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 24/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 18:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:47     ` Michael Roth
2021-12-13 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 18:00         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-11  8:59       ` Chao Fan
2022-01-05 23:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 19:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 25/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:33   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 26/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-06 20:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 27/40] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:12   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:30       ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 14:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-12-13 15:08           ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 15:55             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 11:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-06 22:48   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 28/40] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-01-07 13:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-01-13 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-01-13 16:39     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-14 16:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18  4:35         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 14:23             ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:32               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 14:37                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 16:34                   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 17:20                     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-18 17:41                       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-18 18:49                         ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19  1:18                           ` Michael Roth
2022-01-19 11:17                             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-19 16:27                               ` Michael Roth
2022-01-27 17:23                                 ` Michael Roth
2022-01-28 22:58                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 30/40] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-01-17 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 31/40] x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-19 12:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 32/40] x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-20 12:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 33/40] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 19:52   ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-13 17:54     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-25 13:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 34/40] x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-01-25 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 35/40] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-26 18:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-01-27 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-27 17:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 10:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-29 11:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-29 12:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 37/40] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 38/40] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 39/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 22:27   ` Liam Merwick
2021-12-10 15:43 ` [PATCH v8 40/40] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-12-10 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Dave Hansen
2021-12-10 20:20   ` Brijesh Singh

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