From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 14:38:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230808133857.GC2369@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <09b7a94d-cc88-4372-85de-52db26bc2daf@sirena.org.uk>
On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 04:09:58PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 03:13:20PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 02:43:09PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
>
> > > The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for
> > > hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide
> > > hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make
> > > it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling.
>
> > Why is this better than Clang's software shadow stack implementation? It
> > would be nice to see some justification behind adding all this, rather
> > than it being an architectural tick-box exercise.
>
> Mainly that it's hardware enforced (as the quoted paragraph says). This
> makes it harder to attack, and hopefully it's also a bit faster (how
> measurable that might be will be an open question, but even NOPs in
> function entry/exit tend to get noticed).
I dunno, "hardware enforced" can also mean worse security nowadays ;)
But seriously, I think the question is more about what this brings us
*on top of* SCS, since for the forseeable future folks that care about
this stuff (like Android) will be using SCS. GCS on its own doesn't make
sense to me, given the recompilation effort to remove SCS and the lack
of hardware, so then you have to look at what it brings in addition to
GCS and balance that against the performance cost.
Given that, is anybody planning to ship a distribution with this enabled?
If not, why are we bothering? If so, how much of that distribution has
been brought up and how does the "dynamic linker or other startup code"
decide what to do?
After the mess we had with BTI and mprotect(), I'm hesitant to merge
features like this without knowing that the ABI can stand real code.
Will
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 14:38:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230808133857.GC2369@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <09b7a94d-cc88-4372-85de-52db26bc2daf@sirena.org.uk>
On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 04:09:58PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 03:13:20PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 02:43:09PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
>
> > > The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for
> > > hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide
> > > hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make
> > > it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling.
>
> > Why is this better than Clang's software shadow stack implementation? It
> > would be nice to see some justification behind adding all this, rather
> > than it being an architectural tick-box exercise.
>
> Mainly that it's hardware enforced (as the quoted paragraph says). This
> makes it harder to attack, and hopefully it's also a bit faster (how
> measurable that might be will be an open question, but even NOPs in
> function entry/exit tend to get noticed).
I dunno, "hardware enforced" can also mean worse security nowadays ;)
But seriously, I think the question is more about what this brings us
*on top of* SCS, since for the forseeable future folks that care about
this stuff (like Android) will be using SCS. GCS on its own doesn't make
sense to me, given the recompilation effort to remove SCS and the lack
of hardware, so then you have to look at what it brings in addition to
GCS and balance that against the performance cost.
Given that, is anybody planning to ship a distribution with this enabled?
If not, why are we bothering? If so, how much of that distribution has
been brought up and how does the "dynamic linker or other startup code"
decide what to do?
After the mess we had with BTI and mprotect(), I'm hesitant to merge
features like this without knowing that the ABI can stand real code.
Will
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 14:38:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230808133857.GC2369@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <09b7a94d-cc88-4372-85de-52db26bc2daf@sirena.org.uk>
On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 04:09:58PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 01, 2023 at 03:13:20PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 02:43:09PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
>
> > > The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for
> > > hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide
> > > hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make
> > > it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling.
>
> > Why is this better than Clang's software shadow stack implementation? It
> > would be nice to see some justification behind adding all this, rather
> > than it being an architectural tick-box exercise.
>
> Mainly that it's hardware enforced (as the quoted paragraph says). This
> makes it harder to attack, and hopefully it's also a bit faster (how
> measurable that might be will be an open question, but even NOPs in
> function entry/exit tend to get noticed).
I dunno, "hardware enforced" can also mean worse security nowadays ;)
But seriously, I think the question is more about what this brings us
*on top of* SCS, since for the forseeable future folks that care about
this stuff (like Android) will be using SCS. GCS on its own doesn't make
sense to me, given the recompilation effort to remove SCS and the lack
of hardware, so then you have to look at what it brings in addition to
GCS and balance that against the performance cost.
Given that, is anybody planning to ship a distribution with this enabled?
If not, why are we bothering? If so, how much of that distribution has
been brought up and how does the "dynamic linker or other startup code"
decide what to do?
After the mess we had with BTI and mprotect(), I'm hesitant to merge
features like this without knowing that the ABI can stand real code.
Will
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-08 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 192+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-31 13:43 [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 01/36] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 02/36] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 03/36] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 04/36] arm64/sysreg: Add new system registers for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 05/36] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 06/36] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 07/36] arm64/gcs: Provide copy_to_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 08/36] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 09/36] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 10/36] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 16:53 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 16:53 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 16:53 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 11/36] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 19:05 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 19:05 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 19:05 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 12/36] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 13/36] arm64/gcs: Allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 14/36] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 15/36] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 16/36] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 17/36] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 18/36] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 19/36] arm64/gcs: Allocate a new GCS for threads with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 20/36] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 21/36] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 15:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-31 15:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-31 15:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-31 17:06 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 17:06 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 17:06 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 23:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-31 23:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-07-31 23:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 14:01 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 14:01 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 14:01 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 17:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 17:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 17:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2023-08-01 18:03 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 18:03 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 18:03 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 17:57 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 17:57 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 17:57 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 20:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 20:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-01 20:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-02 16:27 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-02 16:27 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-02 16:27 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 13:38 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 13:38 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 13:38 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 16:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-04 16:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-04 16:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-08-04 17:10 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 17:10 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-04 17:10 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-07 10:20 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-07 10:20 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-07 10:20 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-07 13:00 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-07 13:00 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-07 13:00 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 8:21 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 8:21 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 8:21 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 20:42 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 20:42 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 20:42 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 22/36] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 23/36] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 24/36] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 25/36] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 26/36] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 27/36] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 28/36] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 29/36] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 30/36] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 31/36] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 32/36] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 33/36] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 34/36] selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 35/36] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` [PATCH v3 36/36] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-31 13:43 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 14:13 ` [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Will Deacon
2023-08-01 14:13 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-01 14:13 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-01 15:09 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 15:09 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-01 15:09 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 10:27 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 10:27 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 10:27 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-08-08 13:38 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2023-08-08 13:38 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-08 13:38 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-08 20:25 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 20:25 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-08 20:25 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-10 9:40 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-10 9:40 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-10 9:40 ` Will Deacon
2023-08-10 16:05 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-10 16:05 ` Mark Brown
2023-08-10 16:05 ` Mark Brown
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