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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>, Guo Hui <guohui@uniontech.com>,
	Manoj.Iyer@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, James Yang <james.yang@arm.com>,
	Shiyou Huang <shiyou.huang@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] arm64: syscall: Direct PRNG kstack randomization
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 11:10:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202403071105.C3B038C@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f1dd15ce-69af-4315-8d7c-b7a480e541aa@app.fastmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 07, 2024 at 12:10:34PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> For the strength, we have at least four options:
> 
> - strong rng, most expensive
> - your new prng, less strong but somewhat cheaper and/or more
>   predictable overhead
> - cycle counter, cheap but probably even less strong,
>   needs architecture code.

Are the low bits of a cycler counter really less safe than a
deterministic pRNG?

> - no rng, no overhead and no protection.

For the pRNG, why not just add a reseed timer or something that'll
happen outside the syscall window, if that's the concern about reseeding
delay? (In which case, why not continue to use the strong rng?)

-- 
Kees Cook

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>, Guo Hui <guohui@uniontech.com>,
	Manoj.Iyer@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, James Yang <james.yang@arm.com>,
	Shiyou Huang <shiyou.huang@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] arm64: syscall: Direct PRNG kstack randomization
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 11:10:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202403071105.C3B038C@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f1dd15ce-69af-4315-8d7c-b7a480e541aa@app.fastmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 07, 2024 at 12:10:34PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> For the strength, we have at least four options:
> 
> - strong rng, most expensive
> - your new prng, less strong but somewhat cheaper and/or more
>   predictable overhead
> - cycle counter, cheap but probably even less strong,
>   needs architecture code.

Are the low bits of a cycler counter really less safe than a
deterministic pRNG?

> - no rng, no overhead and no protection.

For the pRNG, why not just add a reseed timer or something that'll
happen outside the syscall window, if that's the concern about reseeding
delay? (In which case, why not continue to use the strong rng?)

-- 
Kees Cook

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-07 19:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-05 22:18 [PATCH 0/1] Bring kstack randomized perf closer to unrandomized Jeremy Linton
2024-03-05 22:18 ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-05 22:18 ` [PATCH 1/1] arm64: syscall: Direct PRNG kstack randomization Jeremy Linton
2024-03-05 22:18   ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-05 23:33   ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 23:33     ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 20:46     ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-06 20:46       ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-06 21:54       ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-06 21:54         ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-07 11:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 11:10           ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 19:10           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-03-07 19:10             ` Kees Cook
2024-03-07 21:56             ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 21:56               ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 19:15           ` Kees Cook
2024-03-07 19:15             ` Kees Cook
2024-03-07 22:02             ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 22:02               ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-08 16:49           ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-08 16:49             ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-08 20:29             ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-08 20:29               ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-22 23:40               ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-22 23:40                 ` Jeremy Linton
2024-03-23 12:47                 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-23 12:47                   ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 19:05   ` kernel test robot
2024-03-07 19:05     ` kernel test robot

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