From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 08:09:20 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <55A7C920.7090206@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20150716135947.GC77715@ubuntu-hedt> On 7/16/2015 6:59 AM, Seth Forshee wrote: > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 10:15:21PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Seth I think for the LSMs we should start with: >> >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index 062f3c997fdc..5b6ece92a8e5 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) >> int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, >> const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) >> { >> + if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) >> + return -EPERM; >> return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); >> } > This just makes it impossible to mount from a user namespace. Every > mount from current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns will fail. > >> Then we should push this down into all of the lsms. >> Then when we should remove or relax or change the check as appropriate >> in each lsm. >> >> The point is this is good enough to see that it is trivially safe, >> and this allows us to focus on the core issues, and stop worrying about >> the lsms for a bit. Given the extent to which LSMs are deployed I find it a bit worrisome that they might not be considered a "core issue". >> Then we can focus on each lsm one at at time and take the time to really >> understand them and talk with their maintainers etc to make certain >> we get things correct. The "Do the easy stuff, fix the hard stuff after we've sold the product" approach works really well until you get to the point of fixing the hard stuff. This is the origin of the 90/90 rule of software development. >> >> This should remove the need for your patches 5, 6 and 7. For the >> immediate future. > I'm still not entirely sure what you were trying to do, maybe refuse to > mount whenever a security module is loaded? I think this could be a good > option to start, but couldn't we restrict it to only the LSMs which use > xattrs for security labels? In situations where the filesystem cannot > supply security policy metadata I can't think of any reason to disallow > the mounts. This whole notion of mounting a generic filesystem (e.g. ext4) that is "owned" by a user (as opposed to the system) has lots of implications, and I seriously doubt that many of them have been accounted for. Think back to the "negative group access" issue. You can't just ignore issues that are inconvenient, or claim that you have a reasonable system just because *you* can't think of a problem. > Seth > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 08:09:20 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <55A7C920.7090206@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20150716135947.GC77715@ubuntu-hedt> On 7/16/2015 6:59 AM, Seth Forshee wrote: > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 10:15:21PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Seth I think for the LSMs we should start with: >> >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index 062f3c997fdc..5b6ece92a8e5 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) >> int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, >> const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) >> { >> + if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) >> + return -EPERM; >> return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); >> } > This just makes it impossible to mount from a user namespace. Every > mount from current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns will fail. > >> Then we should push this down into all of the lsms. >> Then when we should remove or relax or change the check as appropriate >> in each lsm. >> >> The point is this is good enough to see that it is trivially safe, >> and this allows us to focus on the core issues, and stop worrying about >> the lsms for a bit. Given the extent to which LSMs are deployed I find it a bit worrisome that they might not be considered a "core issue". >> Then we can focus on each lsm one at at time and take the time to really >> understand them and talk with their maintainers etc to make certain >> we get things correct. The "Do the easy stuff, fix the hard stuff after we've sold the product" approach works really well until you get to the point of fixing the hard stuff. This is the origin of the 90/90 rule of software development. >> >> This should remove the need for your patches 5, 6 and 7. For the >> immediate future. > I'm still not entirely sure what you were trying to do, maybe refuse to > mount whenever a security module is loaded? I think this could be a good > option to start, but couldn't we restrict it to only the LSMs which use > xattrs for security labels? In situations where the filesystem cannot > supply security policy metadata I can't think of any reason to disallow > the mounts. This whole notion of mounting a generic filesystem (e.g. ext4) that is "owned" by a user (as opposed to the system) has lots of implications, and I seriously doubt that many of them have been accounted for. Think back to the "negative group access" issue. You can't just ignore issues that are inconvenient, or claim that you have a reasonable system just because *you* can't think of a problem. > Seth > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-16 15:09 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 232+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 2:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 2:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-08-05 21:03 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-05 21:03 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-05 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-08-05 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-08-06 14:20 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-06 14:20 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-06 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-08-06 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-08-06 15:44 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-06 15:44 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-06 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-08-06 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-08-07 14:16 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-07 14:16 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-07 14:32 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-07 14:32 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-07 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-08-07 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-08-07 18:57 ` Seth Forshee 2015-08-07 18:57 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-15 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-15 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-15 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-15 22:35 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-15 22:35 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 1:14 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 1:14 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 13:06 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 13:06 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 4:23 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 4:23 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 4:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 4:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 5:04 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 5:04 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 5:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 5:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 5:44 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 5:44 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 13:13 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 13:13 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-17 0:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 0:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-29 16:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-29 16:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-29 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-29 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-17 6:46 ` Nikolay Borisov 2015-07-17 6:46 ` Nikolay Borisov 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 13:23 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-22 16:02 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-22 16:14 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 16:14 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-22 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-22 20:40 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-22 20:40 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-23 13:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-23 13:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-23 14:39 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 14:39 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 15:36 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-23 15:36 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-23 16:23 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 16:23 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-24 15:11 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-24 15:11 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-30 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-30 16:24 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 16:24 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 20:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 20:36 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 21:06 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-15 21:06 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-15 21:48 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 21:48 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-15 22:28 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-15 22:28 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 1:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 1:05 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 13:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-16 13:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-07-15 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-15 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 2:54 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 2:54 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 0:09 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-17 0:09 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-17 0:42 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 0:42 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 2:47 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-17 2:47 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-21 17:37 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-21 17:37 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-22 7:56 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-22 7:56 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-22 14:09 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-22 14:09 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-22 16:52 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn 2015-07-22 16:52 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn 2015-07-22 17:41 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-22 17:41 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-23 1:51 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-23 1:51 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-23 13:19 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-23 13:19 ` J. Bruce Fields 2015-07-23 23:48 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-23 23:48 ` Dave Chinner 2015-07-18 0:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-18 0:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-20 17:54 ` Colin Walters 2015-07-20 17:54 ` Colin Walters 2015-07-16 11:16 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk 2015-07-16 11:16 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk 2015-07-17 0:10 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 0:10 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 10:13 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk 2015-07-17 10:13 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk 2015-07-16 3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-16 13:59 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 13:59 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2015-07-16 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 18:57 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 18:57 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 23:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 23:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-16 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-17 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-17 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-17 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-17 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-07-17 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-17 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2015-07-17 14:56 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-17 14:56 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-21 20:35 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-21 20:35 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 1:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-22 1:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-22 15:56 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 15:56 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-22 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-22 19:32 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-22 19:32 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-23 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-23 0:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-23 0:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-23 5:15 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 5:15 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-23 21:48 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-23 21:48 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-28 20:40 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-28 20:40 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-30 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-30 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-30 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-30 17:25 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 17:25 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-30 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-17 13:21 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-17 13:21 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-17 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-17 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-16 15:59 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-16 15:59 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 4:24 Amir Goldstein 2015-07-30 4:24 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-30 13:55 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 13:55 ` Seth Forshee 2015-07-30 14:47 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-30 14:47 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-30 15:33 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-30 15:33 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-30 15:52 ` Colin Walters 2015-07-30 15:52 ` Colin Walters 2015-07-30 16:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-30 16:15 ` Eric W. Biederman 2015-07-30 13:57 ` Serge Hallyn 2015-07-30 13:57 ` Serge Hallyn 2015-07-30 15:09 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-30 15:09 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-31 8:11 Amir Goldstein 2015-07-31 8:11 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-07-31 19:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-07-31 19:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2015-08-01 17:01 ` Amir Goldstein 2015-08-01 17:01 ` Amir Goldstein
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