From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"nnk@google.com" <nnk@google.com>,
"jeffv@google.com" <jeffv@google.com>,
"salyzyn@android.com" <salyzyn@android.com>,
"dcashman@android.com" <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 16:51:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5797F78A.2000600@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160726214453.GN4541@io.lakedaemon.net>
On 07/26/2016 02:44 PM, Jason Cooper wrote:
>> > I'd likely need to take a small sample of programs and examine them,
>> > especially considering That as gaps are harder to find, it forces the
>> > randomization down and randomization can Be directly altered with
>> > length on mmap(), versus randomize_addr() which didn't have this
>> > restriction but OOM'd do to fragmented easier.
> Right, after the Android feedback from Nick, I think you have a lot of
> work on your hands. Not just in design, but also in developing convincing
> arguments derived from real use cases.
Why not just have the feature be disabled on 32-bit by default? All of
the Android problems seemed to originate with having a constrained
32-bit address space.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"nnk@google.com" <nnk@google.com>,
"jeffv@google.com" <jeffv@google.com>,
"salyzyn@android.com" <salyzyn@android.com>,
"dcashman@android.com" <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 16:51:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5797F78A.2000600@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160726214453.GN4541@io.lakedaemon.net>
On 07/26/2016 02:44 PM, Jason Cooper wrote:
>> > I'd likely need to take a small sample of programs and examine them,
>> > especially considering That as gaps are harder to find, it forces the
>> > randomization down and randomization can Be directly altered with
>> > length on mmap(), versus randomize_addr() which didn't have this
>> > restriction but OOM'd do to fragmented easier.
> Right, after the Android feedback from Nick, I think you have a lot of
> work on your hands. Not just in design, but also in developing convincing
> arguments derived from real use cases.
Why not just have the feature be disabled on 32-bit by default? All of
the Android problems seemed to originate with having a constrained
32-bit address space.
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"nnk@google.com" <nnk@google.com>,
"jeffv@google.com" <jeffv@google.com>,
"salyzyn@android.com" <salyzyn@android.com>,
"dcashman@android.com" <dcashman@android.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 16:51:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5797F78A.2000600@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160726214453.GN4541@io.lakedaemon.net>
On 07/26/2016 02:44 PM, Jason Cooper wrote:
>> > I'd likely need to take a small sample of programs and examine them,
>> > especially considering That as gaps are harder to find, it forces the
>> > randomization down and randomization can Be directly altered with
>> > length on mmap(), versus randomize_addr() which didn't have this
>> > restriction but OOM'd do to fragmented easier.
> Right, after the Android feedback from Nick, I think you have a lot of
> work on your hands. Not just in design, but also in developing convincing
> arguments derived from real use cases.
Why not just have the feature be disabled on 32-bit by default? All of
the Android problems seemed to originate with having a constrained
32-bit address space.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-26 23:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-26 18:22 [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization william.c.roberts
2016-07-26 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " william.c.roberts
2016-07-26 18:22 ` william.c.roberts
2016-07-26 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " william.c.roberts
2016-07-26 20:03 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 20:11 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:13 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:13 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:59 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 20:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 20:59 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 21:06 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 21:06 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 21:44 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 21:44 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-26 23:51 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2016-07-26 23:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2016-07-26 23:51 ` Dave Hansen
2016-08-02 17:17 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:17 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-03 18:19 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-03 18:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-08-03 18:19 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:15 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:15 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-27 16:59 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-07-27 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Kralevich
2016-07-27 16:59 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-07-28 21:07 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 21:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason Cooper
2016-07-28 21:07 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-29 10:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-07-31 22:24 ` Jason Cooper
2016-07-31 22:24 ` Jason Cooper
2016-08-01 0:24 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 16:57 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 16:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 16:57 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-02 17:02 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-08-02 17:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Kralevich
2016-08-02 17:02 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-08-14 16:31 ` Pavel Machek 1
2016-08-14 16:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek 1
2016-08-14 16:31 ` Pavel Machek 1
2016-07-26 20:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-26 20:17 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:17 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:17 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:41 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-07-26 20:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Kralevich
2016-07-26 21:02 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 21:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 21:11 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-07-26 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Kralevich
2016-07-26 21:11 ` Nick Kralevich
2016-08-14 16:22 ` Pavel Machek
2016-08-14 16:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-08-04 16:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 16:55 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-04 16:55 ` Roberts, William C
2016-08-04 17:10 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-26 18:27 william.c.roberts
2016-07-26 19:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2016-07-26 19:57 ` Roberts, William C
2016-07-26 20:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2016-07-26 20:35 ` Roberts, William C
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=5797F78A.2000600@intel.com \
--to=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dcashman@android.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=jason@lakedaemon.net \
--cc=jeffv@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=nnk@google.com \
--cc=salyzyn@android.com \
--cc=william.c.roberts@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.