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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 15:25:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <891BA2BC-CF94-429C-B452-162EC9A0D6B7@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161121151758.GA1319@wunner.de>


> On 21 Nov 2016, at 15:17, Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:
> 
>> On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 01:14:52PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> On 21 November 2016 at 12:41, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>>> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>>> Looking in efi_get_secureboot(), is there a reason:
>>>>> 
>>>>>        efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
>>>>> 
>>>>> isn't static const?
>>>> 
>>>> Not a good one, no. It used to be static const, but for some reason,
>>>> commit 30d7bf034c03 ("efi/arm64: Check SetupMode when determining
>>>> Secure Boot status") removed the static and the const (and I reviewed
>>>> it and did not complain AFAIR)
>>>> I'll gladly take a patch that reinstates that, though.
>>> 
>>> Also, is there a reason that:
>>> 
>>> typedef efi_status_t efi_get_variable_t (efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *attr,
>>>                                         unsigned long *data_size, void *data);
>>> 
>>> Doesn't have const name and vendor?
>> 
>> Yes, but not a good one either.
>> 
>> Sadly, the prototypes in the UEFI spec completely ignore constness,
>> and these definitions are intended to be identical to the ones in the
>> spec. This also means, for instance, that most UEFI firmwares stores
>> these kinds of GUIDs in read-write memory, which is a potential
>> goldmine for hackers, given how GUIDs are UEFI's duct tape, i.e.,
>> keeping the world together.
> 
> But the spec declares these two parameters as "IN", so it would seem
> legal to declare them const, no?
> 

Good point.

> Incidentally I've already prepared commits a couple of days ago to
> change the GUID declarations to const everywhere and also change the
> get_variable prototype, I was planning to submit them for 4.11... :-)
> 

I would like to take those, provided that they only modify IN pointer arguments.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-21 15:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 15:52           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:25             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 20:36           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:42     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:52       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 12:41       ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:17           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:27   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-22  6:12     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 17:34       ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-28 22:32     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:35         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 14:41         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:25         ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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