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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 21:58:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu_8r3oM-jvvuSiXTzxp0YMEVgc5KkScJ2UhGTaXm28L6w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147933287290.19316.3360403691390019935.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 16 November 2016 at 21:47, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
>
> UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
> for use with efi_enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    1 +
>  include/linux/efi.h     |    1 +
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index 9521acce8378..539f29587712 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>         if (boot_params.secure_boot &&
>             IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
>                 lock_kernel_down();
> +               set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);

Why is this x86 only? And why is this bit only set if
CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN is enabled?

>                 pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
>         }
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index 11372fb8784c..5d7fb3e3400b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1079,6 +1079,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
>  #define EFI_ARCH_1             7       /* First arch-specific bit */
>  #define EFI_DBG                        8       /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
>  #define EFI_NX_PE_DATA         9       /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
> +#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT                10      /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
>  /*
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-17 21:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 15:52           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:25             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 20:36           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:42     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:52       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 12:41       ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:17           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:27   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-22  6:12     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 17:34       ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-28 22:32     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:35         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 14:41         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:25         ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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