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From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:25:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24973.1479829961@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, 2016-11-22 at 15:52 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> wrote:
> 
> > > > Small nit, checkpatch usually complains that this should be written as
> > > > 12-character SHA-1 followed by the commit subject, i.e.
> > > > 
> > > > 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services")
> > > 
> > > In this case, checkpatch is wrong.
> > 
> > Why do you think so?
> 
> Actually, checkpatch doesn't complain about embedded commit IDs anymore, so in
> that case, it's just about acceptable.

checkpatch still emits warnings about the format of
commmit IDs.

What version of checkpatch are yuu using?

> Apart from that, I think we should put in the full SHA-1 commit.  The
> probability of a collision in a 12-digit hex number for the >5,000,000 commits
> just in Linus's tree is currently at ~4.5% and gradually increasing.  Add in
> all the commits in not-yet-upstreamed trees - which might be another million
> commits, say - then we're over 6%..

Umm, no, that's not correct.
SHA-1 lengths of 12 are unique for quite awhile yet.

https://blog.cuviper.com/2013/11/10/how-short-can-git-abbreviate/

Using Linus' tree today, from commit 3b404a519815
the current output of the git-uniq-abbrev script is:

$ git-uniq-abbrev 
5048673 objects
 4: 5048673 / 65536
 5: 5007413 / 998721
 6: 1312496 / 623343
 7: 94487 / 47089
 8: 6163 / 3081
 9: 416 / 208
10: 28 / 14
11: 4 / 2
12: 0 / 0
d597639e2036f04f0226761e2d818b31f2db7820
d597639e203a100156501df8a0756fd09573e2de
ef91b6e893a00d903400f8e1303efc4d52b710af
ef91b6e893afc4c4ca488453ea9f19ced5fa5861

> Oh, yes, and speaking of checkpatch, can you make it so that if it sees:
> 
> commit 12345...
> Author: foo <foo@bar>
> Date: blah
> 
>    Subject line
> 
>    Description lines
>    ...
>    ...
>    ...
>    ...
> 
>    Signed-off-by-and-suchline-lines
> 
> diff ...
> 
> with the all description indented by 4 spaces, then assume that it's the
> output of git show and not give the warnings about signed-off-by and other
> things being indented?

No.  Use --format=email as appropriate instead.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joe Perches <joe-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:25:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24973.1479829961-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>

On Tue, 2016-11-22 at 15:52 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Joe Perches <joe-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> 
> > > > Small nit, checkpatch usually complains that this should be written as
> > > > 12-character SHA-1 followed by the commit subject, i.e.
> > > > 
> > > > 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services")
> > > 
> > > In this case, checkpatch is wrong.
> > 
> > Why do you think so?
> 
> Actually, checkpatch doesn't complain about embedded commit IDs anymore, so in
> that case, it's just about acceptable.

checkpatch still emits warnings about the format of
commmit IDs.

What version of checkpatch are yuu using?

> Apart from that, I think we should put in the full SHA-1 commit.  The
> probability of a collision in a 12-digit hex number for the >5,000,000 commits
> just in Linus's tree is currently at ~4.5% and gradually increasing.  Add in
> all the commits in not-yet-upstreamed trees - which might be another million
> commits, say - then we're over 6%..

Umm, no, that's not correct.
SHA-1 lengths of 12 are unique for quite awhile yet.

https://blog.cuviper.com/2013/11/10/how-short-can-git-abbreviate/

Using Linus' tree today, from commit 3b404a519815
the current output of the git-uniq-abbrev script is:

$ git-uniq-abbrev 
5048673 objects
 4: 5048673 / 65536
 5: 5007413 / 998721
 6: 1312496 / 623343
 7: 94487 / 47089
 8: 6163 / 3081
 9: 416 / 208
10: 28 / 14
11: 4 / 2
12: 0 / 0
d597639e2036f04f0226761e2d818b31f2db7820
d597639e203a100156501df8a0756fd09573e2de
ef91b6e893a00d903400f8e1303efc4d52b710af
ef91b6e893afc4c4ca488453ea9f19ced5fa5861

> Oh, yes, and speaking of checkpatch, can you make it so that if it sees:
> 
> commit 12345...
> Author: foo <foo@bar>
> Date: blah
> 
>    Subject line
> 
>    Description lines
>    ...
>    ...
>    ...
>    ...
> 
>    Signed-off-by-and-suchline-lines
> 
> diff ...
> 
> with the all description indented by 4 spaces, then assume that it's the
> output of git show and not give the warnings about signed-off-by and other
> things being indented?

No.  Use --format=email as appropriate instead.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-22 16:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 15:52           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches [this message]
2016-11-22 16:25             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 20:36           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:42     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:52       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 12:41       ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:17           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:27   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-22  6:12     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 17:34       ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-28 22:32     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:35         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 14:41         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:25         ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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