From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:25:39 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <24973.1479829961@warthog.procyon.org.uk> On Tue, 2016-11-22 at 15:52 +0000, David Howells wrote: > Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> wrote: > > > > > Small nit, checkpatch usually complains that this should be written as > > > > 12-character SHA-1 followed by the commit subject, i.e. > > > > > > > > 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") > > > > > > In this case, checkpatch is wrong. > > > > Why do you think so? > > Actually, checkpatch doesn't complain about embedded commit IDs anymore, so in > that case, it's just about acceptable. checkpatch still emits warnings about the format of commmit IDs. What version of checkpatch are yuu using? > Apart from that, I think we should put in the full SHA-1 commit. The > probability of a collision in a 12-digit hex number for the >5,000,000 commits > just in Linus's tree is currently at ~4.5% and gradually increasing. Add in > all the commits in not-yet-upstreamed trees - which might be another million > commits, say - then we're over 6%.. Umm, no, that's not correct. SHA-1 lengths of 12 are unique for quite awhile yet. https://blog.cuviper.com/2013/11/10/how-short-can-git-abbreviate/ Using Linus' tree today, from commit 3b404a519815 the current output of the git-uniq-abbrev script is: $ git-uniq-abbrev 5048673 objects 4: 5048673 / 65536 5: 5007413 / 998721 6: 1312496 / 623343 7: 94487 / 47089 8: 6163 / 3081 9: 416 / 208 10: 28 / 14 11: 4 / 2 12: 0 / 0 d597639e2036f04f0226761e2d818b31f2db7820 d597639e203a100156501df8a0756fd09573e2de ef91b6e893a00d903400f8e1303efc4d52b710af ef91b6e893afc4c4ca488453ea9f19ced5fa5861 > Oh, yes, and speaking of checkpatch, can you make it so that if it sees: > > commit 12345... > Author: foo <foo@bar> > Date: blah > > Subject line > > Description lines > ... > ... > ... > ... > > Signed-off-by-and-suchline-lines > > diff ... > > with the all description indented by 4 spaces, then assume that it's the > output of git show and not give the warnings about signed-off-by and other > things being indented? No. Use --format=email as appropriate instead.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joe Perches <joe-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org> To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:25:39 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <24973.1479829961-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org> On Tue, 2016-11-22 at 15:52 +0000, David Howells wrote: > Joe Perches <joe-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org> wrote: > > > > > Small nit, checkpatch usually complains that this should be written as > > > > 12-character SHA-1 followed by the commit subject, i.e. > > > > > > > > 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") > > > > > > In this case, checkpatch is wrong. > > > > Why do you think so? > > Actually, checkpatch doesn't complain about embedded commit IDs anymore, so in > that case, it's just about acceptable. checkpatch still emits warnings about the format of commmit IDs. What version of checkpatch are yuu using? > Apart from that, I think we should put in the full SHA-1 commit. The > probability of a collision in a 12-digit hex number for the >5,000,000 commits > just in Linus's tree is currently at ~4.5% and gradually increasing. Add in > all the commits in not-yet-upstreamed trees - which might be another million > commits, say - then we're over 6%.. Umm, no, that's not correct. SHA-1 lengths of 12 are unique for quite awhile yet. https://blog.cuviper.com/2013/11/10/how-short-can-git-abbreviate/ Using Linus' tree today, from commit 3b404a519815 the current output of the git-uniq-abbrev script is: $ git-uniq-abbrev 5048673 objects 4: 5048673 / 65536 5: 5007413 / 998721 6: 1312496 / 623343 7: 94487 / 47089 8: 6163 / 3081 9: 416 / 208 10: 28 / 14 11: 4 / 2 12: 0 / 0 d597639e2036f04f0226761e2d818b31f2db7820 d597639e203a100156501df8a0756fd09573e2de ef91b6e893a00d903400f8e1303efc4d52b710af ef91b6e893afc4c4ca488453ea9f19ced5fa5861 > Oh, yes, and speaking of checkpatch, can you make it so that if it sees: > > commit 12345... > Author: foo <foo@bar> > Date: blah > > Subject line > > Description lines > ... > ... > ... > ... > > Signed-off-by-and-suchline-lines > > diff ... > > with the all description indented by 4 spaces, then assume that it's the > output of git show and not give the warnings about signed-off-by and other > things being indented? No. Use --format=email as appropriate instead.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-22 16:25 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells 2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells 2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2016-11-16 22:20 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-11-16 22:20 ` Borislav Petkov 2016-11-16 22:40 ` David Howells 2016-12-25 21:20 ` Pavel Machek 2016-12-25 21:44 ` David Howells 2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells 2016-11-17 12:37 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells 2016-11-22 0:31 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 10:20 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 10:20 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 14:17 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 14:58 ` Joe Perches 2016-11-22 15:52 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 15:52 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 16:25 ` Joe Perches [this message] 2016-11-22 16:25 ` Joe Perches 2016-11-22 16:40 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 16:51 ` Joe Perches 2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells 2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells 2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells 2016-11-22 10:44 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 10:49 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-22 10:49 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-22 14:47 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 20:30 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-23 0:02 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 14:52 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 14:52 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 20:36 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 20:36 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 14:57 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 14:57 ` David Howells 2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells 2016-11-22 13:03 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells 2016-11-22 13:04 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-21 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells 2016-11-21 11:42 ` David Howells 2016-11-21 11:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-21 11:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-21 12:41 ` David Howells 2016-11-21 12:41 ` David Howells 2016-11-21 13:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-21 15:17 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-21 15:17 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-21 15:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-21 11:46 ` David Howells 2016-11-21 19:58 ` Lukas Wunner 2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells 2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells 2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells 2016-11-17 21:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-18 11:58 ` Josh Boyer 2016-11-18 12:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-18 12:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-18 17:28 ` David Howells 2016-11-18 17:28 ` David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells 2016-11-16 21:49 ` David Howells 2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes 2016-11-16 22:27 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2016-11-21 19:53 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2016-11-30 14:27 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes 2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells 2016-11-22 6:12 ` Dominik Brodowski 2016-11-22 6:12 ` Dominik Brodowski 2016-11-23 12:58 ` David Howells 2016-11-23 19:21 ` Dominik Brodowski 2016-11-24 17:34 ` David Howells 2016-11-24 17:34 ` David Howells 2016-11-24 20:19 ` Dominik Brodowski 2016-11-25 14:49 ` David Howells 2016-11-28 22:32 ` Corey Minyard 2016-11-28 22:32 ` Corey Minyard 2016-11-29 0:11 ` David Howells 2016-11-29 0:23 ` Corey Minyard 2016-11-29 14:03 ` David Howells 2016-11-29 14:35 ` Corey Minyard 2016-11-29 14:35 ` Corey Minyard 2016-11-30 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2016-11-30 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2016-11-30 16:25 ` David Howells 2016-11-30 16:25 ` David Howells 2016-11-29 10:40 ` David Howells
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com \ --to=joe@perches.com \ --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \ --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=lukas@wunner.de \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.