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From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 06/43] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory
Date: Thu,  5 Nov 2020 00:18:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c5c57103083a98975d2af537bf82d178117519b.1604531793.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1604531793.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.

The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse the same
functions. Rename kasan_unpoison_shadow to kasan_unpoison_memory,
and kasan_poison_shadow to kasan_poison_memory.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
Change-Id: Ia359f32815242c4704e49a5f1639ca2d2f8cba69
---
 include/linux/kasan.h |  6 +++---
 kernel/fork.c         |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 mm/kasan/generic.c    | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/tags.c       |  2 +-
 mm/slab_common.c      |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 45345dd5cfd6..bfb21d5fd279 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void);
 /* Disable reporting bugs for current task */
 extern void kasan_disable_current(void);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
 void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
 
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ struct kasan_cache {
 size_t __ksize(const void *);
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
 }
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
 
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 32083db7a2a2..463ef51f2b05 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
 		if (!s)
 			continue;
 
-		/* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+		/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
+		kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
 
 		/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
 		memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 89e5ef9417a7..a4b73fa0dd7e 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
  * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
  * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
  */
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 	__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
 	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
+	kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
 	size_t size = sp - base;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, size);
 }
 
 /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 	 */
 	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 	tag = random_tag();
 	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
 	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+		kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),
 				PAGE_SIZE << order,
 				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 }
@@ -284,18 +284,18 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), page_size(page),
+	kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page), page_size(page),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(object, cache->object_size);
 }
 
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object,
+	kasan_poison_memory(object,
 			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+	kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
 	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
 			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
@@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
 	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
 	return (void *)ptr;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
-		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+		kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 	} else {
 		__kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
 	}
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 	 * // vmalloc() allocates memory
 	 * // let a = area->addr
 	 * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc
-	 * // and call kasan_unpoison_shadow:
+	 * // and call kasan_unpoison_memory:
 	 * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val
 	 * ...
 	 * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val	x = LOAD p
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
 		return;
 
 	size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
+	kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
 	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(start, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(start, size);
 }
 
 static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 37ccfadd3263..7006157c674b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
 {
 	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(global->beg, global->size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(global->beg + aligned_size,
+	kasan_poison_memory(global->beg + aligned_size,
 		global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
 		KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
 }
@@ -285,11 +285,11 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
 
 	WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
+	kasan_unpoison_memory((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
 			      size - rounded_down_size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+	kasan_poison_memory(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
 			KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(right_redzone,
+	kasan_poison_memory(right_redzone,
 			padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
 			KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
 }
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom)
 	if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
 
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index ac499456740f..03450d3b31f7 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
 	return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
 
 /**
  * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
index 5c8b08a25715..4bdd7dbd6647 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
 
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index f9ccd5dc13f3..53d0f8bb57ea 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
 	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
 	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
 	return size;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 06/43] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory
Date: Thu,  5 Nov 2020 00:18:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c5c57103083a98975d2af537bf82d178117519b.1604531793.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1604531793.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.

The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse the same
functions. Rename kasan_unpoison_shadow to kasan_unpoison_memory,
and kasan_poison_shadow to kasan_poison_memory.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
Change-Id: Ia359f32815242c4704e49a5f1639ca2d2f8cba69
---
 include/linux/kasan.h |  6 +++---
 kernel/fork.c         |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 mm/kasan/generic.c    | 12 ++++++------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/tags.c       |  2 +-
 mm/slab_common.c      |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 45345dd5cfd6..bfb21d5fd279 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void);
 /* Disable reporting bugs for current task */
 extern void kasan_disable_current(void);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
 
 void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
 
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ struct kasan_cache {
 size_t __ksize(const void *);
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
 }
 size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
 
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
 
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 32083db7a2a2..463ef51f2b05 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
 		if (!s)
 			continue;
 
-		/* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+		/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
+		kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
 
 		/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
 		memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 89e5ef9417a7..a4b73fa0dd7e 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
  * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
  * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
  */
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 	__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
 }
 
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
 {
 	u8 tag = get_tag(address);
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
+	kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
 	size_t size = sp - base;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, size);
 }
 
 /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 	 */
 	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
 }
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
@@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 	tag = random_tag();
 	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
 }
 
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
 	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+		kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),
 				PAGE_SIZE << order,
 				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 }
@@ -284,18 +284,18 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), page_size(page),
+	kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page), page_size(page),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(object, cache->object_size);
 }
 
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object,
+	kasan_poison_memory(object,
 			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 	}
 
 	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+	kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
 	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
 			unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
@@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
 
 	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 
 	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
 	return (void *)ptr;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
 			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
 			return;
 		}
-		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+		kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
 	} else {
 		__kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
 	}
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 	 * // vmalloc() allocates memory
 	 * // let a = area->addr
 	 * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc
-	 * // and call kasan_unpoison_shadow:
+	 * // and call kasan_unpoison_memory:
 	 * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val
 	 * ...
 	 * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val	x = LOAD p
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
 		return;
 
 	size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
+	kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
 }
 
 void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
 	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(start, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(start, size);
 }
 
 static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 37ccfadd3263..7006157c674b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
 {
 	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(global->beg, global->size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
 
-	kasan_poison_shadow(global->beg + aligned_size,
+	kasan_poison_memory(global->beg + aligned_size,
 		global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
 		KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
 }
@@ -285,11 +285,11 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
 
 	WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
+	kasan_unpoison_memory((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
 			      size - rounded_down_size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+	kasan_poison_memory(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
 			KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(right_redzone,
+	kasan_poison_memory(right_redzone,
 			padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
 			KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
 }
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom)
 	if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))
 		return;
 
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
 
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index ac499456740f..03450d3b31f7 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
 	return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
 }
 
-void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
 
 /**
  * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
index 5c8b08a25715..4bdd7dbd6647 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
 
 void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
 {
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
+	kasan_poison_memory((void *)addr, size, tag);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
 
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index f9ccd5dc13f3..53d0f8bb57ea 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
 	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
 	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size);
+	kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
 	return size;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog


_______________________________________________
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-04 23:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 136+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-04 23:18 [PATCH v8 00/43] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/43] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/43] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/43] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/43] s390/kasan: include asm/page.h from asm/kasan.h Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/43] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2020-11-04 23:18   ` [PATCH v8 06/43] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/43] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/43] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/43] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/43] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/43] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/43] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/43] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/43] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/43] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 16/43] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 17/43] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 15:59   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 15:59     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 18/43] kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 16:00   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 16:00     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 19/43] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 20/43] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 21/43] kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 22/43] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 23/43] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 24/43] kasan, arm64: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 25/43] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 26/43] arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 27/43] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 28/43] arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 15:59   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 15:59     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-06 11:46     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-06 11:46       ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 29/43] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 16:57   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 16:57     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 30/43] arm64: kasan: Allow enabling in-kernel MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 11:16   ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 11:16     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 11:35     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 11:35       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 11:35       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 11:42       ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 11:42         ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 12:14         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 12:14           ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 12:14           ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 14:17           ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 14:17             ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-05 17:27             ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:27               ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:27               ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:25   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:25     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:29     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:29       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:29       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:39       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:39         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 18:09         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 18:09           ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 18:09           ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-06 11:11           ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-06 11:11             ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 31/43] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 32/43] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:30   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:30     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:33     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:33       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:33       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:42   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:42     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 33/43] arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 34/43] arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 35/43] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 36/43] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 37/43] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-05 17:32   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-05 17:32     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 38/43] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:48   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:48     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 39/43] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 40/43] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 41/43] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 42/43] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18 ` [PATCH v8 43/43] kselftest/arm64: Check GCR_EL1 after context switch Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-04 23:18   ` Andrey Konovalov

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