From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 10:44:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFwHUw+6xEc-M+mZvwOxCsBD6zZDwyAQ-a_xupaH8py7cA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160623170352.GA17372@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Let me quote my previous email ;)
>
> And we can't free/nullify it when the parent/debuger reaps a zombie,
> say, mark_oom_victim() expects that get_task_struct() protects
> thread_info as well.
>
> probably we can fix all such users though...
TIF_MEMDIE is indeed a potential problem, but I don't think
mark_oom_victim() is actually problematic.
mark_oom_victim() is called with either "current", or with a victim
that still has its mm and signal pointer (and the task is locked). So
the lifetime is already guaranteed - or that code is already very very
buggy, since it follows tsk->signal and tsk->mm
So as far as I can tell, that's all fine.
That said, by now it would actually in many ways be great if we could
get rid of thread_info entirely. The historical reasons for
thread_info have almost all been subsumed by the percpu area.
The reason for thread_info originally was
- we used to find the task_struct by just masking the stack pointer
(long long ago). When the task struct grew too big, we kept just the
critical pieces and some arch-specific stuff and , called it
"thread_info", and moved the rest to an external allocation and added
the pointer to it.
- the really crticial stuff we didn't want to follow a pointer for,
so things like preempt_count etc were in thread_info
- but they were *so* critical that PeterZ (at my prodding) moved
those things to percpu caches that get updated at schedule time
instead
so these days, thread_info has almost nothing really critical in it
any more. There's the thread-local flags, yes, but they could stay or
easily be moved to the task_struct or get similar per-cpu fixup as
preempt_count did a couple of years ago. The only annoyance is the few
remaining entry code assembly sequences, but I suspect they would
actually become simpler with a per-cpu thing, and with Andy's cleanups
they are pretty insignificant these days. There seems to be exactly
two uses of ASM_THREAD_INFO(TI_flags,.. left.
So I suspect that it would
(a) already be possible to just free the stack and thread info at
release time, because any rcu users will already be doing task_lock()
and check mm etc.
(b) it probably would be a nice cleanup to try to make it even more
obviously safe by just shrinking thread_info more (or even getting rid
of it entirely, but that may be too painful because there are other
architectures that may depend on it more).
I dunno. Looking at what remains of thread_info, it really doesn't
seem very critical.
The thread_info->tsk pointer, that was one of the most critical issues
and the main raison d'être of the thread_info, has been replaced on
x86 by just using the per-cpu "current_task". Yes,.there are probably
more than a few "ti->task" users left for legacy reasons, harking back
to when the thread-info was cheaper to access, but it shouldn't be a
big deal.
Linus
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 10:44:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFwHUw+6xEc-M+mZvwOxCsBD6zZDwyAQ-a_xupaH8py7cA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160623170352.GA17372@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Let me quote my previous email ;)
>
> And we can't free/nullify it when the parent/debuger reaps a zombie,
> say, mark_oom_victim() expects that get_task_struct() protects
> thread_info as well.
>
> probably we can fix all such users though...
TIF_MEMDIE is indeed a potential problem, but I don't think
mark_oom_victim() is actually problematic.
mark_oom_victim() is called with either "current", or with a victim
that still has its mm and signal pointer (and the task is locked). So
the lifetime is already guaranteed - or that code is already very very
buggy, since it follows tsk->signal and tsk->mm
So as far as I can tell, that's all fine.
That said, by now it would actually in many ways be great if we could
get rid of thread_info entirely. The historical reasons for
thread_info have almost all been subsumed by the percpu area.
The reason for thread_info originally was
- we used to find the task_struct by just masking the stack pointer
(long long ago). When the task struct grew too big, we kept just the
critical pieces and some arch-specific stuff and , called it
"thread_info", and moved the rest to an external allocation and added
the pointer to it.
- the really crticial stuff we didn't want to follow a pointer for,
so things like preempt_count etc were in thread_info
- but they were *so* critical that PeterZ (at my prodding) moved
those things to percpu caches that get updated at schedule time
instead
so these days, thread_info has almost nothing really critical in it
any more. There's the thread-local flags, yes, but they could stay or
easily be moved to the task_struct or get similar per-cpu fixup as
preempt_count did a couple of years ago. The only annoyance is the few
remaining entry code assembly sequences, but I suspect they would
actually become simpler with a per-cpu thing, and with Andy's cleanups
they are pretty insignificant these days. There seems to be exactly
two uses of ASM_THREAD_INFO(TI_flags,.. left.
So I suspect that it would
(a) already be possible to just free the stack and thread info at
release time, because any rcu users will already be doing task_lock()
and check mm etc.
(b) it probably would be a nice cleanup to try to make it even more
obviously safe by just shrinking thread_info more (or even getting rid
of it entirely, but that may be too painful because there are other
architectures that may depend on it more).
I dunno. Looking at what remains of thread_info, it really doesn't
seem very critical.
The thread_info->tsk pointer, that was one of the most critical issues
and the main raison d'être of the thread_info, has been replaced on
x86 by just using the per-cpu "current_task". Yes,.there are probably
more than a few "ti->task" users left for legacy reasons, harking back
to when the thread-info was cheaper to access, but it shouldn't be a
big deal.
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-23 17:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 269+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-20 23:43 [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-21 9:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Fleming
2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-21 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:32 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 19:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:44 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 17:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrey Ryabinin
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 4:01 ` [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 4:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 4:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 1:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 6:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 14:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-06 16:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2016-06-23 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 12:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 20:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 2:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-26 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 14:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 20:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-27 10:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 9:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:02 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
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