From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2016 23:02:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFx480bxx7VAmFqdsVGHjoSav4eCvVpcx5ZSpBQuq+=1Mw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUuG0-tGNQ5iAEO2_gaK1eUq7AoALoBeQKcOP8cvxr=eA@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
> I implemented a percpu cache, and it's useless.
>
> When a task goes away, one reference is held until the next RCU grace
> period so that task_struct can be used under RCU (look for
> delayed_put_task_struct).
Yeah, that RCU batching will screw the cache idea.
But isn't it only the "task_struct" that needs that? That's a separate
allocation from the stack, which contains the "thread_info".
I think that what we *could* do is re-use the tread-info within the
RCU grace period, as long as we delay freeing the task_struct.
Yes, yes, we currently tie the task_struct and thread_info lifetimes
together very tightly, but that's a historical thing rather than a
requirement. We do the
account_kernel_stack(tsk->stack, -1);
arch_release_thread_info(tsk->stack);
free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
in free_task(), but I could imagine doing it earlier, and
independently of the RCU-delayed free.
In fact, I think we just do that at exit() time synchronously. The
reference counting of the task_struct() is because a lot of other
threads can have references to the exiting thread (and we have the
tasklist and thread lists that are RCU-traversed), but none of those
other references should ever look at the stack. Or even the
thread-info.
Hmm. I bet it would show some problems, but not be technically
impossible. Especially if we make the thread-info rules be like the
SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU semantics - the allocation may be re-used during
the RCU grace period, but it is going to still exists and be of the
same type.
This sounds very much like something for Oleg Nesterov.
Oleg, what do you think? Would it be reasonable to free the stack and
thread_info synchronously at exit time, clear the pointer (to catch
any odd use), and only RCU-delay the task_struct itself?
That is, after all, what we already do with the VM, semaphores, files,
fs info etc. There's no real reason I see to keep the stack around.
(Obviously, we can't release it in do_exit() itself like we do some of
the other state - it would need to be released after we've scheduled
away to another process' stack, but we already have that TASK_DEAD
handling in finish_task_switch for this exact reason).
Linus
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2016 23:02:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFx480bxx7VAmFqdsVGHjoSav4eCvVpcx5ZSpBQuq+=1Mw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUuG0-tGNQ5iAEO2_gaK1eUq7AoALoBeQKcOP8cvxr=eA@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
> I implemented a percpu cache, and it's useless.
>
> When a task goes away, one reference is held until the next RCU grace
> period so that task_struct can be used under RCU (look for
> delayed_put_task_struct).
Yeah, that RCU batching will screw the cache idea.
But isn't it only the "task_struct" that needs that? That's a separate
allocation from the stack, which contains the "thread_info".
I think that what we *could* do is re-use the tread-info within the
RCU grace period, as long as we delay freeing the task_struct.
Yes, yes, we currently tie the task_struct and thread_info lifetimes
together very tightly, but that's a historical thing rather than a
requirement. We do the
account_kernel_stack(tsk->stack, -1);
arch_release_thread_info(tsk->stack);
free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
in free_task(), but I could imagine doing it earlier, and
independently of the RCU-delayed free.
In fact, I think we just do that at exit() time synchronously. The
reference counting of the task_struct() is because a lot of other
threads can have references to the exiting thread (and we have the
tasklist and thread lists that are RCU-traversed), but none of those
other references should ever look at the stack. Or even the
thread-info.
Hmm. I bet it would show some problems, but not be technically
impossible. Especially if we make the thread-info rules be like the
SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU semantics - the allocation may be re-used during
the RCU grace period, but it is going to still exists and be of the
same type.
This sounds very much like something for Oleg Nesterov.
Oleg, what do you think? Would it be reasonable to free the stack and
thread_info synchronously at exit time, clear the pointer (to catch
any odd use), and only RCU-delay the task_struct itself?
That is, after all, what we already do with the VM, semaphores, files,
fs info etc. There's no real reason I see to keep the stack around.
(Obviously, we can't release it in do_exit() itself like we do some of
the other state - it would need to be released after we've scheduled
away to another process' stack, but we already have that TASK_DEAD
handling in finish_task_switch for this exact reason).
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-23 6:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 269+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-20 23:43 [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-21 9:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Fleming
2016-06-21 9:53 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:46 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:35 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-21 9:54 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-22 7:38 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-21 7:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-06-21 7:30 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:13 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:32 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 19:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:44 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 17:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrey Ryabinin
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20 23:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 4:01 ` [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 4:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 4:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:19 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 1:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 1:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2016-06-23 6:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 6:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 14:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 14:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:19 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-06 16:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-06 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 17:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 18:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 6:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 12:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 12:25 ` Brian Gerst
2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 17:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 20:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-24 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 2:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 2:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-25 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-26 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-26 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 18:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 14:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 14:05 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 15:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 20:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-24 20:22 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-27 10:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Hocko
2016-06-27 10:36 ` Michal Hocko
2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-23 19:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 9:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 18:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:02 ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-21 18:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
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