From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: luto@kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
jmorris@namei.org, Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
jforbes@redhat.com, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, jlee@suse.com,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
Date: Tue, 03 Apr 2018 23:59:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuvqQQ+hidokY5GA7g-yrAs5-358it0cs+m_d4RFDMuB_w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwVUmjZ+Swe9xUdDOEE+EOoaU3dh7BcrH74BOLCi8y_Kw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:55 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote:
> >> Be honest now. It wasn't generally users who clamored for it.
> >
> > If you ask a user whether they want a system that lets an attacker
replace
> > their kernel or one that doesn't, what do you think their answer is
likely
> > to be?
> Goddamnit.
> We both know what the answer will be.
> And it will have *nothing* to do with secure boot.
Right, because they care about outcome rather than mechanism. Secure Boot
is the mechanism we have to make that outcome possible.
> > Again, what is your proposed mechanism for ensuring that off the shelf
> > systems can be configured in a way that makes this possible?
> If you think lockdown is a good idea, and you enabled it, then IT IS
ENABLED.
Ok. So we can build distribution kernels that *always* have this on, and to
turn it off you have to disable Secure Boot and install a different kernel.
Or we can build distribution kernels that only have this on when you're
booting in a context that makes sense, and you can disable it by just
disabling Secure Boot (by running mokutil --disable-validation) and not
have to install a new kernel. Which outcome do you prefer?
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mjg59@google.com (Matthew Garrett)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
Date: Tue, 03 Apr 2018 23:59:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuvqQQ+hidokY5GA7g-yrAs5-358it0cs+m_d4RFDMuB_w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwVUmjZ+Swe9xUdDOEE+EOoaU3dh7BcrH74BOLCi8y_Kw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:55 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:45 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote:
> >> Be honest now. It wasn't generally users who clamored for it.
> >
> > If you ask a user whether they want a system that lets an attacker
replace
> > their kernel or one that doesn't, what do you think their answer is
likely
> > to be?
> Goddamnit.
> We both know what the answer will be.
> And it will have *nothing* to do with secure boot.
Right, because they care about outcome rather than mechanism. Secure Boot
is the mechanism we have to make that outcome possible.
> > Again, what is your proposed mechanism for ensuring that off the shelf
> > systems can be configured in a way that makes this possible?
> If you think lockdown is a good idea, and you enabled it, then IT IS
ENABLED.
Ok. So we can build distribution kernels that *always* have this on, and to
turn it off you have to disable Secure Boot and install a different kernel.
Or we can build distribution kernels that only have this on when you're
booting in a context that makes sense, and you can disable it by just
disabling Secure Boot (by running mokutil --disable-validation) and not
have to install a new kernel. Which outcome do you prefer?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-03 23:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 252+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-30 23:29 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot David Howells
2018-03-30 23:29 ` David Howells
2018-03-31 0:46 ` James Morris
2018-03-31 0:46 ` James Morris
2018-04-03 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 0:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 1:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 1:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 7:06 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 7:06 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 15:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-03 15:41 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-03 16:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 16:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 16:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 16:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 16:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 18:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 18:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-04-03 19:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 19:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 21:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 18:42 ` Peter Jones
2018-04-04 18:42 ` Peter Jones
2018-04-04 20:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-04 20:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-04 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 18:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-05 18:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-06 4:42 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-06 4:42 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-03 17:16 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 17:16 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 19:49 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 19:49 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 21:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 21:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:32 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 22:32 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 22:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 22:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 22:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 22:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 22:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-03 23:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 14:58 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 14:58 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-04 0:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 0:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 0:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-05 17:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 17:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 18:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 18:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 23:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:59 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2018-04-03 23:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 0:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 9:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 9:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 0:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 0:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 0:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 1:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 1:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 4:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 4:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 12:57 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 12:57 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-04-04 13:29 ` Mike Galbraith
2018-04-04 13:29 ` Mike Galbraith
2018-04-04 16:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 22:00 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-04 13:33 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 13:33 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 13:52 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 13:52 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-04 16:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 16:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:46 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 16:46 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-05 0:05 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 0:05 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 0:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 0:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 13:57 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 13:57 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 16:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 16:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 16:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 6:56 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 6:56 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-05 1:28 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 1:28 ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-04 1:30 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 1:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-04 1:36 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 1:36 ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-04 0:17 ` Jann Horn
2018-04-04 0:17 ` Jann Horn
2018-04-04 0:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 0:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 8:05 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 8:05 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 8:05 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 14:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 14:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-04 14:44 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 14:44 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 14:44 ` David Howells
2018-04-04 15:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-04 15:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-03 23:56 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:56 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:56 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:39 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:39 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 23:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 8:23 ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-03 23:12 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:12 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 23:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-03 20:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 20:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:21 ` Al Viro
2018-04-03 21:21 ` Al Viro
2018-04-03 21:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-03 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-03 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 8:10 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-31 10:20 ` David Howells
2018-03-31 10:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-03 13:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-04-03 13:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-04-03 21:48 ` James Morris
2018-04-03 21:48 ` James Morris
2018-04-05 17:53 ` Alan Cox
2018-04-05 17:53 ` Alan Cox
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 0/1] debugfs EPERM fix for 'Kernel lockdown for secure boot' patch series Vasily Gorbik
2018-11-21 12:05 ` [PATCH next-lockdown 1/1] debugfs: avoid EPERM when no open file operation defined Vasily Gorbik
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-04 2:34 [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-04 2:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-04 4:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-04 4:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-04-08 7:44 ` joeyli
2018-04-08 7:44 ` joeyli
2018-04-08 8:07 ` joeyli
2018-04-08 8:07 ` joeyli
2018-04-09 3:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-09 3:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-09 8:14 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-04-09 8:14 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-04-09 13:55 ` joeyli
2018-04-09 13:55 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 16:37 David Howells
2017-10-26 16:37 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 16:37 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 18:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 18:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 18:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 19:20 ` James Morris
2017-10-26 19:20 ` James Morris
2017-10-26 19:20 ` James Morris
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