All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>,
	Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Luke Hinds <lhinds@redhat.com>,
	"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 10:53:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYN1n_x1wUefXEf-4Y+bUZybNAMeD9cirvz4WQnK2E7djw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201013014304.GC41176@linux.intel.com>

On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:13, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:45PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> >
> > Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
> > can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
> > which contains necessary functions of a backend.
> >
> > Also, add a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source
> > in case a platform support multiple trust sources.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>
> This is exactly kind of place where I think static_call() should be
> taken into use, which is a v5.10 feature [1]. For background and
> context, I'd read [2].

This looks like an interesting feature. But I am not sure about the
real benefits that it will provide in case of trusted keys. If we are
looking at it performance wise then I think the gain will be
negligible when compared with slow TPM communication interface (eg.
SPI, I2C) or when compared with context switching involved in TEE.

Also, it requires arch specific support too which currently seems to
be limited to x86 only.

>
> The other thing that I see that does not make much else than additional
> complexity, is trusted_tpm.ko. We can do with one trusted.ko.
>

Current implementation only builds a single trusted.ko module. There
isn't any trusted_tpm.ko.

-Sumit

> I'd also *guess* that the static_call() mechanism does not work accross
> module boundaries.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201012155542.GA3557765@gmail.com/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/815908/
>
> /Jarkko

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>,
	Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
	Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de>,
	Luke Hinds <lhinds@redhat.com>,
	"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 16:23:36 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYN1n_x1wUefXEf-4Y+bUZybNAMeD9cirvz4WQnK2E7djw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201013014304.GC41176@linux.intel.com>

On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:13, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:45PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> >
> > Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
> > can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
> > which contains necessary functions of a backend.
> >
> > Also, add a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source
> > in case a platform support multiple trust sources.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>
> This is exactly kind of place where I think static_call() should be
> taken into use, which is a v5.10 feature [1]. For background and
> context, I'd read [2].

This looks like an interesting feature. But I am not sure about the
real benefits that it will provide in case of trusted keys. If we are
looking at it performance wise then I think the gain will be
negligible when compared with slow TPM communication interface (eg.
SPI, I2C) or when compared with context switching involved in TEE.

Also, it requires arch specific support too which currently seems to
be limited to x86 only.

>
> The other thing that I see that does not make much else than additional
> complexity, is trusted_tpm.ko. We can do with one trusted.ko.
>

Current implementation only builds a single trusted.ko module. There
isn't any trusted_tpm.ko.

-Sumit

> I'd also *guess* that the static_call() mechanism does not work accross
> module boundaries.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201012155542.GA3557765@gmail.com/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/815908/
>
> /Jarkko

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>,
	Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Luke Hinds <lhinds@redhat.com>,
	"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 16:23:36 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYN1n_x1wUefXEf-4Y+bUZybNAMeD9cirvz4WQnK2E7djw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201013014304.GC41176@linux.intel.com>

On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:13, Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:45PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
> > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> >
> > Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
> > can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
> > which contains necessary functions of a backend.
> >
> > Also, add a module parameter in order to select a particular trust source
> > in case a platform support multiple trust sources.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>
> This is exactly kind of place where I think static_call() should be
> taken into use, which is a v5.10 feature [1]. For background and
> context, I'd read [2].

This looks like an interesting feature. But I am not sure about the
real benefits that it will provide in case of trusted keys. If we are
looking at it performance wise then I think the gain will be
negligible when compared with slow TPM communication interface (eg.
SPI, I2C) or when compared with context switching involved in TEE.

Also, it requires arch specific support too which currently seems to
be limited to x86 only.

>
> The other thing that I see that does not make much else than additional
> complexity, is trusted_tpm.ko. We can do with one trusted.ko.
>

Current implementation only builds a single trusted.ko module. There
isn't any trusted_tpm.ko.

-Sumit

> I'd also *guess* that the static_call() mechanism does not work accross
> module boundaries.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201012155542.GA3557765@gmail.com/
> [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/815908/
>
> /Jarkko

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-13 10:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-07 10:07 [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:19 ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07 ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:19   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13  1:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  1:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  1:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 10:53     ` Sumit Garg [this message]
2020-10-13 10:53       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 10:53       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 11:59       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 11:59         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 11:59         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-14  5:04         ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-14  5:16           ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-14  5:04           ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-21  3:21   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-10-21  3:21     ` Mimi Zohar
2020-10-21  5:46     ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-21  5:46       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-21 12:25       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-10-21 12:25         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-10-22 11:40         ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-22 11:40           ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:19   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13  1:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  1:52     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  1:52     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 11:01     ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 11:13       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 11:01       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:19   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:19   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-07 10:07   ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13  2:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  2:21     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13  2:21     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 11:28     ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 11:40       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 11:28       ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-13 13:40       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 13:40         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-13 13:40         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-14  5:06         ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-14  5:18           ` Sumit Garg
2020-10-14  5:06           ` Sumit Garg

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAFA6WYN1n_x1wUefXEf-4Y+bUZybNAMeD9cirvz4WQnK2E7djw@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=sumit.garg@linaro.org \
    --cc=Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=daniel.thompson@linaro.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=janne.karhunen@gmail.com \
    --cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=jens.wiklander@linaro.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lhinds@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.