From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Date: Mon, 08 Jul 2019 12:53:39 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAFA6WYPn3HB6BRocKmKTR+ZPE=Fav5w1TUdRgmLp-NkYobp3rw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Hi Jens, On Thu, 13 Jun 2019 at 16:01, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote: > > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is > an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. > > This series also adds some TEE features like: > > Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE. > Would you like to pick up Patch #1, #2 separately? I think both these patches add independent functionality and also got reviewed-by tags too. -Sumit > Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for > cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access > TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents. > > Rest of the patches from #4 to #7 adds support for TEE based trusted keys. > > This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be > found here [1]. > > Looking forward to your valuable feedback/suggestions. > > [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 > > Sumit Garg (7): > tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm > tee: enable support to register kernel memory > tee: add private login method for kernel clients > KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys > KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys > doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys > MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys > > Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++ > MAINTAINERS | 9 + > drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + > drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + > drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- > include/keys/tee_trusted.h | 84 ++++ > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + > include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 2 + > security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + > security/keys/Makefile | 3 + > security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 10 +- > security/keys/tee_trusted.c | 506 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > 13 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst > create mode 100644 include/keys/tee_trusted.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/tee_trusted.c > > -- > 2.7.4 >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:11:39 +0530 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAFA6WYPn3HB6BRocKmKTR+ZPE=Fav5w1TUdRgmLp-NkYobp3rw@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Hi Jens, On Thu, 13 Jun 2019 at 16:01, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote: > > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is > an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. > > This series also adds some TEE features like: > > Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE. > Would you like to pick up Patch #1, #2 separately? I think both these patches add independent functionality and also got reviewed-by tags too. -Sumit > Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for > cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access > TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents. > > Rest of the patches from #4 to #7 adds support for TEE based trusted keys. > > This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be > found here [1]. > > Looking forward to your valuable feedback/suggestions. > > [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 > > Sumit Garg (7): > tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm > tee: enable support to register kernel memory > tee: add private login method for kernel clients > KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys > KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys > doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys > MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys > > Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++ > MAINTAINERS | 9 + > drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + > drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + > drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- > include/keys/tee_trusted.h | 84 ++++ > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + > include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 2 + > security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + > security/keys/Makefile | 3 + > security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 10 +- > security/keys/tee_trusted.c | 506 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > 13 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst > create mode 100644 include/keys/tee_trusted.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/tee_trusted.c > > -- > 2.7.4 >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-08 12:53 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-06-13 10:30 [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 1/7] tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 15:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-14 5:12 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:24 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 8:15 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-06-14 8:15 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 2/7] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 15:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-14 5:13 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:25 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 8:16 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-06-14 8:16 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 3/7] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-08 15:39 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-08 15:39 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-09 5:56 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-09 5:56 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-09 7:03 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-09 7:03 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-09 9:36 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-09 9:48 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-29 7:08 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-29 7:08 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-29 13:13 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-29 13:25 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 4/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-14 5:43 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:55 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 5/7] KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 15:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 15:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-14 5:37 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:49 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 15:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-14 15:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-13 10:30 ` [RFC 7/7] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for " Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 10:42 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-13 16:40 ` [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Casey Schaufler 2019-06-13 16:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-06-14 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-14 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-14 8:17 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 8:29 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:58 ` Sumit Garg 2019-06-14 5:58 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-08 12:41 ` Sumit Garg [this message] 2019-07-08 12:53 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-08 16:31 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-08 16:31 ` Jens Wiklander 2019-07-09 5:58 ` Sumit Garg 2019-07-09 5:59 ` Sumit Garg
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