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From: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, arjan@linux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 09/11] kallsyms: hide layout and expose seed
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2020 09:51:14 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a915e1eb131551aa766fde4c14de5a3e825af667.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202002060428.08B14F1@keescook>

On Thu, 2020-02-06 at 04:32 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 02:39:48PM -0800, Kristen Carlson Accardi
> wrote:
> > To support finer grained kaslr (fgkaslr), we need to make a couple
> > changes
> > to kallsyms. Firstly, we need to hide our sorted list of symbols,
> > since
> > this will give away our new layout. Secondly, we will export the
> > seed used
> > for randomizing the layout so that it can be used to make a
> > particular
> > layout persist across boots for debug purposes.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  kernel/kallsyms.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c
> > index 136ce049c4ad..432b13a3a033 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kallsyms.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c
> > @@ -698,6 +698,21 @@ const char *kdb_walk_kallsyms(loff_t *pos)
> >  }
> >  #endif	/* CONFIG_KGDB_KDB */
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FG_KASLR
> > +extern const u64 fgkaslr_seed[] __weak;
> > +
> > +static int proc_fgkaslr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> > +{
> > +	seq_printf(m, "%llx\n", fgkaslr_seed[0]);
> > +	seq_printf(m, "%llx\n", fgkaslr_seed[1]);
> > +	seq_printf(m, "%llx\n", fgkaslr_seed[2]);
> > +	seq_printf(m, "%llx\n", fgkaslr_seed[3]);
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +#else
> > +static inline int proc_fgkaslr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) {
> > return 0; }
> > +#endif
> > +
> 
> I'd like to put the fgkaslr seed exposure behind a separate DEBUG
> config, since it shouldn't be normally exposed. As such, its
> infrastructure should be likely extracted from this and the main
> fgkaslr
> patches and added back separately (and maybe it will entirely vanish
> once the RNG is switched to ChaCha20).

OK, sounds reasonable to me.

> 
> >  static const struct file_operations kallsyms_operations = {
> >  	.open = kallsyms_open,
> >  	.read = seq_read,
> > @@ -707,7 +722,20 @@ static const struct file_operations
> > kallsyms_operations = {
> >  
> >  static int __init kallsyms_init(void)
> >  {
> > -	proc_create("kallsyms", 0444, NULL, &kallsyms_operations);
> > +	/*
> > +	 * When fine grained kaslr is enabled, we don't want to
> > +	 * print out the symbols even with zero pointers because
> > +	 * this reveals the randomization order. If fg kaslr is
> > +	 * enabled, make kallsyms available only to privileged
> > +	 * users.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FG_KASLR))
> > +		proc_create("kallsyms", 0444, NULL,
> > &kallsyms_operations);
> > +	else {
> > +		proc_create_single("fgkaslr_seed", 0400, NULL,
> > +					proc_fgkaslr_show);
> > +		proc_create("kallsyms", 0400, NULL,
> > &kallsyms_operations);
> > +	}
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >  device_initcall(kallsyms_init);
> > -- 
> > 2.24.1
> 
> In the past, making kallsyms entirely unreadable seemed to break
> weird
> stuff in userspace. How about having an alternative view that just
> contains a alphanumeric sort of the symbol names (and they will
> continue
> to have zeroed addresses for unprivileged users)?
> 
> Or perhaps we wait to hear about this causing a problem, and deal
> with
> it then? :)
> 

Yeah - I don't know what people want here. Clearly, we can't leave
kallsyms the way it is. Removing it entirely is a pretty fast way to
figure out how people use it though :).



  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-06 17:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 22:39 [RFC PATCH 00/11] Finer grained kernel address space randomization Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 01/11] modpost: Support >64K sections Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:38   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 02/11] x86: tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:39   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 03/11] x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06  1:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 11:48     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 16:58     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 16:58       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 04/11] x86/boot/KASLR: Introduce PRNG for faster shuffling Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06  1:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 15:10   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-07  7:23     ` Jean-Philippe Aumasson
2020-02-07  9:05       ` Kees Cook
2020-02-07 16:52         ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-07 16:52           ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 05/11] x86: Makefile: Add build and config option for CONFIG_FG_KASLR Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 10:30   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 11:52     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 17:55   ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-26 19:13     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-26 19:13       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-24 21:24     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-24 21:24       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-25 15:34       ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 06/11] x86: make sure _etext includes function sections Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:26   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 13:15     ` Jann Horn
2020-02-06 13:15       ` Jann Horn
2020-02-06 16:27       ` David Laight
2020-02-06 14:39     ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 15:29       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 16:11         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 14:57     ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 15:45       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 19:41     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 19:41       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 20:02       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-07  9:24         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-10  1:43           ` Kees Cook
2020-02-10 10:51             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-10 15:54               ` Arjan van de Ven
2020-02-10 16:36                 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-21 19:50                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-02-21 23:05                     ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 07/11] x86/tools: Adding relative relocs for randomized functions Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:37   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 08/11] x86: Add support for finer grained KASLR Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06  1:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06  1:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-06 11:56     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 17:36       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 17:36         ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 10:38   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 12:06     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 14:52       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 17:25         ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 17:25           ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 17:35           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-06 17:43             ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 17:43               ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-25 17:49   ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-26 19:26     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-26 19:26       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 09/11] kallsyms: hide layout and expose seed Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:32   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 17:51     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi [this message]
2020-02-06 17:51       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 19:27       ` Jann Horn
2020-02-06 19:27         ` Jann Horn
2020-03-02 19:01         ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-02 19:08           ` Kees Cook
2020-03-02 19:19             ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-03-02 19:19               ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-27  2:42       ` Baoquan He
2020-02-27 16:02         ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28  3:36           ` Baoquan He
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 10/11] module: Reorder functions Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 12:41   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-11 12:39     ` Jessica Yu
2020-02-06 22:15   ` kbuild test robot
2020-02-06 23:58   ` kbuild test robot
2020-02-05 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH 11/11] x86/boot: Move "boot heap" out of .bss Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06  0:11   ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06  0:33     ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06  0:33       ` Kristen Carlson Accardi
2020-02-06 11:13     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-06 14:25       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-06 21:32         ` Kees Cook

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