[PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace

All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Martin Schwidefsky
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2016 14:02:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
 arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
	Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2016 14:02:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
 arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Martin
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2016 14:02:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
 arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)

From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2016 14:02:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
 arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2016 14:02:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
---
 arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8c6d2f2fefa3..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 		return -1;
-
-	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
-		if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
-			regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
 	if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
 
-- 
2.7.4


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

next prev parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-09 21:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-09 21:01 [PATCH 00/14] run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 01/14] seccomp: add tests for ptrace hole Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 02/14] seccomp: Add a seccomp_data parameter secure_computing() Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 03/14] x86/entry: Get rid of two-phase syscall entry work Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 04/14] seccomp: remove 2-phase API Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 22:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 06/14] x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 22:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-10  2:01     ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10  2:01       ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10  2:01       ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10  2:01       ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10  2:01       ` Kees Cook
2016-06-14  2:27     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14  2:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14  2:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14  2:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14  2:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 09/14] MIPS/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 11/14] s390/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 10:51   ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-10 10:51     ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-10 10:51     ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 12/14] powerpc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-06-09 21:02   ` [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 14/14] um/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` [PATCH 00/14] " Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50   ` Kees Cook

find likely ancestor, descendant, or conflicting patches for this message:
dfblob:8c6d2f2fefa dfblob:8c6d2f2fefa dfblob:8c6d2f2fefa
dfblob:8c6d2f2fefa dfblob:8c6d2f2fefa dfblob:d89b7011667
dfblob:d89b7011667 dfblob:d89b7011667 dfblob:d89b7011667
dfblob:d89b7011667
	(help)

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1465506124-21866-14-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=cmetcalf@mellanox.com \
    --cc=deller@gmx.de \
    --cc=heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=james.hogan@imgtec.com \
    --cc=jdike@addtoit.com \
    --cc=jejb@parisc-linux.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mips@linux-mips.org \
    --cc=linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=paulus@samba.org \
    --cc=ralf@linux-mips.org \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.