From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux MIPS Mailing List <linux-mips@linux-mips.org>,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 15:46:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUsqr3YbD=5mA9mRmgYqiHeEoLpWi-teyexUo_jR1BaFA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
> should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
> to make sure things continue to pass.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 14a37d71b612..54d15eb2b701 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> + const bool recheck_after_trace)
This patch looks good with one minor nit: I read this as "pass true if
you want to recheck after trace", which is exactly the opposite of how
it works.
--Andy
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux MIPS Mailing List <linux-mips@linux-mips.org>,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net"
<user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 15:46:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUsqr3YbD=5mA9mRmgYqiHeEoLpWi-teyexUo_jR1BaFA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
> should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
> to make sure things continue to pass.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 14a37d71b612..54d15eb2b701 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> + const bool recheck_after_trace)
This patch looks good with one minor nit: I read this as "pass true if
you want to recheck after trace", which is exactly the opposite of how
it works.
--Andy
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux MIPS Mailing List <linux-mips@linux-mips.org>,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 15:46:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUsqr3YbD=5mA9mRmgYqiHeEoLpWi-teyexUo_jR1BaFA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
> should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
> to make sure things continue to pass.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 14a37d71b612..54d15eb2b701 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> + const bool recheck_after_trace)
This patch looks good with one minor nit: I read this as "pass true if
you want to recheck after trace", which is exactly the opposite of how
it works.
--Andy
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux MIPS Mailing List <linux-mips@linux-mips.org>,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"linux-s390@vger.kernel.org" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net"
<user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 15:46:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUsqr3YbD=5mA9mRmgYqiHeEoLpWi-teyexUo_jR1BaFA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20160609224610.h_g6aSO7UDZiprO3Vkxs_u-fJlZgCYtPcNQ1UmrJn1Q@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
> should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
> to make sure things continue to pass.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 14a37d71b612..54d15eb2b701 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> + const bool recheck_after_trace)
This patch looks good with one minor nit: I read this as "pass true if
you want to recheck after trace", which is exactly the opposite of how
it works.
--Andy
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: luto@amacapital.net (Andy Lutomirski)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 15:46:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUsqr3YbD=5mA9mRmgYqiHeEoLpWi-teyexUo_jR1BaFA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> When RET_TRACE triggers, a tracer may change a syscall into something that
> should be filtered by seccomp. This re-runs seccomp after a trace event
> to make sure things continue to pass.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 14a37d71b612..54d15eb2b701 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> + const bool recheck_after_trace)
This patch looks good with one minor nit: I read this as "pass true if
you want to recheck after trace", which is exactly the opposite of how
it works.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-09 22:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-09 21:01 [PATCH 00/14] run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 01/14] seccomp: add tests for ptrace hole Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 02/14] seccomp: Add a seccomp_data parameter secure_computing() Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 03/14] x86/entry: Get rid of two-phase syscall entry work Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 04/14] seccomp: remove 2-phase API Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 06/14] x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 09/14] MIPS/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 11/14] s390/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-10 10:51 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-10 10:51 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-10 10:51 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 12/14] powerpc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 14/14] um/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` [PATCH 00/14] " Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` Kees Cook
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