From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 18:46:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1473788797-10879-8-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1473788797-10879-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This patch adds the Kconfig option to enable support for TTBR0 PAN
emulation. The option is default off because of a slight performance hit
when enabled, caused by the additional TTBR0_EL1 switching during user
access operations or exception entry/exit code.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index bc3f00f586f1..3640f9ffcc1e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -785,6 +785,14 @@ config SETEND_EMULATION
If unsure, say Y
endif
+config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+ bool "Emulate Priviledged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
+ help
+ Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
+ user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
+ zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines
+ restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily.
+
menu "ARMv8.1 architectural features"
config ARM64_HW_AFDBM
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 18:46:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1473788797-10879-8-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1473788797-10879-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This patch adds the Kconfig option to enable support for TTBR0 PAN
emulation. The option is default off because of a slight performance hit
when enabled, caused by the additional TTBR0_EL1 switching during user
access operations or exception entry/exit code.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index bc3f00f586f1..3640f9ffcc1e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -785,6 +785,14 @@ config SETEND_EMULATION
If unsure, say Y
endif
+config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+ bool "Emulate Priviledged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
+ help
+ Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
+ user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
+ zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines
+ restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily.
+
menu "ARMv8.1 architectural features"
config ARM64_HW_AFDBM
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-13 17:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-13 17:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:10 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 15:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:19 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 15:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 20:45 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-13 20:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-14 8:52 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 8:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 16:45 ` Will Deacon
2016-09-14 16:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-16 11:33 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-16 11:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-16 15:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-16 15:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 10:13 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:36 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:48 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-14 20:54 ` David Brown
2016-09-15 9:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 9:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 16:20 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 16:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 16:41 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-29 22:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2016-09-29 22:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2016-09-30 18:42 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-30 18:42 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 14:54 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-27 14:54 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-27 21:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 21:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-14 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-14 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-15 14:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-15 14:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-10-16 2:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-16 2:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
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