From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 13:17:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1495829844-69341-19-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1495829844-69341-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> This enables the automatic structure selection logic in the randstruct GCC plugin. The selection logic randomizes all structures that contain only function pointers, unless marked with __no_randomize_layout. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- arch/Kconfig | 12 +++++++----- scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 3 --- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 3eac97a4c7b3..f4597dbd0631 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -448,11 +448,13 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT depends on GCC_PLUGINS select MODVERSIONS if MODULES help - If you say Y here, the layouts of structures explicitly - marked by __randomize_layout will be randomized at - compile-time. This can introduce the requirement of an - additional information exposure vulnerability for exploits - targeting these structure types. + If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely + function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with + __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly + marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time. + This can introduce the requirement of an additional information + exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure + types. Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact, slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c index e6e02a40d522..bb2c6789c4b7 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c @@ -437,9 +437,6 @@ static int is_pure_ops_struct(const_tree node) gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(node) == RECORD_TYPE || TREE_CODE(node) == UNION_TYPE); - /* XXX: Do not apply randomization to all-ftpr structs yet. */ - return 0; - for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(node); field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field)) { const_tree fieldtype = get_field_type(field); enum tree_code code = TREE_CODE(fieldtype); -- 2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 13:17:22 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1495829844-69341-19-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1495829844-69341-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> This enables the automatic structure selection logic in the randstruct GCC plugin. The selection logic randomizes all structures that contain only function pointers, unless marked with __no_randomize_layout. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- arch/Kconfig | 12 +++++++----- scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 3 --- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 3eac97a4c7b3..f4597dbd0631 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -448,11 +448,13 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT depends on GCC_PLUGINS select MODVERSIONS if MODULES help - If you say Y here, the layouts of structures explicitly - marked by __randomize_layout will be randomized at - compile-time. This can introduce the requirement of an - additional information exposure vulnerability for exploits - targeting these structure types. + If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely + function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with + __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly + marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time. + This can introduce the requirement of an additional information + exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure + types. Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact, slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c index e6e02a40d522..bb2c6789c4b7 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c @@ -437,9 +437,6 @@ static int is_pure_ops_struct(const_tree node) gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(node) == RECORD_TYPE || TREE_CODE(node) == UNION_TYPE); - /* XXX: Do not apply randomization to all-ftpr structs yet. */ - return 0; - for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(node); field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field)) { const_tree fieldtype = get_field_type(field); enum tree_code code = TREE_CODE(fieldtype); -- 2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-27 1:12 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-05-26 20:17 [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:53 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 16:55 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 16:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6 Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-29 22:08 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-29 22:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-29 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-29 22:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 0:04 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-30 0:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 7:35 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 7:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 7:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-06-30 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-06-30 8:27 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 8:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 14:41 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-30 14:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 15:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:41 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 22:04 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-27 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-27 22:04 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-28 0:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 0:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 0:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-30 10:34 ` James Morris 2017-05-30 10:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris 2017-05-30 10:34 ` James Morris 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:20 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:56 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 8:12 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 8:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 16:59 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-19 19:24 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-19 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-09-07 7:20 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-07 7:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-07 22:55 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 8:15 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 8:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 17:35 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:35 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:42 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 4:55 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 4:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:44 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] drm/amdgpu: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] drm/amd/powerplay: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:47 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:10 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] mtk-vcodec: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] ntfs: Use ERR_CAST() to avoid cross-structure cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] ocfs2: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-05-26 20:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2017-05-26 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] ACPICA: Use designated initializers Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:45 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
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