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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 13:23:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFzQA+W_t1-7UaQtiEY3MJQ0cRP0r3AJi5qOum_9zb_3sA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1495829844-69341-20-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 1:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
> thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
> untouched at the end.

I think you want to abstract this out somehow, because this is both
ugly and bad:

> +       /* This begins the randomizable portion of task_struct... */
> +#if GCC_VERSION >= 40600
> +       struct {
> +#endif

when you could instead just introduce something like

#if GCC_VERSION >= 40600
  #define randomized_struct_fields_start struct {
  #define randomized_struct_fields_end } __randomize_layout;
#else
  #define randomized_struct_fields_start
  #define randomized_struct_fields_end
#endif

and then this pattern is
 (a) more-or-less self-documenting
 (b) usable in other places too.
 (c) maybe some future compiler wants that struct field to have some
"randomize-me attribute" or something

Hmm?

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 13:23:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFzQA+W_t1-7UaQtiEY3MJQ0cRP0r3AJi5qOum_9zb_3sA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1495829844-69341-20-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 1:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This marks most of the layout of task_struct as randomizable, but leaves
> thread_info and scheduler state untouched at the start, and thread_struct
> untouched at the end.

I think you want to abstract this out somehow, because this is both
ugly and bad:

> +       /* This begins the randomizable portion of task_struct... */
> +#if GCC_VERSION >= 40600
> +       struct {
> +#endif

when you could instead just introduce something like

#if GCC_VERSION >= 40600
  #define randomized_struct_fields_start struct {
  #define randomized_struct_fields_end } __randomize_layout;
#else
  #define randomized_struct_fields_start
  #define randomized_struct_fields_end
#endif

and then this pattern is
 (a) more-or-less self-documenting
 (b) usable in other places too.
 (c) maybe some future compiler wants that struct field to have some
"randomize-me attribute" or something

Hmm?

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-27  1:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-26 20:17 [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  7:53     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 16:55     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 16:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6 Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-29 22:08   ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-29 22:08     ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-29 22:53     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-29 22:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-30  0:04       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-30  0:04         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-30  7:35       ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30  7:35         ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30  7:55         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-06-30  7:55           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-06-30  8:27           ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30  8:27             ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30 14:41             ` Kees Cook
2017-06-30 14:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-30 15:22               ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-06-30 15:22                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:41   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27  8:41     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:09     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-27 20:09       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-27 20:09       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-27 22:04       ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:04         ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:04         ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  0:43         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  0:43           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28  0:43           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-30 10:34       ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:34         ` James Morris
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:56   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  7:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  8:12   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  8:12     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 16:59     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 16:59       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 19:24       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 19:24         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-09-07  7:20         ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-07  7:20           ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-07 22:55           ` Kees Cook
2017-09-07 22:55             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  8:15   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  8:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28 17:35     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:35       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:35       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:37     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 17:37       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:42   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27  8:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:03     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-27 20:03       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  4:55       ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  4:55         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:44   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27  8:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] drm/amdgpu: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] drm/amd/powerplay: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-27  8:47   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27  8:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-27 20:10     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-27 20:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] mtk-vcodec: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] ntfs: Use ERR_CAST() to avoid cross-structure cast Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] ocfs2: " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:23   ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2017-05-26 20:23     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-05-26 20:32     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:32       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] ACPICA: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-05-26 20:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  7:45   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-28  7:45     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig

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