From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@kernel.org
To: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, paul.walmsley@sifive.com,
palmer@dabbelt.com, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, guoren@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 22:50:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166812061618.32242.11997902319930265840.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221029113450.4027-1-jszhang@kernel.org>
Hello:
This patch was applied to riscv/linux.git (fixes)
by Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>:
On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 19:34:50 +0800 you wrote:
> thread_struct's s[12] may contain random kernel memory content, which
> may be finally leaked to userspace. This is a security hole. Fix it
> by clearing the s[12] array in thread_struct when fork.
>
> As for kthread case, it's better to clear the s[12] array as well.
>
> Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
> Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage
https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/6510c78490c4
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@kernel.org
To: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, paul.walmsley@sifive.com,
palmer@dabbelt.com, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, guoren@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 22:50:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166812061618.32242.11997902319930265840.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221029113450.4027-1-jszhang@kernel.org>
Hello:
This patch was applied to riscv/linux.git (fixes)
by Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>:
On Sat, 29 Oct 2022 19:34:50 +0800 you wrote:
> thread_struct's s[12] may contain random kernel memory content, which
> may be finally leaked to userspace. This is a security hole. Fix it
> by clearing the s[12] array in thread_struct when fork.
>
> As for kthread case, it's better to clear the s[12] array as well.
>
> Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
> Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage
https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/6510c78490c4
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-10 22:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-29 11:34 [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage Jisheng Zhang
2022-10-29 11:34 ` Jisheng Zhang
2022-10-30 0:03 ` Guo Ren
2022-10-30 0:03 ` Guo Ren
2022-10-31 19:14 ` Conor Dooley
2022-10-31 19:14 ` Conor Dooley
2022-11-10 22:45 ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-11-10 22:45 ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-11-10 22:50 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv [this message]
2022-11-10 22:50 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv
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