From: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> To: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2022 08:03:33 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAJF2gTSqUtU77HvEsQi8+akod4Fn1pEe2REH2nae39dK2VsacA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20221029113450.4027-1-jszhang@kernel.org> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 7:44 PM Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> wrote: > > thread_struct's s[12] may contain random kernel memory content, which > may be finally leaked to userspace. This is a security hole. Fix it > by clearing the s[12] array in thread_struct when fork. > > As for kthread case, it's better to clear the s[12] array as well. > > Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation") > Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> > --- > > Previously, it's one of the series of "riscv: entry: further clean up > and VMAP_STACK fix". This is a fix, so I move it out of the series and > send it separately > > arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > index ceb9ebab6558..52002d54b163 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > @@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) > unsigned long tls = args->tls; > struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p); > > + memset(&p->thread.s, 0, sizeof(p->thread.s)); Tested-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> > + > /* p->thread holds context to be restored by __switch_to() */ > if (unlikely(args->fn)) { > /* Kernel thread */ > -- > 2.37.2 > -- Best Regards Guo Ren
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> To: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2022 08:03:33 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAJF2gTSqUtU77HvEsQi8+akod4Fn1pEe2REH2nae39dK2VsacA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20221029113450.4027-1-jszhang@kernel.org> On Sat, Oct 29, 2022 at 7:44 PM Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> wrote: > > thread_struct's s[12] may contain random kernel memory content, which > may be finally leaked to userspace. This is a security hole. Fix it > by clearing the s[12] array in thread_struct when fork. > > As for kthread case, it's better to clear the s[12] array as well. > > Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation") > Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> > --- > > Previously, it's one of the series of "riscv: entry: further clean up > and VMAP_STACK fix". This is a fix, so I move it out of the series and > send it separately > > arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > index ceb9ebab6558..52002d54b163 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c > @@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) > unsigned long tls = args->tls; > struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p); > > + memset(&p->thread.s, 0, sizeof(p->thread.s)); Tested-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> > + > /* p->thread holds context to be restored by __switch_to() */ > if (unlikely(args->fn)) { > /* Kernel thread */ > -- > 2.37.2 > -- Best Regards Guo Ren _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-30 0:03 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2022-10-29 11:34 [PATCH] riscv: process: fix kernel info leakage Jisheng Zhang 2022-10-29 11:34 ` Jisheng Zhang 2022-10-30 0:03 ` Guo Ren [this message] 2022-10-30 0:03 ` Guo Ren 2022-10-31 19:14 ` Conor Dooley 2022-10-31 19:14 ` Conor Dooley 2022-11-10 22:45 ` Palmer Dabbelt 2022-11-10 22:45 ` Palmer Dabbelt 2022-11-10 22:50 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv 2022-11-10 22:50 ` patchwork-bot+linux-riscv
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