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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2011 14:17:24 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110622101724.GA4278@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110622064545.GA3605@albatros>

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 10:45 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> More generic solution (I'm not suggesting it, but merely discussing)
> would use some user-supplied set of files to restrict access to (or,
> better, the set of allowed files because white list is almost always
> better than black list).  Maybe this one:
> 
>     mount -t proc -o "pid_allow=exe,status,comm,oom_*" proc /proc
> 
> And without pid_allow it would behave like pid_allow=*.

>  "pid_allow=."
> would deny access to the whole /proc/PID.

I mean "pid_allow=", of course.

> This would be a bit inconsistent with current permissions because e.g.
> if use pid_allow=environ then environ file would not be accessible
> because of posix permissions.  Hierarchical mode (pid_allow=fd/1) is not
> allowed too.

For hierarchical mode: attr_allowed, tgid_allowed, tid_allowed.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2011 14:17:24 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110622101724.GA4278@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110622064545.GA3605@albatros>

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 10:45 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> More generic solution (I'm not suggesting it, but merely discussing)
> would use some user-supplied set of files to restrict access to (or,
> better, the set of allowed files because white list is almost always
> better than black list).  Maybe this one:
> 
>     mount -t proc -o "pid_allow=exe,status,comm,oom_*" proc /proc
> 
> And without pid_allow it would behave like pid_allow=*.

>  "pid_allow=."
> would deny access to the whole /proc/PID.

I mean "pid_allow=", of course.

> This would be a bit inconsistent with current permissions because e.g.
> if use pid_allow=environ then environ file would not be accessible
> because of posix permissions.  Hierarchical mode (pid_allow=fd/1) is not
> allowed too.

For hierarchical mode: attr_allowed, tgid_allowed, tid_allowed.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  reply	other threads:[~2011-06-22 10:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-15 18:51 [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-15 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16  8:50 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16  8:50   ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16  8:58   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16  8:58     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 11:40     ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 11:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 13:33       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 13:33         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-10-30 17:09       ` richard -rw- weinberger
2011-10-30 17:09         ` [kernel-hardening] " richard -rw- weinberger
2011-06-21 22:31 ` Andrew Morton
2011-06-21 22:31   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-06-22  6:45   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22  6:45     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 10:17     ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-06-22 10:17       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 11:25       ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-07-06 11:25         ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan

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