All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 18:09:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFLxGvxSBV9yF2AjXR5A3e-yLDXqMpS+GUFip1JhtzUc5Q0org@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de>

On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 12:40 PM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Thursday 16 June 2011, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
>> > I have no opinion on whether it's a good idea to include the feature or not.
>>
>> Why not?  Have you some specific complains where it can be perhaps too
>> strong/insufficient/non-configurable?
>
> No, not at all. I just haven't had the need for this myself, and I'm not
> enough of a security person to judge whether the vulnerability addressed
> by the patch is a relevant one. E.g. if all the sensitive information
> you are hiding in procfs is still available through netlink, your patch
> is pointless. Similarly if there is no recorded case of an attack that
> relies on any of the information in procfs.
>

Is this interface somewhere documented?
IOW how is it possible to get all processes via netlink?

-- 
Thanks,
//richard

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 18:09:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFLxGvxSBV9yF2AjXR5A3e-yLDXqMpS+GUFip1JhtzUc5Q0org@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201106161340.16117.arnd@arndb.de>

On Thu, Jun 16, 2011 at 12:40 PM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Thursday 16 June 2011, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
>> > I have no opinion on whether it's a good idea to include the feature or not.
>>
>> Why not?  Have you some specific complains where it can be perhaps too
>> strong/insufficient/non-configurable?
>
> No, not at all. I just haven't had the need for this myself, and I'm not
> enough of a security person to judge whether the vulnerability addressed
> by the patch is a relevant one. E.g. if all the sensitive information
> you are hiding in procfs is still available through netlink, your patch
> is pointless. Similarly if there is no recorded case of an attack that
> relies on any of the information in procfs.
>

Is this interface somewhere documented?
IOW how is it possible to get all processes via netlink?

-- 
Thanks,
//richard

  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-10-30 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-15 18:51 [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-15 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16  8:50 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16  8:50   ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16  8:58   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16  8:58     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 11:40     ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 11:40       ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 13:33       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 13:33         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-10-30 17:09       ` richard -rw- weinberger [this message]
2011-10-30 17:09         ` richard -rw- weinberger
2011-06-21 22:31 ` Andrew Morton
2011-06-21 22:31   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-06-22  6:45   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22  6:45     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 10:17     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 10:17       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 11:25       ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-07-06 11:25         ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAFLxGvxSBV9yF2AjXR5A3e-yLDXqMpS+GUFip1JhtzUc5Q0org@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=richard.weinberger@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=gregkh@suse.de \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=segoon@openwall.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.