From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 15:57:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160510135758.GA16783@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160510134358.GR2839@codeblueprint.co.uk>
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 02:43:58PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> Is it not possible to maintain some kind of kernel virtual address
> mapping so memremap*() and friends can figure out when to twiddle the
> mapping attributes and map with/without encryption?
I guess we can move the sme_* specific stuff one indirection layer
below, i.e., in the *memremap() routines so that callers don't have to
care... That should keep the churn down...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
To: Matt Fleming <matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro-zLv9SwRftAIdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk"
<konrad.wilk-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini"
<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 15:57:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160510135758.GA16783@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160510134358.GR2839-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 02:43:58PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> Is it not possible to maintain some kind of kernel virtual address
> mapping so memremap*() and friends can figure out when to twiddle the
> mapping attributes and map with/without encryption?
I guess we can move the sme_* specific stuff one indirection layer
below, i.e., in the *memremap() routines so that callers don't have to
care... That should keep the churn down...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 15:57:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160510135758.GA16783@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160510134358.GR2839@codeblueprint.co.uk>
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 02:43:58PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> Is it not possible to maintain some kind of kernel virtual address
> mapping so memremap*() and friends can figure out when to twiddle the
> mapping attributes and map with/without encryption?
I guess we can move the sme_* specific stuff one indirection layer
below, i.e., in the *memremap() routines so that callers don't have to
care... That should keep the churn down...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-10 13:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 227+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 7:17 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 16:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30 6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-26 22:45 Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
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