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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 10:16:12 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <575ECE3C.5030600@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160613120322.GA2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>

On 06/13/2016 07:03 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Jun, at 11:16:40AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
>> (initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
>> be added later as needed.
>  
> Sure, that works for me, though maybe BOOT_DATA would be more
> applicable considering the devicetree case too.
> 
>> Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
>> by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
>> In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
>> that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
> 
> Would we need a new function? Couldn't we just have a new
> FIXMAP_PAGE_* constant? e.g. would something like this work?

Looking forward to the virtualization support (SEV), the VM will be
completely encrypted from the time it is started. In this case all of
the UEFI data will be encrypted and I would need to insure that the
mapping reflects that. When I do the SEV patches, I can change the
FIXMAP #define to add some logic to return a value, so I think the
FIXMAP_PAGE_ idea can work.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> 
> enum memremap_owner {
> 	KERNEL_DATA = 0,
> 	BOOT_DATA,
> };
> 
> void __init *
> early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> 	       enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> 	pgprot_t prot;
> 
> 	switch (owner) {
> 	case BOOT_DATA:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_BOOT;
> 		break;
> 	case KERNEL_DATA:	/* FALLTHROUGH */
> 	default:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL;
> 		
> 	}
> 
> 	return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
> }
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 10:16:12 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <575ECE3C.5030600@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160613120322.GA2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>

On 06/13/2016 07:03 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Jun, at 11:16:40AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
>> (initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
>> be added later as needed.
>  
> Sure, that works for me, though maybe BOOT_DATA would be more
> applicable considering the devicetree case too.
> 
>> Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
>> by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
>> In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
>> that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
> 
> Would we need a new function? Couldn't we just have a new
> FIXMAP_PAGE_* constant? e.g. would something like this work?

Looking forward to the virtualization support (SEV), the VM will be
completely encrypted from the time it is started. In this case all of
the UEFI data will be encrypted and I would need to insure that the
mapping reflects that. When I do the SEV patches, I can change the
FIXMAP #define to add some logic to return a value, so I think the
FIXMAP_PAGE_ idea can work.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> 
> enum memremap_owner {
> 	KERNEL_DATA = 0,
> 	BOOT_DATA,
> };
> 
> void __init *
> early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> 	       enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> 	pgprot_t prot;
> 
> 	switch (owner) {
> 	case BOOT_DATA:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_BOOT;
> 		break;
> 	case KERNEL_DATA:	/* FALLTHROUGH */
> 	default:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL;
> 		
> 	}
> 
> 	return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
> }
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 10:16:12 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <575ECE3C.5030600@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160613120322.GA2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>

On 06/13/2016 07:03 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Jun, at 11:16:40AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
>> (initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
>> be added later as needed.
>  
> Sure, that works for me, though maybe BOOT_DATA would be more
> applicable considering the devicetree case too.
> 
>> Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
>> by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
>> In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
>> that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
> 
> Would we need a new function? Couldn't we just have a new
> FIXMAP_PAGE_* constant? e.g. would something like this work?

Looking forward to the virtualization support (SEV), the VM will be
completely encrypted from the time it is started. In this case all of
the UEFI data will be encrypted and I would need to insure that the
mapping reflects that. When I do the SEV patches, I can change the
FIXMAP #define to add some logic to return a value, so I think the
FIXMAP_PAGE_ idea can work.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> 
> enum memremap_owner {
> 	KERNEL_DATA = 0,
> 	BOOT_DATA,
> };
> 
> void __init *
> early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> 	       enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> 	pgprot_t prot;
> 
> 	switch (owner) {
> 	case BOOT_DATA:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_BOOT;
> 		break;
> 	case KERNEL_DATA:	/* FALLTHROUGH */
> 	default:
> 		prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL;
> 		
> 	}
> 
> 	return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
> }
> 

--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-06-13 15:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 227+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:00   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:21     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01   ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:01     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:17       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:30         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:41             ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07             ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:07               ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 17:12               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03   ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:03     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 16:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43   ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43     ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43     ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 13:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 13:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-12 18:20         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09           ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09             ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09             ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30           ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30             ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30             ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07               ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07                 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07                 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 16:16                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 16:16                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03                   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03                     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03                     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16                     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-06-13 15:16                       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 15:16                       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 18:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 13:51         ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51             ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-17 15:51               ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29  7:17   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 15:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 15:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 16:27       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 23:49         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10   ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-01 22:10     ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13   ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13     ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30  6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55     ` Tom Lendacky
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-26 22:45 Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47   ` Tom Lendacky

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