From: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 16:54:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161019145420.GA22003@pox.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-5-mic@digikod.net>
On 09/14/16 at 09:23am, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This fix a pointer leak when an unprivileged eBPF program read a pointer
> value from the context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer
> type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register
> value containing an address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this
> prevented unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate)
> pointer arguments.
>
> This bug was not a problem until now because the only unprivileged eBPF
> program allowed is of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER and all the types
> from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")
> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Can you post this fix separately? It's valid and needed outside of the
scope of this series.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kern
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 16:54:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161019145420.GA22003@pox.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-5-mic@digikod.net>
On 09/14/16 at 09:23am, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This fix a pointer leak when an unprivileged eBPF program read a pointer
> value from the context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer
> type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register
> value containing an address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this
> prevented unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate)
> pointer arguments.
>
> This bug was not a problem until now because the only unprivileged eBPF
> program allowed is of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER and all the types
> from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")
> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Can you post this fix separately? It's valid and needed outside of the
scope of this series.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 16:54:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161019145420.GA22003@pox.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-5-mic@digikod.net>
On 09/14/16 at 09:23am, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This fix a pointer leak when an unprivileged eBPF program read a pointer
> value from the context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer
> type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register
> value containing an address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this
> prevented unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate)
> pointer arguments.
>
> This bug was not a problem until now because the only unprivileged eBPF
> program allowed is of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER and all the types
> from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")
> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Can you post this fix separately? It's valid and needed outside of the
scope of this series.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-19 14:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 260+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-14 7:23 [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 14:54 ` Thomas Graf [this message]
2016-10-19 14:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 14:54 ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Borkmann
2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:01 ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:01 ` Thomas Graf
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:19 ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 22:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 19:07 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-14 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-09-14 19:07 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 0:12 ` lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20 0:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20 0:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20 1:10 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 1:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 1:10 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 16:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 2:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 2:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 4:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:20 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:20 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 21:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 14:36 ` [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36 ` David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36 ` David Laight
2016-09-14 14:36 ` David Laight
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