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From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 14:05:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161121190531.dcha3soohybzaqr6@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu__wAnOawWZWVF6NF3En0suuFTBrFwwZ5KosqBU8LVHMA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 04:42:45PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 21 November 2016 at 16:26, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:18 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
> > <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >> On 16 November 2016 at 18:11, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
> >>>
> >>> If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
> >>> for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
> >>> MokIgnoreDB.  Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
> >>> variable if it is found.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Similar concern as in the previous patch: it appears to me that you
> >> can DoS a machine by setting MokIgnoreDB if, e.g., its modules are
> >> signed against a cert that resides in db, and shim/mokmanager are not
> >> being used.
> >
> > If shim/mokmanager aren't used, then you can't actually modify
> > MokIgnoreDB.  Again, it requires physical access and a reboot into
> > mokmanager to actually take effect.
> >
> 
> This does the trick as well
> 
> printf "\x07\x00\x00\x00\x01" >
> /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/MokIgnoreDB-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23

So that really means two things.  First, kernel should only honor any of
the Mok* variables if they're Boot Services-only variables.  Second, to
avoid the DoS, shim should create them all as Boot Services-only the
first time it boots.  That'll prevent them from being created post-boot.

-- 
        Peter

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Jones <pjones-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer
	<jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Matthew Garrett
	<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
	<linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
	"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
	<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-security-module
	<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 14:05:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161121190531.dcha3soohybzaqr6@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu__wAnOawWZWVF6NF3En0suuFTBrFwwZ5KosqBU8LVHMA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 04:42:45PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 21 November 2016 at 16:26, Josh Boyer <jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:18 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
> > <ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >> On 16 November 2016 at 18:11, David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >>> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
> >>>
> >>> If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
> >>> for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
> >>> MokIgnoreDB.  Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
> >>> variable if it is found.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Similar concern as in the previous patch: it appears to me that you
> >> can DoS a machine by setting MokIgnoreDB if, e.g., its modules are
> >> signed against a cert that resides in db, and shim/mokmanager are not
> >> being used.
> >
> > If shim/mokmanager aren't used, then you can't actually modify
> > MokIgnoreDB.  Again, it requires physical access and a reboot into
> > mokmanager to actually take effect.
> >
> 
> This does the trick as well
> 
> printf "\x07\x00\x00\x00\x01" >
> /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/MokIgnoreDB-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23

So that really means two things.  First, kernel should only honor any of
the Mok* variables if they're Boot Services-only variables.  Second, to
avoid the DoS, shim should create them all as Boot Services-only the
first time it boots.  That'll prevent them from being created post-boot.

-- 
        Peter

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-21 19:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring David Howells
2016-11-17  6:41   ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17  9:56   ` David Howells
2016-11-17 10:22     ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 10:22       ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 11:18     ` David Howells
2016-11-17 11:18       ` David Howells
2016-11-21 14:04     ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 14:04       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43   ` Mat Martineau
2016-11-17  9:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-17  9:44     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:08     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:08       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:25     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:25       ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-24 19:22       ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:22         ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17     ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17       ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57       ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18         ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
2016-11-21 16:18   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:18     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:26     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:26       ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-21 16:42       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:42         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:05         ` Peter Jones [this message]
2016-11-21 19:05           ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18             ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:05   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:05   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 13:18     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 13:18     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28     ` James Bottomley
2018-03-07 15:28       ` James Bottomley
2018-03-07 15:28       ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11  3:20       ` joeyli
2018-03-11  3:20         ` joeyli
2018-03-11  3:20         ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-19 14:12           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-19 14:12           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08           ` joeyli
2018-03-27 11:08             ` joeyli
2018-03-27 11:08             ` joeyli

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