[refpolicy] [PATCH 2/2] system/modutils: Allow kmod to use the sys_admin cap

[aranea@aixah.de (Luis Ressel)]

On Mon, 28 Nov 2016 18:02:56 +0100
Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy <refpolicy@oss.tresys.com> wrote:

> > We've
> > added grsec-specific permissions to the refpolicy before, though
> > (for example "getty_t self:capability cap_sys_admin" earlier this
> > year).  
> 
> Thanks for pointing that out ! I have now removed the sys_admin
> capability locally from the getty module.
> 
> It is not needed. And, there must be something wrong if the patch you
> mention forces permissions that are normally unneeded... It seems like
> it is forcing the users to weaken the policy, which is not what we
> want.

I do of course agree that unconditionally adding grsec-specific
permissions to the refpolicy isn't optimal either.

What are your thoughts about adding a new kernel_grsec ifdef, similar
to our current distro_* ifdef's? It would apply to the getty_t
permission I mentioned earlier, to the kmod_t capability discussed in
this thread (as soon as we've confirmed it is indeed grsec-related),
and to any other grsec-specific permissions we've added in the past
(@Sven, Jason: Do you remember any such permissions?).

The vast majority of refpolicy+grsec users are probably gentoo folks,
so we could keep these permissions in ifdef(distro_gentoo) blocks, too;
but I think that wouldn't be ideal. After all, there may well be other
people using this particular combination; it's not gentoo-specific.

Regards,
Luis