* [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
swapped out after the use.
There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
A simple smoke test suite can be run by
sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
v3:
* Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
v2:
* Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
* Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
* Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
header match in tpm_transmit().
James Bottomley (3):
tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
code
Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
swapped out after the use.
There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
A simple smoke test suite can be run by
sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
v3:
* Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
v2:
* Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
* Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
* Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
header match in tpm_transmit().
James Bottomley (3):
tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
code
Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/7] tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
Check that the length matches the length reported by the response
header already in tpm_transmit() to improve validation.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index bd2128e..708d356 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
unsigned int flags)
{
+ const struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
ssize_t rc;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
@@ -406,9 +407,18 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
out_recv:
rc = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ } else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (rc != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
+ goto out;
+
out:
if (chip->dev.parent)
pm_runtime_put_sync(chip->dev.parent);
@@ -438,19 +448,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf,
size_t bufsiz, size_t min_rsp_body_length,
unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
{
- const struct tpm_output_header *header;
+ const struct tpm_output_header *header = buf;
int err;
ssize_t len;
len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
if (len < 0)
return len;
- else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
- return -EFAULT;
-
- header = buf;
- if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
- return -EFAULT;
err = be32_to_cpu(header->return_code);
if (err != 0 && desc)
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/7] tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Check that the length matches the length reported by the response
header already in tpm_transmit() to improve validation.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index bd2128e..708d356 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
unsigned int flags)
{
+ const struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
ssize_t rc;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
@@ -406,9 +407,18 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
out_recv:
rc = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
- if (rc < 0)
+ if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ } else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (rc != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
+ goto out;
+
out:
if (chip->dev.parent)
pm_runtime_put_sync(chip->dev.parent);
@@ -438,19 +448,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf,
size_t bufsiz, size_t min_rsp_body_length,
unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
{
- const struct tpm_output_header *header;
+ const struct tpm_output_header *header = buf;
int err;
ssize_t len;
len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
if (len < 0)
return len;
- else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
- return -EFAULT;
-
- header = buf;
- if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
- return -EFAULT;
err = be32_to_cpu(header->return_code);
if (err != 0 && desc)
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
and the handle area.
For ContextSave and FlushContext we mark the body to be part of the
handle area. This gives validation for these commands at zero
cost, including the body of the command.
The more important reason for this is that we can virtualize these
commands in the same way as you would virtualize the handle area of a
command.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 15 +++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 708d356..20b1fe3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -328,6 +328,42 @@ unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
+static bool tpm_validate_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ const struct tpm_input_header *header = (const void *)cmd;
+ int i;
+ u32 cc;
+ u32 attrs;
+ unsigned int nr_handles;
+
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 && chip->nr_commands) {
+ cc = be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal);
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(&chip->dev, "0x%04X is an invalid command\n",
+ cc);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ nr_handles =
+ 4 * ((attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0));
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 * nr_handles)
+ goto err_len;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+err_len:
+ dev_dbg(&chip->dev,
+ "%s: insufficient command length %zu", __func__, len);
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* tmp_transmit - Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands.
*
@@ -348,7 +384,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
- if (bufsiz < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+ if (!tpm_validate_command(chip, buf, bufsiz))
return -EINVAL;
if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 4937b56..8568dda 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E,
+ TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B,
@@ -127,15 +128,25 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
};
enum tpm2_capabilities {
+ TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2,
TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5,
TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6,
};
+enum tpm2_properties {
+ TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129,
+};
+
enum tpm2_startup_types {
TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000,
TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001,
};
+enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
+ TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25,
+ TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28,
+};
+
#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086
#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050
#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A
@@ -199,6 +210,9 @@ struct tpm_chip {
acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle;
char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */
+
+ u32 nr_commands;
+ u32 *cc_attrs_tbl;
};
#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev)
@@ -554,4 +568,5 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 881aea9..5efe9c4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -1067,15 +1067,76 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ u32 nr_commands;
+ u32 *attrs;
+ u32 cc;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS, &nr_commands, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nr_commands > 0xFFFFF) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl = devm_kzalloc(&chip->dev, 4 * nr_commands,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, nr_commands);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9 + 4 * nr_commands,
+ 0, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (nr_commands !=
+ be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5])) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ chip->nr_commands = nr_commands;
+
+ attrs = (u32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_commands; i++, attrs++) {
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] = be32_to_cpup(attrs);
+ cc = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & 0xFFFF;
+
+ if (cc == TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE || cc == TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT) {
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] &=
+ ~(GENMASK(2, 0) << TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES);
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] |= 1 << TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+out:
+ if (rc > 0)
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* tpm2_auto_startup - Perform the standard automatic TPM initialization
* sequence
* @chip: TPM chip to use
*
- * Initializes timeout values for operation and command durations, conducts
- * a self-test and reads the list of active PCR banks.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success. Otherwise, a system error code is returned.
+ * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error.
*/
int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
@@ -1104,9 +1165,24 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
rc = tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(chip);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(chip);
out:
if (rc > 0)
rc = -ENODEV;
return rc;
}
+
+int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_commands; i++)
+ if (cc == (chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & GENMASK(15, 0)))
+ return i;
+
+ return -1;
+}
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
and the handle area.
For ContextSave and FlushContext we mark the body to be part of the
handle area. This gives validation for these commands at zero
cost, including the body of the command.
The more important reason for this is that we can virtualize these
commands in the same way as you would virtualize the handle area of a
command.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 15 +++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 708d356..20b1fe3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -328,6 +328,42 @@ unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
+static bool tpm_validate_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ const struct tpm_input_header *header = (const void *)cmd;
+ int i;
+ u32 cc;
+ u32 attrs;
+ unsigned int nr_handles;
+
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 && chip->nr_commands) {
+ cc = be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal);
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(&chip->dev, "0x%04X is an invalid command\n",
+ cc);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ nr_handles =
+ 4 * ((attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0));
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 * nr_handles)
+ goto err_len;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+err_len:
+ dev_dbg(&chip->dev,
+ "%s: insufficient command length %zu", __func__, len);
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* tmp_transmit - Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands.
*
@@ -348,7 +384,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
- if (bufsiz < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+ if (!tpm_validate_command(chip, buf, bufsiz))
return -EINVAL;
if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 4937b56..8568dda 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E,
+ TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B,
@@ -127,15 +128,25 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
};
enum tpm2_capabilities {
+ TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2,
TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5,
TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6,
};
+enum tpm2_properties {
+ TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129,
+};
+
enum tpm2_startup_types {
TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000,
TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001,
};
+enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
+ TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25,
+ TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28,
+};
+
#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086
#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050
#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A
@@ -199,6 +210,9 @@ struct tpm_chip {
acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle;
char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */
+
+ u32 nr_commands;
+ u32 *cc_attrs_tbl;
};
#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev)
@@ -554,4 +568,5 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 881aea9..5efe9c4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -1067,15 +1067,76 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ u32 nr_commands;
+ u32 *attrs;
+ u32 cc;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS, &nr_commands, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nr_commands > 0xFFFFF) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl = devm_kzalloc(&chip->dev, 4 * nr_commands,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, nr_commands);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9 + 4 * nr_commands,
+ 0, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (nr_commands !=
+ be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5])) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ chip->nr_commands = nr_commands;
+
+ attrs = (u32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_commands; i++, attrs++) {
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] = be32_to_cpup(attrs);
+ cc = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & 0xFFFF;
+
+ if (cc == TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE || cc == TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT) {
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] &=
+ ~(GENMASK(2, 0) << TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES);
+ chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] |= 1 << TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+out:
+ if (rc > 0)
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* tpm2_auto_startup - Perform the standard automatic TPM initialization
* sequence
* @chip: TPM chip to use
*
- * Initializes timeout values for operation and command durations, conducts
- * a self-test and reads the list of active PCR banks.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success. Otherwise, a system error code is returned.
+ * Returns 0 on success, < 0 in case of fatal error.
*/
int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
@@ -1104,9 +1165,24 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
rc = tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(chip);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(chip);
out:
if (rc > 0)
rc = -ENODEV;
return rc;
}
+
+int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_commands; i++)
+ if (cc == (chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & GENMASK(15, 0)))
+ return i;
+
+ return -1;
+}
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 3/7] tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 ++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 8568dda..dd5f526 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -555,6 +555,8 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
struct tpm2_digest *digests);
int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max);
+void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 5efe9c4..ec05ab3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -419,6 +419,35 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_get_tpm_pt_header = {
};
/**
+ * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n",
+ handle);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+
+ (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
+ "flushing context");
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+}
+
+/**
* tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
*
* @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
@@ -628,39 +657,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
- *
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @handle: the key data in clear and encrypted form
- * @flags: tpm transmit flags
- *
- * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd.
- */
-static void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
- if (rc) {
- dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n",
- handle);
- return;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
- "flushing context");
- if (rc)
- dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, rc=%d\n", handle,
- rc);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-}
-
-/**
* tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
*
* @chip: TPM chip to use
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 3/7] tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 ++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 8568dda..dd5f526 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -555,6 +555,8 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
struct tpm2_digest *digests);
int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max);
+void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 5efe9c4..ec05ab3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -419,6 +419,35 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_get_tpm_pt_header = {
};
/**
+ * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n",
+ handle);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+
+ (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
+ "flushing context");
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+}
+
+/**
* tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
*
* @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
@@ -628,39 +657,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
- *
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @handle: the key data in clear and encrypted form
- * @flags: tpm transmit flags
- *
- * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd.
- */
-static void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
- if (rc) {
- dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n",
- handle);
- return;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
- "flushing context");
- if (rc)
- dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, rc=%d\n", handle,
- rc);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-}
-
-/**
* tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
*
* @chip: TPM chip to use
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
Added an ability to virtualize TPM commands into an isolated context
that we call a TPM space because the word context is already heavily
used in the TPM specification. Both the handle areas and bodies (where
necessary) are virtualized.
The mechanism works by adding a new parameter struct tpm_space to the
tpm_transmit() function. This new structure contains the list of virtual
handles and a buffer of page size (currently) for backing storage.
When tpm_transmit() is called with a struct tpm_space instance it will
execute the following sequence:
1. Take locks.
2. Load transient objects from the backing storage by using ContextLoad
and map virtual handles to physical handles.
3. Perform the transaction.
4. Save transient objects to backing storage by using ContextSave and
map resulting physical handle to virtual handle if there is such.
This commit does not implement virtualization support for hmac and
policy sessions.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 7 +
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 68 +++---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 26 ++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 33 +--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 431 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 520 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 3d386a8..8f07fcf 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o
+ tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index c843e0a..364d92e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log);
+ kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
kfree(chip);
}
@@ -189,6 +190,12 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
chip->cdev.kobj.parent = &chip->dev.kobj;
+ chip->work_space.context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chip->work_space.context_buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
return chip;
out:
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index 02a8850..414553b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
return -EPIPE;
}
- out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer,
+ out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, NULL, priv->data_buffer,
sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
* 0 when the operation is successful.
* A negative number for system errors (errno).
*/
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- unsigned int flags)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
{
- const struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
- ssize_t rc;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
+ int rc;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
@@ -406,10 +407,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
if (chip->dev.parent)
pm_runtime_get_sync(chip->dev.parent);
+ rc = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, ordinal, buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
+ "tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %d\n", rc);
goto out;
}
@@ -442,18 +447,23 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
goto out;
out_recv:
- rc = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ len = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
+ if (len < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
+ "tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %d\n", rc);
+ rc = len;
goto out;
- } else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ } else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- if (rc != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
+ if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_commit_space(chip, space, ordinal, buf, &len);
out:
if (chip->dev.parent)
@@ -461,7 +471,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
- return rc;
+ return rc ? rc : len;
}
/**
@@ -480,15 +490,16 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
* A negative number for system errors (errno).
* A positive number for a TPM error.
*/
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf,
- size_t bufsiz, size_t min_rsp_body_length,
- unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ size_t min_rsp_body_length, unsigned int flags,
+ const char *desc)
{
const struct tpm_output_header *header = buf;
int err;
ssize_t len;
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
+ len = tpm_transmit(chip, space, (u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
if (len < 0)
return len;
@@ -541,7 +552,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
min_cap_length, 0, desc);
if (!rc)
*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
@@ -565,7 +576,8 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &start_cmd,
+ TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
0, "attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -722,8 +734,8 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE, 0, 0,
- "continue selftest");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
+ 0, 0, "continue selftest");
return rc;
}
@@ -743,7 +755,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
READ_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read a pcr value");
@@ -855,7 +867,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
@@ -960,8 +972,8 @@ int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, 0, 0, "attempting tpm_cmd");
-
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, cmd, buflen, 0, 0,
+ "attempting tpm_cmd");
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -1062,16 +1074,16 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
- EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"extending dummy pcr before suspend");
}
/* now do the actual savestate */
for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
- 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE,
+ 0, 0, NULL);
/*
* If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
@@ -1154,7 +1166,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd,
TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out,
rng_data),
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 2f596d7..55405db 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read the PUBEK");
if (err)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index dd5f526..023fc02 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -89,10 +89,13 @@ enum tpm2_structures {
};
enum tpm2_return_codes {
+ TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000,
TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */
+ TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B,
TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */
TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120,
TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */
+ TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910,
};
enum tpm2_algorithms {
@@ -114,6 +117,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E,
+ TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
@@ -128,6 +132,7 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
};
enum tpm2_capabilities {
+ TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1,
TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2,
TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5,
TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6,
@@ -153,6 +158,11 @@ enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
#define TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN 3
+struct tpm_space {
+ u32 context_tbl[3];
+ u8 *context_buf;
+};
+
enum tpm_chip_flags {
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1),
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2),
@@ -211,6 +221,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {
char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */
+ struct tpm_space work_space;
u32 nr_commands;
u32 *cc_attrs_tbl;
};
@@ -507,10 +518,11 @@ enum tpm_transmit_flags {
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED = BIT(0),
};
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- unsigned int flags);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- size_t min_rsp_body_len, unsigned int flags,
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ size_t min_rsp_body_length, unsigned int flags,
const char *desc);
ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length);
@@ -571,4 +583,10 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
+int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
+ u8 *cmd);
+int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u32 cc, u8 *buf, size_t *bufsiz);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index ec05ab3..3ee6883 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
sizeof(cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select));
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[pcr_idx >> 3] = 1 << (pcr_idx & 0x7);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
TPM2_PCR_READ_RESP_BODY_SIZE,
0, "attempting to read a pcr value");
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
}
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_getrandom_header;
cmd.params.getrandom_in.size = cpu_to_be16(num_bytes);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
0, "attempting get random");
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
- (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
+ (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
"flushing context");
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, 0,
"sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, flags,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, flags,
"loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 6, flags,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 6, flags,
"unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value,
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(property_id);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
TPM2_GET_TPM_PT_OUT_BODY_SIZE, 0, desc);
if (!rc)
*value = be32_to_cpu(cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_out.value);
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static int tpm2_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 startup_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_startup_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(startup_type);
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
"attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_shutdown_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(shutdown_type);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
"stopping the TPM");
/* In places where shutdown command is sent there's no much we can do
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int tpm2_start_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool full)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = full;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0, 0,
"continue selftest");
/* At least some prototype chips seem to give RC_TESTING error
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[1] = 0x00;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[2] = 0x00;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ NULL);
if (rc < 0)
break;
@@ -982,7 +983,7 @@ int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(0x100);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
@@ -1020,7 +1021,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9, 0,
"get tpm pcr allocation");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -1092,8 +1093,8 @@ static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, nr_commands);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9 + 4 * nr_commands,
- 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
+ 9 + 4 * nr_commands, 0, NULL);
if (rc) {
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e955548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * This file contains TPM2 protocol implementations of the commands
+ * used by the kernel internally.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2
+ * of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+enum tpm2_handle_types {
+ TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION = 0x02000000,
+ TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION = 0x03000000,
+ TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT = 0x80000000,
+};
+
+struct tpm2_context {
+ __be64 sequence;
+ __be32 saved_handle;
+ __be32 hierarchy;
+ __be16 blob_size;
+} __packed;
+
+int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ space->context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!space->context_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ kfree(space->context_buf);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
+ unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf tbuf;
+ struct tpm2_context *ctx;
+ unsigned int body_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ctx = (struct tpm2_context *)&buf[*offset];
+ body_size = sizeof(*ctx) + be16_to_cpu(ctx->blob_size);
+ tpm_buf_append(&tbuf, &buf[*offset], body_size);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, tbuf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED, NULL);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (rc > 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ *handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+ *offset += body_size;
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
+ unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf tbuf;
+ unsigned int body_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&tbuf, handle);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, tbuf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED, NULL);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ } else if (rc) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ body_size = tpm_buf_length(&tbuf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ if ((*offset + body_size) > buf_size) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: out of backing storage\n", __func__);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ *offset += body_size;
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void tpm2_flush_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++)
+ if (space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i])
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!space->context_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ /* sanity check, should never happen */
+ if (~space->context_tbl[i]) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "context table is inconsistent");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, space->context_buf, &offset,
+ &space->context_tbl[i]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool tpm2_map_to_phandle(struct tpm_space *space, void *handle)
+{
+ u32 vhandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)handle);
+ u32 phandle;
+ int i;
+
+ i = 0xFFFFFF - (vhandle & 0xFFFFFF);
+ if (i > ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl) || !space->context_tbl[i])
+ return false;
+
+ phandle = space->context_tbl[i];
+ *((__be32 *)handle) = cpu_to_be32(phandle);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int nr_handles;
+ u32 attrs;
+ u32 *handle;
+ int i;
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ nr_handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+
+ handle = (u32 *)&cmd[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_handles; i++, handle++) {
+ if ((be32_to_cpu(*handle) & 0xFF000000) == TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT) {
+ if (!tpm2_map_to_phandle(space, handle))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
+ u8 *cmd)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!space)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(&chip->work_space.context_tbl, &space->context_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(chip->work_space.context_buf, space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_space(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_command(chip, cc, cmd);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 tpm2_map_to_vhandle(struct tpm_space *space, u32 phandle, bool alloc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (alloc) {
+ if (!space->context_tbl[i]) {
+ space->context_tbl[i] = phandle;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (space->context_tbl[i] == phandle)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl))
+ return 0;
+
+ return TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT | (0xFFFFFF - i);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_map_response_header(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)rsp;
+ u32 phandle;
+ u32 phandle_type;
+ u32 vhandle;
+ u32 attrs;
+ int i;
+
+ if (be32_to_cpu(header->return_code) != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ /* sanity check, should never happen */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ if (!((attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE) & 1))
+ return 0;
+
+ phandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+ phandle_type = phandle & 0xFF000000;
+
+ switch (phandle_type) {
+ case TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT:
+ vhandle = tpm2_map_to_vhandle(space, phandle, true);
+ if (!vhandle)
+ goto out_no_slots;
+
+ *(__be32 *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE] = cpu_to_be32(vhandle);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
+ case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ break;
+ default:
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
+ __func__, phandle);
+ break;
+ };
+
+ return 0;
+out_no_slots:
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, phandle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: out of slots for 0x%08X\n", __func__,
+ phandle);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_cap_handles {
+ u8 more_data;
+ __be32 capability;
+ __be32 count;
+ __be32 handles[];
+} __packed;
+
+static int tpm2_map_response_body(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)rsp;
+ struct tpm2_cap_handles *data;
+ u32 phandle;
+ u32 phandle_type;
+ u32 vhandle;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+
+ if (cc != TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY ||
+ be32_to_cpu(header->return_code) != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = (void *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ if (be32_to_cpu(data->capability) != TPM2_CAP_HANDLES)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (len != TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9 + 4 * be32_to_cpu(data->count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < be32_to_cpu(data->count); i++) {
+ phandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&data->handles[i]);
+ phandle_type = phandle & 0xFF000000;
+
+ switch (phandle_type) {
+ case TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT:
+ vhandle = tpm2_map_to_vhandle(space, phandle, false);
+ if (!vhandle)
+ break;
+
+ data->handles[j] = cpu_to_be32(vhandle);
+ j++;
+ break;
+ case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
+ case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ data->handles[j] = cpu_to_be32(phandle);
+ j++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
+ __func__, phandle);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ header->length = cpu_to_be32(TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9 + 4 * j);
+ data->count = cpu_to_be32(j);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_save_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!(space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &offset);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ space->context_tbl[i] = 0;
+ continue;
+ } else if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ space->context_tbl[i] = ~0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u32 cc, u8 *buf, size_t *bufsiz)
+{
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!space)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_response_header(chip, cc, buf, *bufsiz);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_response_body(chip, cc, buf, *bufsiz);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_space(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ *bufsiz = be32_to_cpu(header->length);
+
+ memcpy(&space->context_tbl, &chip->work_space.context_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(space->context_buf, chip->work_space.context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Added an ability to virtualize TPM commands into an isolated context
that we call a TPM space because the word context is already heavily
used in the TPM specification. Both the handle areas and bodies (where
necessary) are virtualized.
The mechanism works by adding a new parameter struct tpm_space to the
tpm_transmit() function. This new structure contains the list of virtual
handles and a buffer of page size (currently) for backing storage.
When tpm_transmit() is called with a struct tpm_space instance it will
execute the following sequence:
1. Take locks.
2. Load transient objects from the backing storage by using ContextLoad
and map virtual handles to physical handles.
3. Perform the transaction.
4. Save transient objects to backing storage by using ContextSave and
map resulting physical handle to virtual handle if there is such.
This commit does not implement virtualization support for hmac and
policy sessions.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 7 +
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 68 +++---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 26 ++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 33 +--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 431 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 520 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 3d386a8..8f07fcf 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o
+ tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index c843e0a..364d92e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log);
+ kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
kfree(chip);
}
@@ -189,6 +190,12 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
chip->cdev.kobj.parent = &chip->dev.kobj;
+ chip->work_space.context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chip->work_space.context_buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
return chip;
out:
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index 02a8850..414553b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
return -EPIPE;
}
- out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer,
+ out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, NULL, priv->data_buffer,
sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
* 0 when the operation is successful.
* A negative number for system errors (errno).
*/
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- unsigned int flags)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
{
- const struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
- ssize_t rc;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
+ int rc;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
@@ -406,10 +407,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
if (chip->dev.parent)
pm_runtime_get_sync(chip->dev.parent);
+ rc = tpm2_prepare_space(chip, space, ordinal, buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
+ "tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %d\n", rc);
goto out;
}
@@ -442,18 +447,23 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
goto out;
out_recv:
- rc = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ len = chip->ops->recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
+ if (len < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
+ "tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %d\n", rc);
+ rc = len;
goto out;
- } else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ } else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- if (rc != be32_to_cpu(header->length))
+ if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_commit_space(chip, space, ordinal, buf, &len);
out:
if (chip->dev.parent)
@@ -461,7 +471,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
- return rc;
+ return rc ? rc : len;
}
/**
@@ -480,15 +490,16 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
* A negative number for system errors (errno).
* A positive number for a TPM error.
*/
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf,
- size_t bufsiz, size_t min_rsp_body_length,
- unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ size_t min_rsp_body_length, unsigned int flags,
+ const char *desc)
{
const struct tpm_output_header *header = buf;
int err;
ssize_t len;
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
+ len = tpm_transmit(chip, space, (u8 *)buf, bufsiz, flags);
if (len < 0)
return len;
@@ -541,7 +552,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
min_cap_length, 0, desc);
if (!rc)
*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
@@ -565,7 +576,8 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &start_cmd,
+ TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
0, "attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -722,8 +734,8 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE, 0, 0,
- "continue selftest");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
+ 0, 0, "continue selftest");
return rc;
}
@@ -743,7 +755,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
READ_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read a pcr value");
@@ -855,7 +867,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
@@ -960,8 +972,8 @@ int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, 0, 0, "attempting tpm_cmd");
-
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, cmd, buflen, 0, 0,
+ "attempting tpm_cmd");
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -1062,16 +1074,16 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
- EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"extending dummy pcr before suspend");
}
/* now do the actual savestate */
for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
- 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE,
+ 0, 0, NULL);
/*
* If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
@@ -1154,7 +1166,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd,
TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out,
rng_data),
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 2f596d7..55405db 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read the PUBEK");
if (err)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index dd5f526..023fc02 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -89,10 +89,13 @@ enum tpm2_structures {
};
enum tpm2_return_codes {
+ TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000,
TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */
+ TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B,
TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */
TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120,
TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */
+ TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910,
};
enum tpm2_algorithms {
@@ -114,6 +117,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E,
+ TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162,
TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165,
TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A,
@@ -128,6 +132,7 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
};
enum tpm2_capabilities {
+ TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1,
TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2,
TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5,
TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6,
@@ -153,6 +158,11 @@ enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
#define TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN 3
+struct tpm_space {
+ u32 context_tbl[3];
+ u8 *context_buf;
+};
+
enum tpm_chip_flags {
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1),
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2),
@@ -211,6 +221,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {
char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */
+ struct tpm_space work_space;
u32 nr_commands;
u32 *cc_attrs_tbl;
};
@@ -507,10 +518,11 @@ enum tpm_transmit_flags {
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED = BIT(0),
};
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- unsigned int flags);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
- size_t min_rsp_body_len, unsigned int flags,
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ size_t min_rsp_body_length, unsigned int flags,
const char *desc);
ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length);
@@ -571,4 +583,10 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
+int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
+ u8 *cmd);
+int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u32 cc, u8 *buf, size_t *bufsiz);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index ec05ab3..3ee6883 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
sizeof(cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select));
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[pcr_idx >> 3] = 1 << (pcr_idx & 0x7);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
TPM2_PCR_READ_RESP_BODY_SIZE,
0, "attempting to read a pcr value");
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
}
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_getrandom_header;
cmd.params.getrandom_in.size = cpu_to_be16(num_bytes);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
0, "attempting get random");
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
- (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
+ (void) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, flags,
"flushing context");
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, 0,
"sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, flags,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4, flags,
"loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 6, flags,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 6, flags,
"unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value,
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(property_id);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
TPM2_GET_TPM_PT_OUT_BODY_SIZE, 0, desc);
if (!rc)
*value = be32_to_cpu(cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_out.value);
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static int tpm2_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 startup_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_startup_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(startup_type);
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
"attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_shutdown_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(shutdown_type);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
"stopping the TPM");
/* In places where shutdown command is sent there's no much we can do
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int tpm2_start_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool full)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = full;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0, 0,
"continue selftest");
/* At least some prototype chips seem to give RC_TESTING error
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[1] = 0x00;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[2] = 0x00;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0,
+ NULL);
if (rc < 0)
break;
@@ -982,7 +983,7 @@ int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(0x100);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, 0, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
@@ -1020,7 +1021,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9, 0,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9, 0,
"get tpm pcr allocation");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -1092,8 +1093,8 @@ static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, nr_commands);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 9 + 4 * nr_commands,
- 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
+ 9 + 4 * nr_commands, 0, NULL);
if (rc) {
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e955548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * This file contains TPM2 protocol implementations of the commands
+ * used by the kernel internally.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2
+ * of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+enum tpm2_handle_types {
+ TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION = 0x02000000,
+ TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION = 0x03000000,
+ TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT = 0x80000000,
+};
+
+struct tpm2_context {
+ __be64 sequence;
+ __be32 saved_handle;
+ __be32 hierarchy;
+ __be16 blob_size;
+} __packed;
+
+int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ space->context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!space->context_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ kfree(space->context_buf);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
+ unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf tbuf;
+ struct tpm2_context *ctx;
+ unsigned int body_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ctx = (struct tpm2_context *)&buf[*offset];
+ body_size = sizeof(*ctx) + be16_to_cpu(ctx->blob_size);
+ tpm_buf_append(&tbuf, &buf[*offset], body_size);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, tbuf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 4,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED, NULL);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (rc > 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ *handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+ *offset += body_size;
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
+ unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf tbuf;
+ unsigned int body_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&tbuf, handle);
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, tbuf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED, NULL);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ } else if (rc) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ body_size = tpm_buf_length(&tbuf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ if ((*offset + body_size) > buf_size) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: out of backing storage\n", __func__);
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ *offset += body_size;
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void tpm2_flush_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++)
+ if (space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i])
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!space->context_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ /* sanity check, should never happen */
+ if (~space->context_tbl[i]) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "context table is inconsistent");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, space->context_buf, &offset,
+ &space->context_tbl[i]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool tpm2_map_to_phandle(struct tpm_space *space, void *handle)
+{
+ u32 vhandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)handle);
+ u32 phandle;
+ int i;
+
+ i = 0xFFFFFF - (vhandle & 0xFFFFFF);
+ if (i > ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl) || !space->context_tbl[i])
+ return false;
+
+ phandle = space->context_tbl[i];
+ *((__be32 *)handle) = cpu_to_be32(phandle);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int nr_handles;
+ u32 attrs;
+ u32 *handle;
+ int i;
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ nr_handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+
+ handle = (u32 *)&cmd[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_handles; i++, handle++) {
+ if ((be32_to_cpu(*handle) & 0xFF000000) == TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT) {
+ if (!tpm2_map_to_phandle(space, handle))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
+ u8 *cmd)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!space)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(&chip->work_space.context_tbl, &space->context_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(chip->work_space.context_buf, space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_space(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_command(chip, cc, cmd);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 tpm2_map_to_vhandle(struct tpm_space *space, u32 phandle, bool alloc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (alloc) {
+ if (!space->context_tbl[i]) {
+ space->context_tbl[i] = phandle;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (space->context_tbl[i] == phandle)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl))
+ return 0;
+
+ return TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT | (0xFFFFFF - i);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_map_response_header(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)rsp;
+ u32 phandle;
+ u32 phandle_type;
+ u32 vhandle;
+ u32 attrs;
+ int i;
+
+ if (be32_to_cpu(header->return_code) != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+
+ i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+ /* sanity check, should never happen */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+ if (!((attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE) & 1))
+ return 0;
+
+ phandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+ phandle_type = phandle & 0xFF000000;
+
+ switch (phandle_type) {
+ case TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT:
+ vhandle = tpm2_map_to_vhandle(space, phandle, true);
+ if (!vhandle)
+ goto out_no_slots;
+
+ *(__be32 *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE] = cpu_to_be32(vhandle);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
+ case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ break;
+ default:
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
+ __func__, phandle);
+ break;
+ };
+
+ return 0;
+out_no_slots:
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, phandle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: out of slots for 0x%08X\n", __func__,
+ phandle);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_cap_handles {
+ u8 more_data;
+ __be32 capability;
+ __be32 count;
+ __be32 handles[];
+} __packed;
+
+static int tpm2_map_response_body(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)rsp;
+ struct tpm2_cap_handles *data;
+ u32 phandle;
+ u32 phandle_type;
+ u32 vhandle;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+
+ if (cc != TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY ||
+ be32_to_cpu(header->return_code) != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = (void *)&rsp[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ if (be32_to_cpu(data->capability) != TPM2_CAP_HANDLES)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (len != TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9 + 4 * be32_to_cpu(data->count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < be32_to_cpu(data->count); i++) {
+ phandle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&data->handles[i]);
+ phandle_type = phandle & 0xFF000000;
+
+ switch (phandle_type) {
+ case TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT:
+ vhandle = tpm2_map_to_vhandle(space, phandle, false);
+ if (!vhandle)
+ break;
+
+ data->handles[j] = cpu_to_be32(vhandle);
+ j++;
+ break;
+ case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
+ case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ data->handles[j] = cpu_to_be32(phandle);
+ j++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
+ __func__, phandle);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ header->length = cpu_to_be32(TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9 + 4 * j);
+ data->count = cpu_to_be32(j);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_save_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ int i;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->context_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!(space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &offset);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ space->context_tbl[i] = 0;
+ continue;
+ } else if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ space->context_tbl[i] = ~0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
+ u32 cc, u8 *buf, size_t *bufsiz)
+{
+ struct tpm_output_header *header = (void *)buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!space)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_response_header(chip, cc, buf, *bufsiz);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_map_response_body(chip, cc, buf, *bufsiz);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_space(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ *bufsiz = be32_to_cpu(header->length);
+
+ memcpy(&space->context_tbl, &chip->work_space.context_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(space->context_buf, chip->work_space.context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 5/7] tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 ++++--------------------------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 +++++++
4 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 8f07fcf..10e5827 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
+ tpm-dev-common.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..610638a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Obsidian Research Corp
+ * Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+ *
+ * Device file system interface to the TPM
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = (struct file_priv *)ptr;
+
+ pr_warn("TPM user space timeout is deprecated (pid=%d)\n",
+ task_tgid_nr(current));
+
+ schedule_work(&priv->work);
+}
+
+static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = container_of(work, struct file_priv, work);
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+}
+
+void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct file_priv *priv)
+{
+ priv->chip = chip;
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ mutex_init(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ setup_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
+ (unsigned long)priv);
+ INIT_WORK(&priv->work, timeout_work);
+
+ file->private_data = priv;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
+ ssize_t ret_size;
+ ssize_t orig_ret_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
+ flush_work(&priv->work);
+ ret_size = atomic_read(&priv->data_pending);
+ if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
+ orig_ret_size = ret_size;
+ if (size < ret_size)
+ ret_size = size;
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ rc = copy_to_user(buf, priv->data_buffer, ret_size);
+ memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
+ if (rc)
+ ret_size = -EFAULT;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ }
+
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+
+ return ret_size;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off, struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
+ size_t in_size = size;
+ ssize_t out_size;
+
+ /* Cannot perform a write until the read has cleared either via
+ * tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout. This also prevents split
+ * buffered writes from blocking here.
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->data_pending) != 0)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+
+ if (copy_from_user
+ (priv->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* atomic tpm command send and result receive. We only hold the ops
+ * lock during this period so that the tpm can be unregistered even if
+ * the char dev is held open.
+ */
+ if (tpm_try_get_ops(priv->chip)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EPIPE;
+ }
+ out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, space, priv->data_buffer,
+ sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
+
+ tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
+ if (out_size < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return out_size;
+ }
+
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, out_size);
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+
+ /* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
+ mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ));
+
+ return in_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called on file close
+ */
+void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv)
+{
+ del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
+ flush_work(&priv->work);
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index 414553b..ebd74ab 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -18,48 +18,15 @@
*
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include "tpm.h"
-
-struct file_priv {
- struct tpm_chip *chip;
-
- /* Data passed to and from the tpm via the read/write calls */
- atomic_t data_pending;
- struct mutex buffer_mutex;
-
- struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */
- struct work_struct work;
-
- u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE];
-};
-
-static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = (struct file_priv *)ptr;
-
- pr_warn("TPM user space timeout is deprecated (pid=%d)\n",
- task_tgid_nr(current));
-
- schedule_work(&priv->work);
-}
-
-static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = container_of(work, struct file_priv, work);
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
- memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-}
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct tpm_chip *chip =
- container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdev);
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
struct file_priv *priv;
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdev);
+
/* It's assured that the chip will be opened just once,
* by the check of is_open variable, which is protected
* by driver_lock. */
@@ -69,100 +36,22 @@ static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
}
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (priv == NULL) {
- clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ goto out;
- priv->chip = chip;
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
- mutex_init(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- setup_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
- (unsigned long)priv);
- INIT_WORK(&priv->work, timeout_work);
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, priv);
- file->private_data = priv;
return 0;
-}
-
-static ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- size_t size, loff_t *off)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- ssize_t ret_size;
- int rc;
- del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
- flush_work(&priv->work);
- ret_size = atomic_read(&priv->data_pending);
- if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
- ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
- if (size < ret_size)
- ret_size = size;
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- rc = copy_to_user(buf, priv->data_buffer, ret_size);
- memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
- if (rc)
- ret_size = -EFAULT;
-
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- }
-
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
-
- return ret_size;
+ out:
+ clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *off)
{
- struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- size_t in_size = size;
- ssize_t out_size;
-
- /* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
- either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout.
- This also prevents splitted buffered writes from blocking here.
- */
- if (atomic_read(&priv->data_pending) != 0)
- return -EBUSY;
-
- if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
- return -E2BIG;
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-
- if (copy_from_user
- (priv->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- /* atomic tpm command send and result receive. We only hold the ops
- * lock during this period so that the tpm can be unregistered even if
- * the char dev is held open.
- */
- if (tpm_try_get_ops(priv->chip)) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return -EPIPE;
- }
- out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, NULL, priv->data_buffer,
- sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
-
- tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
- if (out_size < 0) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return out_size;
- }
-
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, out_size);
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-
- /* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
- mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ));
-
- return in_size;
+ return tpm_common_write(file, buf, size, off, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -172,12 +61,10 @@ static int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
- flush_work(&priv->work);
- file->private_data = NULL;
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ tpm_common_release(file, priv);
clear_bit(0, &priv->chip->is_open);
kfree(priv);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -185,9 +72,7 @@ const struct file_operations tpm_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.llseek = no_llseek,
.open = tpm_open,
- .read = tpm_read,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
.write = tpm_write,
.release = tpm_release,
};
-
-
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff15cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#ifndef _TPM_DEV_H
+#define _TPM_DEV_H
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+struct file_priv {
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+ /* Data passed to and from the tpm via the read/write calls */
+ atomic_t data_pending;
+ struct mutex buffer_mutex;
+
+ struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */
+ struct work_struct work;
+
+ u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE];
+};
+
+void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct file_priv *priv);
+ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off);
+ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off, struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv);
+
+#endif
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 5/7] tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 ++++--------------------------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 +++++++
4 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 8f07fcf..10e5827 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
+ tpm-dev-common.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..610638a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert-aZOuKsOsJu3MbYB6QlFGEg@public.gmane.org>
+ * Dave Safford <safford-aZOuKsOsJu3MbYB6QlFGEg@public.gmane.org>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer-aZOuKsOsJu3MbYB6QlFGEg@public.gmane.org>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Obsidian Research Corp
+ * Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe-ePGOBjL8dl3ta4EC/59zMFaTQe2KTcn/@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * Device file system interface to the TPM
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = (struct file_priv *)ptr;
+
+ pr_warn("TPM user space timeout is deprecated (pid=%d)\n",
+ task_tgid_nr(current));
+
+ schedule_work(&priv->work);
+}
+
+static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = container_of(work, struct file_priv, work);
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+}
+
+void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct file_priv *priv)
+{
+ priv->chip = chip;
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ mutex_init(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ setup_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
+ (unsigned long)priv);
+ INIT_WORK(&priv->work, timeout_work);
+
+ file->private_data = priv;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
+ ssize_t ret_size;
+ ssize_t orig_ret_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
+ flush_work(&priv->work);
+ ret_size = atomic_read(&priv->data_pending);
+ if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
+ orig_ret_size = ret_size;
+ if (size < ret_size)
+ ret_size = size;
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ rc = copy_to_user(buf, priv->data_buffer, ret_size);
+ memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
+ if (rc)
+ ret_size = -EFAULT;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ }
+
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+
+ return ret_size;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off, struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
+ size_t in_size = size;
+ ssize_t out_size;
+
+ /* Cannot perform a write until the read has cleared either via
+ * tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout. This also prevents split
+ * buffered writes from blocking here.
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->data_pending) != 0)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+
+ if (copy_from_user
+ (priv->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* atomic tpm command send and result receive. We only hold the ops
+ * lock during this period so that the tpm can be unregistered even if
+ * the char dev is held open.
+ */
+ if (tpm_try_get_ops(priv->chip)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EPIPE;
+ }
+ out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, space, priv->data_buffer,
+ sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
+
+ tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
+ if (out_size < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return out_size;
+ }
+
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, out_size);
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+
+ /* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
+ mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ));
+
+ return in_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called on file close
+ */
+void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv)
+{
+ del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
+ flush_work(&priv->work);
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index 414553b..ebd74ab 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -18,48 +18,15 @@
*
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include "tpm.h"
-
-struct file_priv {
- struct tpm_chip *chip;
-
- /* Data passed to and from the tpm via the read/write calls */
- atomic_t data_pending;
- struct mutex buffer_mutex;
-
- struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */
- struct work_struct work;
-
- u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE];
-};
-
-static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = (struct file_priv *)ptr;
-
- pr_warn("TPM user space timeout is deprecated (pid=%d)\n",
- task_tgid_nr(current));
-
- schedule_work(&priv->work);
-}
-
-static void timeout_work(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = container_of(work, struct file_priv, work);
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
- memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-}
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct tpm_chip *chip =
- container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdev);
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
struct file_priv *priv;
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdev);
+
/* It's assured that the chip will be opened just once,
* by the check of is_open variable, which is protected
* by driver_lock. */
@@ -69,100 +36,22 @@ static int tpm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
}
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (priv == NULL) {
- clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ goto out;
- priv->chip = chip;
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
- mutex_init(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- setup_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, user_reader_timeout,
- (unsigned long)priv);
- INIT_WORK(&priv->work, timeout_work);
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, priv);
- file->private_data = priv;
return 0;
-}
-
-static ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- size_t size, loff_t *off)
-{
- struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- ssize_t ret_size;
- int rc;
- del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
- flush_work(&priv->work);
- ret_size = atomic_read(&priv->data_pending);
- if (ret_size > 0) { /* relay data */
- ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
- if (size < ret_size)
- ret_size = size;
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- rc = copy_to_user(buf, priv->data_buffer, ret_size);
- memset(priv->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
- if (rc)
- ret_size = -EFAULT;
-
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- }
-
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
-
- return ret_size;
+ out:
+ clear_bit(0, &chip->is_open);
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *off)
{
- struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- size_t in_size = size;
- ssize_t out_size;
-
- /* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
- either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout.
- This also prevents splitted buffered writes from blocking here.
- */
- if (atomic_read(&priv->data_pending) != 0)
- return -EBUSY;
-
- if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
- return -E2BIG;
-
- mutex_lock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-
- if (copy_from_user
- (priv->data_buffer, (void __user *) buf, in_size)) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- /* atomic tpm command send and result receive. We only hold the ops
- * lock during this period so that the tpm can be unregistered even if
- * the char dev is held open.
- */
- if (tpm_try_get_ops(priv->chip)) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return -EPIPE;
- }
- out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, NULL, priv->data_buffer,
- sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
-
- tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
- if (out_size < 0) {
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
- return out_size;
- }
-
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, out_size);
- mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
-
- /* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
- mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ));
-
- return in_size;
+ return tpm_common_write(file, buf, size, off, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -172,12 +61,10 @@ static int tpm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
- del_singleshot_timer_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
- flush_work(&priv->work);
- file->private_data = NULL;
- atomic_set(&priv->data_pending, 0);
+ tpm_common_release(file, priv);
clear_bit(0, &priv->chip->is_open);
kfree(priv);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -185,9 +72,7 @@ const struct file_operations tpm_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.llseek = no_llseek,
.open = tpm_open,
- .read = tpm_read,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
.write = tpm_write,
.release = tpm_release,
};
-
-
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff15cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#ifndef _TPM_DEV_H
+#define _TPM_DEV_H
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+
+struct file_priv {
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+ /* Data passed to and from the tpm via the read/write calls */
+ atomic_t data_pending;
+ struct mutex buffer_mutex;
+
+ struct timer_list user_read_timer; /* user needs to claim result */
+ struct work_struct work;
+
+ u8 data_buffer[TPM_BUFSIZE];
+};
+
+void tpm_common_open(struct file *file, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct file_priv *priv);
+ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off);
+ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off, struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm_common_release(struct file *file, struct file_priv *priv);
+
+#endif
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 6/7] tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Currently the tpm spaces are not exposed to userspace. Make this
exposure via a separate device, which can now be opened multiple times
because each read/write transaction goes separately via the space.
Concurrency is protected by the chip->tpm_mutex for each read/write
transaction separately. The TPM is cleared of all transient objects
by the time the mutex is dropped, so there should be no interference
between the kernel and userspace.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 13 ++++++--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 +++
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 10e5827..23681f0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm-dev-common.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
+ tpm-dev-common.o tpmrm-dev.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o \
+ tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 364d92e..3db38f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ DEFINE_IDR(dev_nums_idr);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(idr_lock);
struct class *tpm_class;
+struct class *tpmrm_class;
dev_t tpm_devt;
/**
@@ -132,6 +133,14 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
kfree(chip);
}
+static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs);
+
+ /* release the master device reference */
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
+}
+
/**
* tpm_chip_alloc() - allocate a new struct tpm_chip instance
* @pdev: device to which the chip is associated
@@ -168,27 +177,47 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
chip->dev_num = rc;
device_initialize(&chip->dev);
+ device_initialize(&chip->devs);
chip->dev.class = tpm_class;
chip->dev.release = tpm_dev_release;
chip->dev.parent = pdev;
chip->dev.groups = chip->groups;
+ chip->devs.parent = pdev;
+ chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class;
+ chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release;
+ /* get extra reference on main device to hold on
+ * behalf of devs. This holds the chip structure
+ * while cdevs is in use. The corresponding put
+ * is in the tpm_devs_release
+ */
+ get_device(&chip->dev);
+
if (chip->dev_num == 0)
chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MISC_MAJOR, TPM_MINOR);
else
chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num);
+ chip->devs.devt =
+ MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+
rc = dev_set_name(&chip->dev, "tpm%d", chip->dev_num);
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (!pdev)
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL;
cdev_init(&chip->cdev, &tpm_fops);
+ cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops);
chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+ chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE;
chip->cdev.kobj.parent = &chip->dev.kobj;
+ chip->cdevs.kobj.parent = &chip->devs.kobj;
chip->work_space.context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chip->work_space.context_buf) {
@@ -199,6 +228,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
return chip;
out:
+ put_device(&chip->devs);
put_device(&chip->dev);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
@@ -263,7 +293,6 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
"unable to cdev_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
dev_name(&chip->dev), MAJOR(chip->dev.devt),
MINOR(chip->dev.devt), rc);
-
return rc;
}
@@ -277,6 +306,29 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ rc = cdev_add(&chip->cdevs, chip->devs.devt, 1);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev,
+ "unable to cdev_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
+ dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt),
+ MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc);
+ tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ rc = device_add(&chip->devs);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev,
+ "unable to device_register() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
+ dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt),
+ MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc);
+ cdev_del(&chip->cdevs);
+ tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
/* Make the chip available. */
mutex_lock(&idr_lock);
idr_replace(&dev_nums_idr, chip, chip->dev_num);
@@ -392,6 +444,10 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip);
tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip);
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+ cdev_del(&chip->cdevs);
+ device_del(&chip->devs);
+ }
tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index db5ffe9..e38c792 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -1257,9 +1257,17 @@ static int __init tpm_init(void)
return PTR_ERR(tpm_class);
}
- rc = alloc_chrdev_region(&tpm_devt, 0, TPM_NUM_DEVICES, "tpm");
+ tpmrm_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "tpmrm");
+ if (IS_ERR(tpmrm_class)) {
+ pr_err("couldn't create tpmrm class\n");
+ class_destroy(tpm_class);
+ return PTR_ERR(tpmrm_class);
+ }
+
+ rc = alloc_chrdev_region(&tpm_devt, 0, 2*TPM_NUM_DEVICES, "tpm");
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("tpm: failed to allocate char dev region\n");
+ class_destroy(tpmrm_class);
class_destroy(tpm_class);
return rc;
}
@@ -1271,7 +1279,8 @@ static void __exit tpm_exit(void)
{
idr_destroy(&dev_nums_idr);
class_destroy(tpm_class);
- unregister_chrdev_region(tpm_devt, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+ class_destroy(tpmrm_class);
+ unregister_chrdev_region(tpm_devt, 2*TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
}
subsys_initcall(tpm_init);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 023fc02..16dd207 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -182,7 +182,9 @@ struct tpm_chip_seqops {
struct tpm_chip {
struct device dev;
+ struct device devs;
struct cdev cdev;
+ struct cdev cdevs;
/* A driver callback under ops cannot be run unless ops_sem is held
* (sometimes implicitly, eg for the sysfs code). ops becomes null
@@ -510,8 +512,10 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
}
extern struct class *tpm_class;
+extern struct class *tpmrm_class;
extern dev_t tpm_devt;
extern const struct file_operations tpm_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops;
extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
enum tpm_transmit_flags {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..630bddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ *
+ * GPLv2
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+struct tpmrm_priv {
+ struct file_priv priv;
+ struct tpm_space space;
+};
+
+static int tpmrm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdevs);
+ priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = tpm2_init_space(&priv->space);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(priv);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, &priv->priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
+ tpm2_del_space(&priv->space);
+ kfree(priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpmrm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ return tpm_common_write(file, buf, size, off, &priv->space);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .open = tpmrm_open,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
+ .write = tpmrm_write,
+ .release = tpmrm_release,
+};
+
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 6/7] tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Currently the tpm spaces are not exposed to userspace. Make this
exposure via a separate device, which can now be opened multiple times
because each read/write transaction goes separately via the space.
Concurrency is protected by the chip->tpm_mutex for each read/write
transaction separately. The TPM is cleared of all transient objects
by the time the mutex is dropped, so there should be no interference
between the kernel and userspace.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 13 ++++++--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 +++
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 10e5827..23681f0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
- tpm-dev-common.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o tpm2-space.o
+ tpm-dev-common.o tpmrm-dev.o tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o \
+ tpm2-space.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 364d92e..3db38f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ DEFINE_IDR(dev_nums_idr);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(idr_lock);
struct class *tpm_class;
+struct class *tpmrm_class;
dev_t tpm_devt;
/**
@@ -132,6 +133,14 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
kfree(chip);
}
+static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs);
+
+ /* release the master device reference */
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
+}
+
/**
* tpm_chip_alloc() - allocate a new struct tpm_chip instance
* @pdev: device to which the chip is associated
@@ -168,27 +177,47 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
chip->dev_num = rc;
device_initialize(&chip->dev);
+ device_initialize(&chip->devs);
chip->dev.class = tpm_class;
chip->dev.release = tpm_dev_release;
chip->dev.parent = pdev;
chip->dev.groups = chip->groups;
+ chip->devs.parent = pdev;
+ chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class;
+ chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release;
+ /* get extra reference on main device to hold on
+ * behalf of devs. This holds the chip structure
+ * while cdevs is in use. The corresponding put
+ * is in the tpm_devs_release
+ */
+ get_device(&chip->dev);
+
if (chip->dev_num == 0)
chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MISC_MAJOR, TPM_MINOR);
else
chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num);
+ chip->devs.devt =
+ MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+
rc = dev_set_name(&chip->dev, "tpm%d", chip->dev_num);
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (!pdev)
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL;
cdev_init(&chip->cdev, &tpm_fops);
+ cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops);
chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+ chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE;
chip->cdev.kobj.parent = &chip->dev.kobj;
+ chip->cdevs.kobj.parent = &chip->devs.kobj;
chip->work_space.context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!chip->work_space.context_buf) {
@@ -199,6 +228,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
return chip;
out:
+ put_device(&chip->devs);
put_device(&chip->dev);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
@@ -263,7 +293,6 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
"unable to cdev_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
dev_name(&chip->dev), MAJOR(chip->dev.devt),
MINOR(chip->dev.devt), rc);
-
return rc;
}
@@ -277,6 +306,29 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ rc = cdev_add(&chip->cdevs, chip->devs.devt, 1);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev,
+ "unable to cdev_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
+ dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt),
+ MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc);
+ tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ rc = device_add(&chip->devs);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev,
+ "unable to device_register() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n",
+ dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt),
+ MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc);
+ cdev_del(&chip->cdevs);
+ tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
/* Make the chip available. */
mutex_lock(&idr_lock);
idr_replace(&dev_nums_idr, chip, chip->dev_num);
@@ -392,6 +444,10 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip);
tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip);
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+ cdev_del(&chip->cdevs);
+ device_del(&chip->devs);
+ }
tpm_del_char_device(chip, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index db5ffe9..e38c792 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -1257,9 +1257,17 @@ static int __init tpm_init(void)
return PTR_ERR(tpm_class);
}
- rc = alloc_chrdev_region(&tpm_devt, 0, TPM_NUM_DEVICES, "tpm");
+ tpmrm_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "tpmrm");
+ if (IS_ERR(tpmrm_class)) {
+ pr_err("couldn't create tpmrm class\n");
+ class_destroy(tpm_class);
+ return PTR_ERR(tpmrm_class);
+ }
+
+ rc = alloc_chrdev_region(&tpm_devt, 0, 2*TPM_NUM_DEVICES, "tpm");
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("tpm: failed to allocate char dev region\n");
+ class_destroy(tpmrm_class);
class_destroy(tpm_class);
return rc;
}
@@ -1271,7 +1279,8 @@ static void __exit tpm_exit(void)
{
idr_destroy(&dev_nums_idr);
class_destroy(tpm_class);
- unregister_chrdev_region(tpm_devt, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
+ class_destroy(tpmrm_class);
+ unregister_chrdev_region(tpm_devt, 2*TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
}
subsys_initcall(tpm_init);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 023fc02..16dd207 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -182,7 +182,9 @@ struct tpm_chip_seqops {
struct tpm_chip {
struct device dev;
+ struct device devs;
struct cdev cdev;
+ struct cdev cdevs;
/* A driver callback under ops cannot be run unless ops_sem is held
* (sometimes implicitly, eg for the sysfs code). ops becomes null
@@ -510,8 +512,10 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
}
extern struct class *tpm_class;
+extern struct class *tpmrm_class;
extern dev_t tpm_devt;
extern const struct file_operations tpm_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops;
extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
enum tpm_transmit_flags {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..630bddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org
+ *
+ * GPLv2
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "tpm-dev.h"
+
+struct tpmrm_priv {
+ struct file_priv priv;
+ struct tpm_space space;
+};
+
+static int tpmrm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct tpm_chip, cdevs);
+ priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (priv == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = tpm2_init_space(&priv->space);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(priv);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tpm_common_open(file, chip, &priv->priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
+ tpm2_del_space(&priv->space);
+ kfree(priv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t tpmrm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *off)
+{
+ struct file_priv *fpriv = file->private_data;
+ struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
+
+ return tpm_common_write(file, buf, size, off, &priv->space);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .open = tpmrm_open,
+ .read = tpm_common_read,
+ .write = tpmrm_write,
+ .release = tpmrm_release,
+};
+
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 7/7] tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space code
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Marcel Selhorst, Jason Gunthorpe,
open list
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Sessions are different from transient objects in that their handles
may not be virtualized (because they're used for some hmac
calculations). Additionally when a session is context saved, a
vestigial memory remains in the TPM and if it is also flushed, that
will be lost and the session context will refuse to load next time, so
the code is updated to flush only transient objects after a context
save. Add a separate array (chip->session_tbl) to save and restore
sessions by handle. Use the failure of a context save or load to
signal that the session has been flushed from the TPM and we can
remove its memory from chip->session_tbl.
Sessions are also isolated during each instance of a tpm space. This
means that spaces shouldn't be able to see each other's sessions and
is enforced by ensuring that a space user may only refer to sessions
handles that are present in their own chip->session_tbl. Finally when
a space is closed, all the sessions belonging to it should be flushed
so the handles may be re-used by other spaces.
Note that if we get a session save or load error, all sessions are
effectively flushed. Even though we restore the session buffer, all
the old sessions will refuse to load after the flush and they'll be
purged from our session memory. This means that while transient
context handling is still soft in the face of errors, session handling
is hard (any failure of the model means all sessions are lost).
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 6 +++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 3db38f9..27a76e7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log);
kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
+ kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf);
kfree(chip);
}
@@ -224,6 +225,11 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ chip->work_space.session_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chip->work_space.session_buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
return chip;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 16dd207..5eacb3f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
struct tpm_space {
u32 context_tbl[3];
u8 *context_buf;
+ u32 session_tbl[3];
+ u8 *session_buf;
};
enum tpm_chip_flags {
@@ -588,7 +590,7 @@ unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space);
-void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space);
int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
u8 *cmd);
int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
index e955548..d36d81e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -32,18 +32,39 @@ struct tpm2_context {
__be16 blob_size;
} __packed;
+static void tpm2_flush_sessions(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ if (space->session_tbl[i])
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->session_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ }
+}
+
int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space)
{
space->context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!space->context_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
+ space->session_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (space->session_buf == NULL) {
+ kfree(space->context_buf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
-void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
{
+ mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ tpm2_flush_sessions(chip, space);
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
kfree(space->context_buf);
+ kfree(space->session_buf);
}
static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
@@ -69,6 +90,20 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
__func__, rc);
tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HANDLE ||
+ rc == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
+ /*
+ * TPM_RC_HANDLE means that the session context can't
+ * be loaded because of an internal counter mismatch
+ * that makes the TPM think there might have been a
+ * replay. This might happen if the context was saved
+ * and loaded outside the space.
+ *
+ * TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0 means the session has been
+ * flushed outside the space
+ */
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
} else if (rc > 0) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
__func__, rc);
@@ -121,7 +156,6 @@ static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
}
memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
- tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
*offset += body_size;
tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return 0;
@@ -136,6 +170,8 @@ static void tpm2_flush_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
if (space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i])
tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+
+ tpm2_flush_sessions(chip, space);
}
static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
@@ -161,6 +197,28 @@ static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ u32 handle;
+
+ if (!space->session_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, space->session_buf,
+ &offset, &handle);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* load failed, just forget session */
+ space->session_tbl[i] = 0;
+ } else if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (handle != space->session_tbl[i]) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "session restored to wrong handle\n");
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -215,7 +273,10 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
memcpy(&chip->work_space.context_tbl, &space->context_tbl,
sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(&chip->work_space.session_tbl, &space->session_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->session_tbl));
memcpy(chip->work_space.context_buf, space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(chip->work_space.session_buf, space->session_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
rc = tpm2_load_space(chip);
if (rc) {
@@ -232,6 +293,22 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
return 0;
}
+static bool tpm2_add_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++)
+ if (space->session_tbl[i] == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl))
+ return false;
+
+ space->session_tbl[i] = handle;
+ return true;
+}
+
static u32 tpm2_map_to_vhandle(struct tpm_space *space, u32 phandle, bool alloc)
{
int i;
@@ -288,6 +365,8 @@ static int tpm2_map_response_header(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
break;
case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ if (!tpm2_add_session(chip, phandle))
+ goto out_no_slots;
break;
default:
dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
@@ -388,9 +467,28 @@ static int tpm2_save_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
} else if (rc)
return rc;
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
space->context_tbl[i] = ~0;
}
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!space->session_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, space->session_tbl[i],
+ space->session_buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &offset);
+
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* handle error saving session, just forget it */
+ space->session_tbl[i] = 0;
+ } else if (rc < 0) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -425,7 +523,10 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
memcpy(&space->context_tbl, &chip->work_space.context_tbl,
sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(&space->session_tbl, &chip->work_space.session_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->session_tbl));
memcpy(space->context_buf, chip->work_space.context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(space->session_buf, chip->work_space.session_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
index 630bddc..c636e7f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
- tpm2_del_space(&priv->space);
+ tpm2_del_space(fpriv->chip, &priv->space);
kfree(priv);
return 0;
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 7/7] tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space code
@ 2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-03 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, open list,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Sessions are different from transient objects in that their handles
may not be virtualized (because they're used for some hmac
calculations). Additionally when a session is context saved, a
vestigial memory remains in the TPM and if it is also flushed, that
will be lost and the session context will refuse to load next time, so
the code is updated to flush only transient objects after a context
save. Add a separate array (chip->session_tbl) to save and restore
sessions by handle. Use the failure of a context save or load to
signal that the session has been flushed from the TPM and we can
remove its memory from chip->session_tbl.
Sessions are also isolated during each instance of a tpm space. This
means that spaces shouldn't be able to see each other's sessions and
is enforced by ensuring that a space user may only refer to sessions
handles that are present in their own chip->session_tbl. Finally when
a space is closed, all the sessions belonging to it should be flushed
so the handles may be re-used by other spaces.
Note that if we get a session save or load error, all sessions are
effectively flushed. Even though we restore the session buffer, all
the old sessions will refuse to load after the flush and they'll be
purged from our session memory. This means that while transient
context handling is still soft in the face of errors, session handling
is hard (any failure of the model means all sessions are lost).
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 6 +++
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 3db38f9..27a76e7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log);
kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
+ kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf);
kfree(chip);
}
@@ -224,6 +225,11 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ chip->work_space.session_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chip->work_space.session_buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
return chip;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 16dd207..5eacb3f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ enum tpm2_cc_attrs {
struct tpm_space {
u32 context_tbl[3];
u8 *context_buf;
+ u32 session_tbl[3];
+ u8 *session_buf;
};
enum tpm_chip_flags {
@@ -588,7 +590,7 @@ unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc);
int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space);
-void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space);
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space);
int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
u8 *cmd);
int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
index e955548..d36d81e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -32,18 +32,39 @@ struct tpm2_context {
__be16 blob_size;
} __packed;
+static void tpm2_flush_sessions(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ if (space->session_tbl[i])
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->session_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ }
+}
+
int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space)
{
space->context_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!space->context_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
+ space->session_buf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (space->session_buf == NULL) {
+ kfree(space->context_buf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
-void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_space *space)
+void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
{
+ mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ tpm2_flush_sessions(chip, space);
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
kfree(space->context_buf);
+ kfree(space->session_buf);
}
static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
@@ -69,6 +90,20 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
__func__, rc);
tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HANDLE ||
+ rc == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
+ /*
+ * TPM_RC_HANDLE means that the session context can't
+ * be loaded because of an internal counter mismatch
+ * that makes the TPM think there might have been a
+ * replay. This might happen if the context was saved
+ * and loaded outside the space.
+ *
+ * TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0 means the session has been
+ * flushed outside the space
+ */
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
} else if (rc > 0) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
__func__, rc);
@@ -121,7 +156,6 @@ static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
}
memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
- tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
*offset += body_size;
tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return 0;
@@ -136,6 +170,8 @@ static void tpm2_flush_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
if (space->context_tbl[i] && ~space->context_tbl[i])
tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+
+ tpm2_flush_sessions(chip, space);
}
static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
@@ -161,6 +197,28 @@ static int tpm2_load_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ u32 handle;
+
+ if (!space->session_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, space->session_buf,
+ &offset, &handle);
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* load failed, just forget session */
+ space->session_tbl[i] = 0;
+ } else if (rc) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (handle != space->session_tbl[i]) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "session restored to wrong handle\n");
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -215,7 +273,10 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
memcpy(&chip->work_space.context_tbl, &space->context_tbl,
sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(&chip->work_space.session_tbl, &space->session_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->session_tbl));
memcpy(chip->work_space.context_buf, space->context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(chip->work_space.session_buf, space->session_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
rc = tpm2_load_space(chip);
if (rc) {
@@ -232,6 +293,22 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u32 cc,
return 0;
}
+static bool tpm2_add_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
+{
+ struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++)
+ if (space->session_tbl[i] == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl))
+ return false;
+
+ space->session_tbl[i] = handle;
+ return true;
+}
+
static u32 tpm2_map_to_vhandle(struct tpm_space *space, u32 phandle, bool alloc)
{
int i;
@@ -288,6 +365,8 @@ static int tpm2_map_response_header(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *rsp,
break;
case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ if (!tpm2_add_session(chip, phandle))
+ goto out_no_slots;
break;
default:
dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: unknown handle 0x%08X\n",
@@ -388,9 +467,28 @@ static int tpm2_save_space(struct tpm_chip *chip)
} else if (rc)
return rc;
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, space->context_tbl[i],
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
space->context_tbl[i] = ~0;
}
+ for (i = 0, offset = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(space->session_tbl); i++) {
+ if (!space->session_tbl[i])
+ continue;
+
+ rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, space->session_tbl[i],
+ space->session_buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ &offset);
+
+ if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* handle error saving session, just forget it */
+ space->session_tbl[i] = 0;
+ } else if (rc < 0) {
+ tpm2_flush_space(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -425,7 +523,10 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
memcpy(&space->context_tbl, &chip->work_space.context_tbl,
sizeof(space->context_tbl));
+ memcpy(&space->session_tbl, &chip->work_space.session_tbl,
+ sizeof(space->session_tbl));
memcpy(space->context_buf, chip->work_space.context_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(space->session_buf, chip->work_space.session_buf, PAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
index 630bddc..c636e7f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int tpmrm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
struct tpmrm_priv *priv = container_of(fpriv, struct tpmrm_priv, priv);
tpm_common_release(file, fpriv);
- tpm2_del_space(&priv->space);
+ tpm2_del_space(fpriv->chip, &priv->space);
kfree(priv);
return 0;
--
2.9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
@ 2017-03-06 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-06 21:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jason Gunthorpe, open list
On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 05:19:01PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
> execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
> space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
> swapped out after the use.
>
> There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
>
> git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
>
> A simple smoke test suite can be run by
>
> sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
>
> v3:
> * Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
> proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
> with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
>
> v2:
> * Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
> * Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
> * Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
> header match in tpm_transmit().
>
>
> James Bottomley (3):
> tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
> tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
> tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
> code
>
> Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
> tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
> tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
> tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
> tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
>
> drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
> 11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
Should I put this available to linux-next? I would think it would
make sense. I'm still looking forward to get more reviewed-by's
and tested-by's but that way it might be easier to get those...
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
@ 2017-03-06 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-06 21:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, open list
On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 05:19:01PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
> execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
> space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
> swapped out after the use.
>
> There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
>
> git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
>
> A simple smoke test suite can be run by
>
> sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
>
> v3:
> * Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
> proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
> with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
>
> v2:
> * Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
> * Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
> * Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
> header match in tpm_transmit().
>
>
> James Bottomley (3):
> tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
> tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
> tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
> code
>
> Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
> tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
> tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
> tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
> tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
>
> drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
> 11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
Should I put this available to linux-next? I would think it would
make sense. I'm still looking forward to get more reviewed-by's
and tested-by's but that way it might be easier to get those...
/Jarkko
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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dictionary content that is easy and intuitive to access. Sign up for an
account today to start using our lexical data to power your apps and
projects. Get started today and enter our developer competition.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2017-03-11 8:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-11 8:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tpmdd-devel
Cc: linux-security-module, James.Bottomley, dhowells,
Jason Gunthorpe, open list, philip.b.tricca, kai.svahn,
Kenneth Goldman, monty.wiseman
On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 05:19:01PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
> execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
> space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
> swapped out after the use.
>
> There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
>
> git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
>
> A simple smoke test suite can be run by
>
> sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
>
> v3:
> * Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
> proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
> with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
>
> v2:
> * Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
> * Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
> * Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
> header match in tpm_transmit().
>
>
> James Bottomley (3):
> tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
> tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
> tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
> code
>
> Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
> tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
> tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
> tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
> tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
>
> drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
> 11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
These commits are now in my master and next branches. Tested-by's are
still most welcome!
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager
@ 2017-03-11 8:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-11 8:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 05:19:01PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This patch set adds support for TPM spaces that provide an isolated
> execution context for transient objects and HMAC and policy sessions. A
> space is swapped into TPM volatile memory only when it is used and
> swapped out after the use.
>
> There's a test script for trying out TPM spaces in
>
> git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/tpm2-scripts.git
>
> A simple smoke test suite can be run by
>
> sudo python -m unittest -v tpm2_smoke.SpaceTest
>
> v3:
> * Reverted back to /dev/tpmrm0 that was actually James' original
> proposal. It's the most pragmatic choice as it cannot be mixed
> with other TPM 2.0 and kernel idioms easily.
>
> v2:
> * Substitute virtual handle in ContextSave.
> * Substitute virtual handles in GetCapability.
> * Validate that the real response length and the one reported in the
> header match in tpm_transmit().
>
>
> James Bottomley (3):
> tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c
> tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>
> tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space
> code
>
> Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
> tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit()
> tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
> tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd
> tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
>
> drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 3 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 71 ++++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 148 +++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c | 143 +---------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h | 27 ++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 131 +++++++---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 49 +++-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 173 +++++++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c | 65 +++++
> 11 files changed, 1123 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpmrm-dev.c
>
> --
> 2.9.3
>
These commits are now in my master and next branches. Tested-by's are
still most welcome!
/Jarkko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
(?)
@ 2017-03-17 15:40 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-17 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen, tpmdd-devel
Cc: dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley, linux-security-module,
peterhuewe
> Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> and the handle area.
This breaks several use cases for me:
1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the TPM never sees the command.
>From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
I see two possible solutions:
1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway, rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 15:40 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com @ 2017-03-17 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
> Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> and the handle area.
This breaks several use cases for me:
1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the TPM never sees the command.
>From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
I see two possible solutions:
1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway, rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%???????\x17??w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w*\x1fjg???\x1e???????j??\a??G??????\f???j:+v???w?j?m?????\x1e??\x1e?w?????f???h?????????
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 15:40 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w @ 2017-03-17 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
> Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> and the handle area.
This breaks several use cases for me:
1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the TPM never sees the command.
>From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
I see two possible solutions:
1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway, rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
Alexander
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
(?)
@ 2017-03-17 15:41 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-17 15:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen, tpmdd-devel
Cc: dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley, linux-security-module,
peterhuewe
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> interface.c
> index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> * 0 when the operation is successful.
> * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> */
> -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> - unsigned int flags)
> +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter "space" here.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-17 15:41 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com @ 2017-03-17 15:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> interface.c
> index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> * 0 when the operation is successful.
> * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> */
> -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> - unsigned int flags)
> +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter "space" here.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%???????\x17??w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w*\x1fjg???\x1e???????j??\a??G??????\f???j:+v???w?j?m?????\x1e??\x1e?w?????f???h?????????
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-17 15:41 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w @ 2017-03-17 15:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> interface.c
> index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> * 0 when the operation is successful.
> * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> */
> -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> - unsigned int flags)
> +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter "space" here.
Alexander
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-17 15:40 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
@ 2017-03-17 16:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-03-17 16:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen
Cc: jarkko.sakkinen, tpmdd-devel, dhowells, James.Bottomley,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:40:15PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command
> codes. Those cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected
> with EINVAL.
>
> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths
and status code right?
This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something
specifically for this special case.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 16:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-03-17 16:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:40:15PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command
> codes. Those cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected
> with EINVAL.
>
> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths
and status code right?
This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something
specifically for this special case.
Jason
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-17 16:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
(?)
@ 2017-03-17 16:35 ` Peter.Huewe at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Peter.Huewe @ 2017-03-17 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jgunthorpe, Alexander.Steffen
Cc: James.Bottomley, linux-kernel, dhowells, linux-security-module,
tpmdd-devel
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and status code right?
>This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically for this special case.
It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2 commands.
Peter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 16:35 ` Peter.Huewe at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Peter.Huewe at infineon.com @ 2017-03-17 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and status code right?
>This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically for this special case.
It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2 commands.
Peter
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 16:35 ` Peter.Huewe at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Peter.Huewe-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w @ 2017-03-17 16:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jgunthorpe-ePGOBjL8dl3ta4EC/59zMFaTQe2KTcn/,
Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and status code right?
>This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically for this special case.
It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2 commands.
Peter
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-17 15:40 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-17 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen
Cc: tpmdd-devel, dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley,
linux-security-module, peterhuewe
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:40:15PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
> > Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> > the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> > and the handle area.
>
> This breaks several use cases for me:
Thank you for reporting these. This is really great feedback to get.
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>
> 3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So
> for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect
> TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the
> TPM never sees the command.
>
> From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent
> communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n>
> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and
> return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up
> reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of
> the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently
> than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
>
> I see two possible solutions:
>
> 1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the
> command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects
> though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
>
> 2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM
> spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will
> not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As
> /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway,
> rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
>
> Alexander
I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
validation to the resource manager. If I send a fix, would you care to
test it? If your issues get sorted, I'll squash it to the existing
commits.
Thanks again!
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:40:15PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> > Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> > the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> > and the handle area.
>
> This breaks several use cases for me:
Thank you for reporting these. This is really great feedback to get.
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>
> 3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So
> for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect
> TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the
> TPM never sees the command.
>
> From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent
> communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n>
> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and
> return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up
> reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of
> the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently
> than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
>
> I see two possible solutions:
>
> 1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the
> command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects
> though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
>
> 2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM
> spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will
> not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As
> /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway,
> rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
>
> Alexander
I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
validation to the resource manager. If I send a fix, would you care to
test it? If your issues get sorted, I'll squash it to the existing
commits.
Thanks again!
/Jarkko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-17 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:40:15PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org wrote:
> > Check for every TPM 2.0 command that the command code is supported and
> > the command buffer has at least the length that can contain the header
> > and the handle area.
>
> This breaks several use cases for me:
Thank you for reporting these. This is really great feedback to get.
> 1. I've got a TPM that implements vendor-specific command codes. Those
> cannot be send to the TPM anymore, but are rejected with EINVAL.
>
> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>
> 3. I'd like to use the kernel driver to test my TPM implementation. So
> for example, I send an invalid command code to the TPM and expect
> TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE in response, but now I get EINVAL instead and the
> TPM never sees the command.
>
> From my point of view, the kernel driver should provide a transparent
> communication channel to the TPM. Whatever I write to /dev/tpm<n>
> should arrive at the TPM device, so that the TPM can handle it and
> return the appropriate response. Otherwise, you'll end up
> reimplementing all the command handling logic, that is already part of
> the TPM's job, and as soon as you miss one case and behave differently
> than the TPM, something relying on this behavior will break.
>
> I see two possible solutions:
>
> 1. When the driver does not know a command code, it passes through the
> command unmodified. This bears the risk of unknown side effects
> though, so TPM spaces might not be as independent as they should be.
>
> 2. Since the command code lookup is only really necessary for TPM
> spaces, it only gets activated when space != NULL. So the change will
> not affect /dev/tpm<n>, but only the new /dev/tpmrm<n>. As
> /dev/tpmrm<n> is not meant to be a transparent interface anyway,
> rejecting unknown commands is acceptable.
>
> Alexander
I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
validation to the resource manager. If I send a fix, would you care to
test it? If your issues get sorted, I'll squash it to the existing
commits.
Thanks again!
/Jarkko
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
2017-03-17 15:41 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-17 20:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen
Cc: tpmdd-devel, dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley,
linux-security-module, peterhuewe
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:41:38PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> > interface.c
> > index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> > tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> > * 0 when the operation is successful.
> > * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> > */
> > -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> > - unsigned int flags)
> > +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> > + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
>
> When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation
> at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter
> "space" here.
I missed that. I'll update the commits with the proper documentation.
> Alexander
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-17 20:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:41:38PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> > interface.c
> > index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> > tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> > * 0 when the operation is successful.
> > * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> > */
> > -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> > - unsigned int flags)
> > +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> > + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
>
> When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation
> at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter
> "space" here.
I missed that. I'll update the commits with the proper documentation.
> Alexander
/Jarkko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces
@ 2017-03-17 20:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-17 20:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 03:41:38PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org wrote:
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-
> > interface.c
> > index 20b1fe3..db5ffe9 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > @@ -376,11 +376,12 @@ static bool tpm_validate_command(struct
> > tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *cmd,
> > * 0 when the operation is successful.
> > * A negative number for system errors (errno).
> > */
> > -ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
> > - unsigned int flags)
> > +ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space,
> > + u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags)
>
> When adding parameters, please also update the parameter documentation
> at the top of the function. It is missing for the new parameter
> "space" here.
I missed that. I'll update the commits with the proper documentation.
> Alexander
/Jarkko
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-17 16:35 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Peter.Huewe at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-20 9:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter.Huewe, jgunthorpe
Cc: James.Bottomley, linux-kernel, dhowells, linux-security-module,
tpmdd-devel
>>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>>
>> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
>> status code right?
>>
>> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
>> for this special case.
>
> It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> commands.
Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted, e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process, leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I'll try to work on those problems in the coming weeks and provide the fixes. Any input is appreciated.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com @ 2017-03-20 9:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
>>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>>
>> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
>> status code right?
>>
>> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
>> for this special case.
>
> It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> commands.
Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted, e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process, leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I'll try to work on those problems in the coming weeks and provide the fixes. Any input is appreciated.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%???????\x17??w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w*\x1fjg???\x1e???????j??\a??G??????\f???j:+v???w?j?m?????\x1e??\x1e?w?????f???h?????????
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-20 9:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter.Huewe, jgunthorpe
Cc: James.Bottomley, linux-kernel, dhowells, linux-security-module,
tpmdd-devel
>>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
>>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
>>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
>>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
>>
>> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
>> status code right?
>>
>> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
>> for this special case.
>
> It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> commands.
Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted, e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process, leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I'll try to work on those problems in the coming weeks and provide the fixes. Any input is appreciated.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-17 20:42 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
(?)
@ 2017-03-20 9:56 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-20 9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen
Cc: tpmdd-devel, dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley,
linux-security-module, peterhuewe
> I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> validation to the resource manager.
Sounds good to me.
> If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
Sure, will do.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 9:56 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com @ 2017-03-20 9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
> I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> validation to the resource manager.
Sounds good to me.
> If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
Sure, will do.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%???????\x17??w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w*\x1fjg???\x1e???????j??\a??G??????\f???j:+v???w?j?m?????\x1e??\x1e?w?????f???h?????????
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 9:56 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w @ 2017-03-20 9:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko.sakkinen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
> I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> validation to the resource manager.
Sounds good to me.
> If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
Sure, will do.
Alexander
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-20 17:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-03-20 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen
Cc: Peter.Huewe, James.Bottomley, linux-kernel, dhowells,
linux-security-module, tpmdd-devel
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:54:41AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
> >>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> >>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> >>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> >>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
> >>
> >> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
> >> status code right?
> >>
> >> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
> >> for this special case.
> >
> > It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> > commands.
>
> Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
It would be nice to do this via plug/unplug with existing sysfs
machinery.
> Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted,
> e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its
> non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a
> valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the
> device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process,
> leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I guess you'd have to teach the TPM core about a new chip mode besides
1.2, 2.0 - some kind of 'upgrade' mode.
So the flow would be to send the upgrade command, unplug/replug the
driver to switch to 'upgrade' mode (which could happen if there was a
reboot?) do the upgrade, then unplug/replug to rediscover the 'new'
TPM.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 17:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-03-20 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:54:41AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> >>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> >>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> >>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> >>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
> >>
> >> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
> >> status code right?
> >>
> >> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
> >> for this special case.
> >
> > It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> > commands.
>
> Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
It would be nice to do this via plug/unplug with existing sysfs
machinery.
> Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted,
> e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its
> non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a
> valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the
> device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process,
> leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I guess you'd have to teach the TPM core about a new chip mode besides
1.2, 2.0 - some kind of 'upgrade' mode.
So the flow would be to send the upgrade command, unplug/replug the
driver to switch to 'upgrade' mode (which could happen if there was a
reboot?) do the upgrade, then unplug/replug to rediscover the 'new'
TPM.
Jason
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 17:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2017-03-20 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
Cc: dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:54:41AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org wrote:
> >>> 2. When upgrading the firmware on my TPM, it switches to a
> >>> non-standard communication mode for the upgrade process and does not
> >>> communicate using TPM2.0 commands during this time. Rejecting
> >>> non-TPM2.0 commands means upgrading won't be possible anymore.
> >>
> >> How non standard? Is the basic header even there? Are the lengths and
> >> status code right?
> >>
> >> This might be an argument to add a 'raw' ioctl or something specifically
> >> for this special case.
> >
> > It follows the regular TPM command syntax and looks something like 1.2
> > commands.
>
> Yep, so most of it already works with the current implementation.
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
It would be nice to do this via plug/unplug with existing sysfs
machinery.
> Another problem arises when the upgrade process is interrupted,
> e.g. because power is lost. Then the TPM is stuck in its
> non-standard upgrade mode, so the kernel does not recognize it as a
> valid TPM device and does not export /dev/tpm<n>. But without the
> device node the upgrader is unable to restart the upgrade process,
> leaving the TPM forever inaccessible.
I guess you'd have to teach the TPM core about a new chip mode besides
1.2, 2.0 - some kind of 'upgrade' mode.
So the flow would be to send the upgrade command, unplug/replug the
driver to switch to 'upgrade' mode (which could happen if there was a
reboot?) do the upgrade, then unplug/replug to rediscover the 'new'
TPM.
Jason
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-20 19:42 ` Ken Goldman
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Ken Goldman @ 2017-03-20 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module, tpmdd-devel, linux-kernel
On 3/20/2017 5:54 AM, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 19:42 ` Ken Goldman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Ken Goldman @ 2017-03-20 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 3/20/2017 5:54 AM, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-20 19:42 ` Ken Goldman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Ken Goldman @ 2017-03-20 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
On 3/20/2017 5:54 AM, Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org wrote:
>
> There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-20 19:42 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Ken Goldman
(?)
@ 2017-03-21 15:44 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen @ 2017-03-21 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kgold; +Cc: linux-security-module, tpmdd-devel, linux-kernel
> > There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> > example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> > from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> > the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> > timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> > manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
>
> In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
> without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
>
> 1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
>
> 2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
For a traditional PC and when your goal is platform integrity, a reboot is probably the way to go. But in an embedded environment where there is no BIOS or if you use the TPM more like a smartcard just to store some keys (or generate random numbers), a reboot is unnecessary and it is more comfortable to avoid it.
We probably should inform the kernel before the upgrade anyway, so that it can shut down the TPM gracefully (and maybe switch to the upgrade mode, as Jason suggested). With that infrastructure in place, it does not seem like a lot of effort to also let it switch the TPM back to normal operation mode once the upgrade is complete.
Alexander
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-21 15:44 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com @ 2017-03-21 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
> > There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> > example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> > from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> > the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> > timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> > manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
>
> In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
> without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
>
> 1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
>
> 2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
For a traditional PC and when your goal is platform integrity, a reboot is probably the way to go. But in an embedded environment where there is no BIOS or if you use the TPM more like a smartcard just to store some keys (or generate random numbers), a reboot is unnecessary and it is more comfortable to avoid it.
We probably should inform the kernel before the upgrade anyway, so that it can shut down the TPM gracefully (and maybe switch to the upgrade mode, as Jason suggested). With that infrastructure in place, it does not seem like a lot of effort to also let it switch the TPM back to normal operation mode once the upgrade is complete.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%???????\x17??w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w*\x1fjg???\x1e???????j??\a??G??????\f???j:+v???w?j?m?????\x1e??\x1e?w?????f???h?????????
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-21 15:44 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w @ 2017-03-21 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kgold-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8
Cc: linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
> > There are a few special cases that need some thought though. For
> > example, it is possible to use an upgrade to switch the TPM family
> > from 1.2 to 2.0 (or vice versa). In this case it seems useful to let
> > the kernel reinitialize the TPM driver, so it uses the correct
> > timeouts for communication, activates the correct features (resource
> > manager or not?), etc., without needing to reboot the system.
>
> In practice, would a TPM upgrade from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 even occur
> without a reboot? Is it an important use case?
>
> 1 - It would leave the SHA-256 PCRs in the reset state.
>
> 2 - It's possible that this upgrade would also require a BIOS upgrade.
For a traditional PC and when your goal is platform integrity, a reboot is probably the way to go. But in an embedded environment where there is no BIOS or if you use the TPM more like a smartcard just to store some keys (or generate random numbers), a reboot is unnecessary and it is more comfortable to avoid it.
We probably should inform the kernel before the upgrade anyway, so that it can shut down the TPM gracefully (and maybe switch to the upgrade mode, as Jason suggested). With that infrastructure in place, it does not seem like a lot of effort to also let it switch the TPM back to normal operation mode once the upgrade is complete.
Alexander
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
2017-03-20 9:56 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
(?)
@ 2017-03-27 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-27 5:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen
Cc: tpmdd-devel, dhowells, linux-kernel, James.Bottomley,
linux-security-module, peterhuewe
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:56:17AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com wrote:
> > I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> > validation to the resource manager.
>
> Sounds good to me.
>
> > If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
>
> Sure, will do.
>
> Alexander
I sent the patch. Please check it out.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-27 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-27 5:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:56:17AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
> > I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> > validation to the resource manager.
>
> Sounds good to me.
>
> > If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
>
> Sure, will do.
>
> Alexander
I sent the patch. Please check it out.
/Jarkko
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands
@ 2017-03-27 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 55+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-03-27 5:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
Cc: James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f
On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 09:56:17AM +0000, Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org wrote:
> > I think the most straight-forward way to sort this out would be to limit
> > validation to the resource manager.
>
> Sounds good to me.
>
> > If I send a fix, would you care to test it?
>
> Sure, will do.
>
> Alexander
I sent the patch. Please check it out.
/Jarkko
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 55+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-03-27 5:26 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-03-03 15:19 [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] tpm: move length validation to tpm_transmit() Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: validate TPM 2.0 commands Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 15:40 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-17 15:40 ` Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
2017-03-17 15:40 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
2017-03-17 16:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-03-17 16:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-03-17 16:35 ` Peter.Huewe
2017-03-17 16:35 ` Peter.Huewe-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
2017-03-17 16:35 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Peter.Huewe at infineon.com
2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-20 9:54 ` Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
2017-03-20 17:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-03-20 17:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2017-03-20 17:23 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jason Gunthorpe
2017-03-20 19:42 ` Ken Goldman
2017-03-20 19:42 ` Ken Goldman
2017-03-20 19:42 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Ken Goldman
2017-03-21 15:44 ` Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-21 15:44 ` Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
2017-03-21 15:44 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
2017-03-17 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 20:42 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-20 9:56 ` Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-20 9:56 ` Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
2017-03-20 9:56 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
2017-03-27 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-27 5:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-27 5:25 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] tpm: export tpm2_flush_context_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 15:41 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen
2017-03-17 15:41 ` Alexander.Steffen-d0qZbvYSIPpWk0Htik3J/w
2017-03-17 15:41 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com
2017-03-17 20:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 20:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-17 20:44 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] tpm: split out tpm-dev.c into tpm-dev.c and tpm-common-dev.c Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n> Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] tpm2: add session handle context saving and restoring to the space code Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-03 15:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-06 21:07 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] in-kernel resource manager Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-06 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-11 8:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-03-11 8:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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