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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 14:14:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607191453.28645.92256.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607191309.28645.15241.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates
the PGD is encrypted.  The encryption bit should not be used when creating
a virtual address for the PGD table.

Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the physical
address from the cr3 register. This function is then used where a virtual
address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |    9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c             |    2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                |    2 +-
 arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c |    2 +-
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c                |    6 +++---
 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 12af3e3..d8e8ace 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
+static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (native_read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 43b7002..dc03624 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
-	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
+	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
 		return -1;
 
 again:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 8ad91a0..2a1fa10c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * Do _not_ use "current" here. We might be inside
 	 * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
 	 */
-	pgd_paddr = read_cr3();
+	pgd_paddr = read_cr3_pa();
 	pmd_k = vmalloc_sync_one(__va(pgd_paddr), address);
 	if (!pmd_k)
 		return -1;
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static bool low_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(address)];
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * happen within a race in page table update. In the later
 	 * case just flush:
 	 */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(address);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address);
 	pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(address);
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd_ref))
 		return -1;
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bad_address(void *p)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = base + pgd_index(address);
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int is_f00f_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 		pgd_t *pgd;
 		pte_t *pte;
 
-		pgd = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+		pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 		pgd += pgd_index(address);
 
 		pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, address, &level);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 2a0fa89..e6305dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	/* Don't assume we're using swapper_pg_dir at this point */
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(addr)];
 	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
 	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
index c5350fd..0668aaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int xo1_power_state_enter(suspend_state_t pm_state)
 
 asmlinkage __visible int xo1_do_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
 {
-	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3());
+	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 
 	/* Program wakeup mask (using dword access to CS5536_PM1_EN) */
 	outl(wakeup_mask << 16, acpi_base + CS5536_PM1_STS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
index a6e21fe..0a7650d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
 	memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	/* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
 	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, relocated_restore_code);
 	if (p4d_large(*p4d)) {
 		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) & ~_PAGE_NX));
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index 1f386d7..2dc5243 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr)
 	pmd_t pmd;
 	pte_t pte;
 
-	pa = read_cr3();
+	pa = read_cr3_pa();
 	pgd = native_make_pgd(xen_read_phys_ulong(pa + pgd_index(vaddr) *
 						       sizeof(pgd)));
 	if (!pgd_present(pgd))
@@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
 	pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd);
 	p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;
 
-	pgd = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
 	idx_p4d = 0;
 	save_pud = n_pud;
@@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static void __init xen_write_cr3_init(unsigned long cr3)
 {
 	unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(__pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
-	BUG_ON(read_cr3() != __pa(initial_page_table));
+	BUG_ON(read_cr3_pa() != __pa(initial_page_table));
 	BUG_ON(cr3 != __pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
 	/*

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 14:14:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607191453.28645.92256.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607191309.28645.15241.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates
the PGD is encrypted.  The encryption bit should not be used when creating
a virtual address for the PGD table.

Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the physical
address from the cr3 register. This function is then used where a virtual
address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |    9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c             |    2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                |    2 +-
 arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c |    2 +-
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c                |    6 +++---
 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 12af3e3..d8e8ace 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
+static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (native_read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 43b7002..dc03624 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
-	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
+	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
 		return -1;
 
 again:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 8ad91a0..2a1fa10c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * Do _not_ use "current" here. We might be inside
 	 * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
 	 */
-	pgd_paddr = read_cr3();
+	pgd_paddr = read_cr3_pa();
 	pmd_k = vmalloc_sync_one(__va(pgd_paddr), address);
 	if (!pmd_k)
 		return -1;
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static bool low_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(address)];
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * happen within a race in page table update. In the later
 	 * case just flush:
 	 */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(address);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address);
 	pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(address);
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd_ref))
 		return -1;
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bad_address(void *p)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = base + pgd_index(address);
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int is_f00f_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 		pgd_t *pgd;
 		pte_t *pte;
 
-		pgd = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+		pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 		pgd += pgd_index(address);
 
 		pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, address, &level);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 2a0fa89..e6305dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	/* Don't assume we're using swapper_pg_dir at this point */
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(addr)];
 	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
 	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
index c5350fd..0668aaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int xo1_power_state_enter(suspend_state_t pm_state)
 
 asmlinkage __visible int xo1_do_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
 {
-	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3());
+	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 
 	/* Program wakeup mask (using dword access to CS5536_PM1_EN) */
 	outl(wakeup_mask << 16, acpi_base + CS5536_PM1_STS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
index a6e21fe..0a7650d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
 	memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	/* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
 	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, relocated_restore_code);
 	if (p4d_large(*p4d)) {
 		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) & ~_PAGE_NX));
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index 1f386d7..2dc5243 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr)
 	pmd_t pmd;
 	pte_t pte;
 
-	pa = read_cr3();
+	pa = read_cr3_pa();
 	pgd = native_make_pgd(xen_read_phys_ulong(pa + pgd_index(vaddr) *
 						       sizeof(pgd)));
 	if (!pgd_present(pgd))
@@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
 	pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd);
 	p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;
 
-	pgd = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
 	idx_p4d = 0;
 	save_pud = n_pud;
@@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static void __init xen_write_cr3_init(unsigned long cr3)
 {
 	unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(__pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
-	BUG_ON(read_cr3() != __pa(initial_page_table));
+	BUG_ON(read_cr3_pa() != __pa(initial_page_table));
 	BUG_ON(cr3 != __pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
 	/*

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 14:14:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607191453.28645.92256.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607191309.28645.15241.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates
the PGD is encrypted.  The encryption bit should not be used when creating
a virtual address for the PGD table.

Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the physical
address from the cr3 register. This function is then used where a virtual
address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |    9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c             |    2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                |    2 +-
 arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c |    2 +-
 arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c                |    6 +++---
 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 12af3e3..d8e8ace 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
+static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (native_read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+	return (read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+}
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 43b7002..dc03624 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
-	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
+	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
 		return -1;
 
 again:
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 8ad91a0..2a1fa10c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * Do _not_ use "current" here. We might be inside
 	 * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
 	 */
-	pgd_paddr = read_cr3();
+	pgd_paddr = read_cr3_pa();
 	pmd_k = vmalloc_sync_one(__va(pgd_paddr), address);
 	if (!pmd_k)
 		return -1;
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static bool low_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(address)];
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
 	 * happen within a race in page table update. In the later
 	 * case just flush:
 	 */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(address);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address);
 	pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(address);
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd_ref))
 		return -1;
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bad_address(void *p)
 
 static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
 {
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = base + pgd_index(address);
 	p4d_t *p4d;
 	pud_t *pud;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int is_f00f_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 		pgd_t *pgd;
 		pte_t *pte;
 
-		pgd = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
+		pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 		pgd += pgd_index(address);
 
 		pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, address, &level);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 2a0fa89..e6305dd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	/* Don't assume we're using swapper_pg_dir at this point */
-	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(addr)];
 	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
 	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
index c5350fd..0668aaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int xo1_power_state_enter(suspend_state_t pm_state)
 
 asmlinkage __visible int xo1_do_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
 {
-	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3());
+	void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 
 	/* Program wakeup mask (using dword access to CS5536_PM1_EN) */
 	outl(wakeup_mask << 16, acpi_base + CS5536_PM1_STS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
index a6e21fe..0a7650d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
 	memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	/* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
-	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
+	pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
 	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, relocated_restore_code);
 	if (p4d_large(*p4d)) {
 		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) & ~_PAGE_NX));
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index 1f386d7..2dc5243 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr)
 	pmd_t pmd;
 	pte_t pte;
 
-	pa = read_cr3();
+	pa = read_cr3_pa();
 	pgd = native_make_pgd(xen_read_phys_ulong(pa + pgd_index(vaddr) *
 						       sizeof(pgd)));
 	if (!pgd_present(pgd))
@@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
 	pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd);
 	p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;
 
-	pgd = __va(read_cr3());
+	pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
 	new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
 	idx_p4d = 0;
 	save_pud = n_pud;
@@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static void __init xen_write_cr3_init(unsigned long cr3)
 {
 	unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(__pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
-	BUG_ON(read_cr3() != __pa(initial_page_table));
+	BUG_ON(read_cr3_pa() != __pa(initial_page_table));
 	BUG_ON(cr3 != __pa(swapper_pg_dir));
 
 	/*


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-07 19:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 363+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-07 19:13 [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 10:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-07 19:14   ` [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:02           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:02           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 22:01               ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 22:01               ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:36               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36               ` [Xen-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` [Xen-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08  6:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08 22:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 21:20         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:39   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  7:39     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  7:39     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 15:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-12 13:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-11 19:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  4:24   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  4:24     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  4:24     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:06     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  5:53     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  5:53     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 21:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08 23:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:49     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 13:23         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:38   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 20:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 14:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 16:33             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-19 17:18               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 20:13             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-21 15:37         ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 15:37           ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 15:37           ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 16:59           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 18:40             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 10:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 17:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky

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