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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 23:01:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d37917b1-8e49-e8a8-b9ac-59491331640f@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12c7e511-996d-cf60-3a3b-0be7b41bd85b@oracle.com>

On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>>>>> guests.
>>>> And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either
>>>> CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.
>>>
>>> Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf
>>> 0x80000007 is passed to the guest unchanged. And so is MSR_K8_SYSCFG.
>> The SME feature is in leaf 0x8000001f, is that leaf passed to the guest
>> unchanged?
> Oh, I misread the patch where X86_FEATURE_SME is defined. Then all
> versions, including the current one, pass it unchanged.
>
> All that's needed is setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME) in
> xen_init_capabilities().

AMD processors still don't support CPUID Faulting (or at least, I
couldn't find any reference to it in the latest docs), so we cannot
actually hide SME from a guest which goes looking at native CPUID. 
Furthermore, I'm not aware of any CPUID masking support covering that leaf.

However, if Linux is using the paravirtual cpuid hook, things are
slightly better.

On Xen 4.9 and later, no guests will see the feature.  On earlier
versions of Xen (before I fixed the logic), plain domUs will not see the
feature, while dom0 will.

For safely, I'd recommend unilaterally clobbering the feature as Boris
suggested.  There is no way SME will be supportable on a per-PV guest
basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to
encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME instance.

~Andrew

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 23:01:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d37917b1-8e49-e8a8-b9ac-59491331640f@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12c7e511-996d-cf60-3a3b-0be7b41bd85b@oracle.com>

On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>>>>> guests.
>>>> And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either
>>>> CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.
>>>
>>> Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf
>>> 0x80000007 is passed to the guest unchanged. And so is MSR_K8_SYSCFG.
>> The SME feature is in leaf 0x8000001f, is that leaf passed to the guest
>> unchanged?
> Oh, I misread the patch where X86_FEATURE_SME is defined. Then all
> versions, including the current one, pass it unchanged.
>
> All that's needed is setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME) in
> xen_init_capabilities().

AMD processors still don't support CPUID Faulting (or at least, I
couldn't find any reference to it in the latest docs), so we cannot
actually hide SME from a guest which goes looking at native CPUID. 
Furthermore, I'm not aware of any CPUID masking support covering that leaf.

However, if Linux is using the paravirtual cpuid hook, things are
slightly better.

On Xen 4.9 and later, no guests will see the feature.  On earlier
versions of Xen (before I fixed the logic), plain domUs will not see the
feature, while dom0 will.

For safely, I'd recommend unilaterally clobbering the feature as Boris
suggested.  There is no way SME will be supportable on a per-PV guest
basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to
encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME instance.

~Andrew

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 23:01:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d37917b1-8e49-e8a8-b9ac-59491331640f@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12c7e511-996d-cf60-3a3b-0be7b41bd85b@oracle.com>

On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>>>>> guests.
>>>> And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either
>>>> CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.
>>>
>>> Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf
>>> 0x80000007 is passed to the guest unchanged. And so is MSR_K8_SYSCFG.
>> The SME feature is in leaf 0x8000001f, is that leaf passed to the guest
>> unchanged?
> Oh, I misread the patch where X86_FEATURE_SME is defined. Then all
> versions, including the current one, pass it unchanged.
>
> All that's needed is setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME) in
> xen_init_capabilities().

AMD processors still don't support CPUID Faulting (or at least, I
couldn't find any reference to it in the latest docs), so we cannot
actually hide SME from a guest which goes looking at native CPUID. 
Furthermore, I'm not aware of any CPUID masking support covering that leaf.

However, if Linux is using the paravirtual cpuid hook, things are
slightly better.

On Xen 4.9 and later, no guests will see the feature.  On earlier
versions of Xen (before I fixed the logic), plain domUs will not see the
feature, while dom0 will.

For safely, I'd recommend unilaterally clobbering the feature as Boris
suggested.  There is no way SME will be supportable on a per-PV guest
basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to
encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME instance.

~Andrew

_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-08 22:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 363+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-07 19:13 [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 10:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-09 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 10:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 10:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 13:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 20:51         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:02           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:02           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:17             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2017-06-08 22:01               ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 22:01               ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:36               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36               ` [Xen-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:36                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:43                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:54                     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` [Xen-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:59                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 19:42                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08  6:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08  6:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08 22:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 22:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 18:46         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 21:20         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 21:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:39   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  7:39     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  7:39     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 15:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 15:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-10 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-12 13:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-12 13:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-11 19:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-11 19:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  4:24   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  4:24     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  4:24     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:06     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  5:53     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08  5:53     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 21:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08  7:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08 23:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 23:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:49     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 19:49       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 13:23         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 13:23           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:38   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:38     ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:42     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 20:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 20:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 14:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 14:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 15:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 16:33             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 16:33               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-19 17:18               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-19 17:18                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 20:13             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-15 20:13               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-21 15:37         ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 15:37           ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 15:37           ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 16:59           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 16:59             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 18:40             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:40               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15  9:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 10:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 10:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 17:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 17:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08  2:40   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 16:14     ` Tom Lendacky

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