All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL
@ 2018-02-05 11:02 Darren Kenny
  2018-02-05 12:59 ` Darren Kenny
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Darren Kenny @ 2018-02-05 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86,
	David Woodhouse, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Andi Kleen,
	Tom Lendacky, Masami Hiramatsu, Darren Kenny

Fixes a comment in commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b
("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")

While the original name was "IBRS All The Time" (IBRS_ATT),
the publicly documented name is IBRS_ALL, we should be using that.

Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4ad4108..5b778d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {
-- 
2.9.5

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL
  2018-02-05 11:02 [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL Darren Kenny
@ 2018-02-05 12:59 ` Darren Kenny
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Darren Kenny @ 2018-02-05 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86,
	David Woodhouse, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Andi Kleen,
	Tom Lendacky, Masami Hiramatsu

Please ignore this, didn't realise it had been already applied - guess I
looked in the wrong place.

Thanks,

Darren.

On Mon, Feb 05, 2018 at 11:02:20AM +0000, Darren Kenny wrote:
>Fixes a comment in commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b
>("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
>
>While the original name was "IBRS All The Time" (IBRS_ATT),
>the publicly documented name is IBRS_ALL, we should be using that.
>
>Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
>Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
>Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
>---
>arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
>1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>index 4ad4108..5b778d2 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
> * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
> * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
> * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
>- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
>+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
> */
>static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
>{
>-- 
>2.9.5
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-02-05 14:57 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-02-05 11:02 [PATCH v2] Correct use of IBRS_ATT name, should be IBRS_ALL Darren Kenny
2018-02-05 12:59 ` Darren Kenny

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.