From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Extracting written string from the write syscall Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 14:21:01 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180427182101.ztkixotkvs7zha4d@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAH5sRboPmzmdBs2=70f-d3+EuiPaMJQXBsU=no7aT=Y8j7hyAA@mail.gmail.com> On 2018-04-27 02:37, Wajih Ul Hassan wrote: > Thanks for your replies. However, I am now thinking of another solution. > Let's say I can capture write() in the userspace by either instrumenting > the LibC or LD_PRELOAD wrapper and store the string buffer passed to > write(). > Can I call/generate *some other non-instrusive* syscall which can take that > string buffer that I stored earlier and that syscall with the buffer will > be visible in the audit.log? I am not worried about performance hit right > now. Use an AUDIT_USER message with the text and some identifier that links it with a particular write call? > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 7:46 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > > On 4/26/2018 5:08 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > wrote: > > >> On 4/26/2018 3:57 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > > >>> On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 20:34:57 +0000 > > >>> Wajih Ul Hassan <wajih.lums@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Hi all, > > >>>> ..... > > >> You could write a Linux Security Module (LSM) to monitor the > > >> content of writes. The performance impact would be rather > > >> amazing. > > >> > > > I would recommend using BPF + kprobes + perf_event buffers for this > > > purpose. There are enough places you can probe to grab these strings > > > in the kernel, and if you do your filtering in BPF, you can then push > > > it into kernel space based on filtering. Although, AFAIK, the BPF JITs > > > don't do vectorization of instructions, but it's still not too bad. If > > > you put your kprobe on the syscall itself, and probe the userspace > > > addr, remember you're going to be open to a time-of-use, time-of-check > > > style attack. > > > > That looks like a whole lot of mechanism to perform a simple task. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> To: Wajih Ul Hassan <wajih.lums@gmail.com> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-audit@redhat.com" <linux-audit@redhat.com> Subject: Re: Extracting written string from the write syscall Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 14:21:01 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180427182101.ztkixotkvs7zha4d@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAH5sRboPmzmdBs2=70f-d3+EuiPaMJQXBsU=no7aT=Y8j7hyAA@mail.gmail.com> On 2018-04-27 02:37, Wajih Ul Hassan wrote: > Thanks for your replies. However, I am now thinking of another solution. > Let's say I can capture write() in the userspace by either instrumenting > the LibC or LD_PRELOAD wrapper and store the string buffer passed to > write(). > Can I call/generate *some other non-instrusive* syscall which can take that > string buffer that I stored earlier and that syscall with the buffer will > be visible in the audit.log? I am not worried about performance hit right > now. Use an AUDIT_USER message with the text and some identifier that links it with a particular write call? > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 7:46 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > > On 4/26/2018 5:08 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > wrote: > > >> On 4/26/2018 3:57 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > > >>> On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 20:34:57 +0000 > > >>> Wajih Ul Hassan <wajih.lums@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Hi all, > > >>>> ..... > > >> You could write a Linux Security Module (LSM) to monitor the > > >> content of writes. The performance impact would be rather > > >> amazing. > > >> > > > I would recommend using BPF + kprobes + perf_event buffers for this > > > purpose. There are enough places you can probe to grab these strings > > > in the kernel, and if you do your filtering in BPF, you can then push > > > it into kernel space based on filtering. Although, AFAIK, the BPF JITs > > > don't do vectorization of instructions, but it's still not too bad. If > > > you put your kprobe on the syscall itself, and probe the userspace > > > addr, remember you're going to be open to a time-of-use, time-of-check > > > style attack. > > > > That looks like a whole lot of mechanism to perform a simple task. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-27 18:21 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-04-26 20:34 Extracting written string from the write syscall Wajih Ul Hassan 2018-04-26 22:57 ` Steve Grubb 2018-04-26 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-04-26 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-04-27 0:08 ` Sargun Dhillon 2018-04-27 0:08 ` Sargun Dhillon 2018-04-27 0:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-04-27 0:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-04-27 2:37 ` Wajih Ul Hassan 2018-04-27 15:35 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-04-27 18:21 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message] 2018-04-27 18:21 ` Richard Guy Briggs
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