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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:59:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604195950.GB14454@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> Differentiate between the kernel reading a file from the kernel loading
> data provided by userspace.  This patch defines a new LSM hook named
> security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> 
> Changelog v4:
> - Define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Changelog v3:
> - Rename security_kernel_read_file to security_kernel_read_data().
> 
> Changelog v2:
> - Define a generic wrapper named security_kernel_read_blob() for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> 
> Changelog v1:
> - Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/security.h  | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c       |  5 +++++
>  3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 8f1131c8dd54..a08bc2587b96 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -576,6 +576,10 @@
>   *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
>   *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
>   *	Return 0 if successful.
> + * @kernel_load_data:
> + *	Load data provided by userspace.
> + *	@id kernel load data identifier
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @kernel_read_file:
>   *	Read a file specified by userspace.
>   *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
> @@ -1582,6 +1586,7 @@ union security_list_options {
>  	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
> +	int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct hlist_head cred_getsecid;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_act_as;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as;
> +	struct hlist_head kernel_load_data;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_module_request;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 63030c85ee19..3d54d5945755 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -159,6 +159,33 @@ extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>  typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode,
>  			   const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_data);
>  
> +
> +#define __kernel_load_data_id(id) \
> +	id(UNKNOWN, unknown)		\
> +	id(FIRMWARE, firmware)		\
> +	id(MODULE, kernel-module)		\
> +	id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image)		\
> +	id(MAX_ID, )
> +
> +#define __data_id_enumify(ENUM, dummy) LOADING_ ## ENUM,
> +#define __data_id_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
> +
> +enum kernel_load_data_id {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_enumify)
> +};
> +
> +static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_stringify)
> +};
> +
> +static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID)
> +		return kernel_load_data_str[LOADING_UNKNOWN];
> +
> +	return kernel_load_data_str[id];
> +}
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
>  struct security_mnt_opts {
> @@ -320,6 +347,7 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -909,6 +937,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
>  					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 68f46d849abe..c2de2f134854 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,11 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>  
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
> +}
> +
>  int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  			     int flags)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.7.5

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:59:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604195950.GB14454@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> Differentiate between the kernel reading a file from the kernel loading
> data provided by userspace.  This patch defines a new LSM hook named
> security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> 
> Changelog v4:
> - Define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Changelog v3:
> - Rename security_kernel_read_file to security_kernel_read_data().
> 
> Changelog v2:
> - Define a generic wrapper named security_kernel_read_blob() for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> 
> Changelog v1:
> - Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/security.h  | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c       |  5 +++++
>  3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 8f1131c8dd54..a08bc2587b96 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -576,6 +576,10 @@
>   *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
>   *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
>   *	Return 0 if successful.
> + * @kernel_load_data:
> + *	Load data provided by userspace.
> + *	@id kernel load data identifier
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @kernel_read_file:
>   *	Read a file specified by userspace.
>   *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
> @@ -1582,6 +1586,7 @@ union security_list_options {
>  	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
> +	int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct hlist_head cred_getsecid;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_act_as;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as;
> +	struct hlist_head kernel_load_data;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_module_request;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 63030c85ee19..3d54d5945755 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -159,6 +159,33 @@ extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>  typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode,
>  			   const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_data);
>  
> +
> +#define __kernel_load_data_id(id) \
> +	id(UNKNOWN, unknown)		\
> +	id(FIRMWARE, firmware)		\
> +	id(MODULE, kernel-module)		\
> +	id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image)		\
> +	id(MAX_ID, )
> +
> +#define __data_id_enumify(ENUM, dummy) LOADING_ ## ENUM,
> +#define __data_id_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
> +
> +enum kernel_load_data_id {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_enumify)
> +};
> +
> +static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_stringify)
> +};
> +
> +static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID)
> +		return kernel_load_data_str[LOADING_UNKNOWN];
> +
> +	return kernel_load_data_str[id];
> +}
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
>  struct security_mnt_opts {
> @@ -320,6 +347,7 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -909,6 +937,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
>  					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 68f46d849abe..c2de2f134854 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,11 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>  
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
> +}
> +
>  int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  			     int flags)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.7.5
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:59:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604195950.GB14454@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> Differentiate between the kernel reading a file from the kernel loading
> data provided by userspace.  This patch defines a new LSM hook named
> security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> 
> Changelog v4:
> - Define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.
> 
> Changelog v3:
> - Rename security_kernel_read_file to security_kernel_read_data().
> 
> Changelog v2:
> - Define a generic wrapper named security_kernel_read_blob() for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> 
> Changelog v1:
> - Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for
> security_kernel_read_file().
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/security.h  | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c       |  5 +++++
>  3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 8f1131c8dd54..a08bc2587b96 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -576,6 +576,10 @@
>   *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
>   *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
>   *	Return 0 if successful.
> + * @kernel_load_data:
> + *	Load data provided by userspace.
> + *	@id kernel load data identifier
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @kernel_read_file:
>   *	Read a file specified by userspace.
>   *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
> @@ -1582,6 +1586,7 @@ union security_list_options {
>  	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
> +	int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct hlist_head cred_getsecid;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_act_as;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as;
> +	struct hlist_head kernel_load_data;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file;
>  	struct hlist_head kernel_module_request;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 63030c85ee19..3d54d5945755 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -159,6 +159,33 @@ extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>  typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode,
>  			   const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_data);
>  
> +
> +#define __kernel_load_data_id(id) \
> +	id(UNKNOWN, unknown)		\
> +	id(FIRMWARE, firmware)		\
> +	id(MODULE, kernel-module)		\
> +	id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image)		\
> +	id(MAX_ID, )
> +
> +#define __data_id_enumify(ENUM, dummy) LOADING_ ## ENUM,
> +#define __data_id_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
> +
> +enum kernel_load_data_id {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_enumify)
> +};
> +
> +static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = {
> +	__kernel_load_data_id(__data_id_stringify)
> +};
> +
> +static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID)
> +		return kernel_load_data_str[LOADING_UNKNOWN];
> +
> +	return kernel_load_data_str[id];
> +}
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
>  struct security_mnt_opts {
> @@ -320,6 +347,7 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
>  int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
>  int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>  int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> @@ -909,6 +937,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
>  					    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 68f46d849abe..c2de2f134854 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,11 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
>  
> +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
> +}
> +
>  int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  			     int flags)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.7.5

_______________________________________________
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-04 19:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 139+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-29 18:01 [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:59   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2018-06-04 19:59     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:59     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 20:00   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 20:00     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 20:00     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:19   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:19     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:19     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:21   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:21     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:21     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:39     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:46       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46         ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46         ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46         ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 23:04         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v4 7/8] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 19:15   ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:15     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:15     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25     ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25       ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-05 22:37       ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:37         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:37         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-06  6:20         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06  6:20           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06  6:20           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06 22:06           ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-06 22:06             ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-06 22:06             ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:02   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:02   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 22:39   ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 22:39     ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 22:39     ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 23:14     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30 21:00       ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:00         ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:00         ` Paul Moore
2018-05-31 15:23         ` [PATCH v4a " Mimi Zohar
2018-05-31 15:23           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-31 15:23           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:28           ` Paul Moore
2018-06-01 22:28             ` Paul Moore
2018-06-01 22:28             ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04  9:19           ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-04  9:19             ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-04  9:19             ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-05 19:45           ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 19:45             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 19:45             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 21:35             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35               ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35               ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35               ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:26               ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:26                 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:26                 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:40                 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40                   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40                   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40                   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25     ` [PATCH v4 " Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30  2:25     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30  2:25       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30  2:25       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 21:09       ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:09         ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:09         ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04 14:03 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:32   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:53     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 22:03   ` Kees Cook
2018-06-04 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2018-06-04 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05  4:09     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05  4:09       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05  4:09       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 12:19       ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 12:19         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 12:19         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:25         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:25           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:25           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:43           ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:43             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:43             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 14:05             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 14:05               ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 14:05               ` Mimi Zohar

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