From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 07:39:02 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180830143904.3168-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180830143904.3168-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following: (1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM), the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK for the child. It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate a SHSTK for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK. (2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing SHSTK. (3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the parent or the child does a call/ret. This patch handles cases (1) & (2). Case (3) is handled in the SHSTK page fault patches. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h index d9ae3d86cdd7..b7b33e1026bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h @@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET int cet_setup_shstk(void); +int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p); void cet_disable_shstk(void); void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p); int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp); int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp); #else static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; } +static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; } static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {} static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> #include <asm/mpx.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id; @@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do { \ #else #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c index 5cc4be6e0982..ce0b3b7b1160 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -134,6 +134,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void) return 0; } +int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + unsigned long addr, size; + struct cet_user_state *state; + + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + return 0; + + state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave, + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER); + + if (!state) + return -EINVAL; + + size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size; + if (size == 0) + size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK); + + addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK); + + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) { + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64)); + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size; + return 0; +} + void cet_disable_shstk(void) { u64 r; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) free_vm86(t); + cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); fpu__drop(fpu); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index a451bc374b9b..cfe955d8d6b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -317,6 +317,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, if (sp) childregs->sp = sp; + /* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */ + if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) { + err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p); + if (err) + goto out; + } + err = -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) { p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr, -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 07:39:02 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180830143904.3168-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180830143904.3168-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following: (1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM), the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK for the child. It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate a SHSTK for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK. (2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing SHSTK. (3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the parent or the child does a call/ret. This patch handles cases (1) & (2). Case (3) is handled in the SHSTK page fault patches. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h index d9ae3d86cdd7..b7b33e1026bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h @@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET int cet_setup_shstk(void); +int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p); void cet_disable_shstk(void); void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p); int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp); int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp); #else static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; } +static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; } static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {} static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> #include <asm/mpx.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id; @@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do { \ #else #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c index 5cc4be6e0982..ce0b3b7b1160 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -134,6 +134,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void) return 0; } +int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + unsigned long addr, size; + struct cet_user_state *state; + + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled) + return 0; + + state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave, + XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER); + + if (!state) + return -EINVAL; + + size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size; + if (size == 0) + size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK); + + addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK); + + if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) { + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64)); + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr; + tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size; + return 0; +} + void cet_disable_shstk(void) { u64 r; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) free_vm86(t); + cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk); fpu__drop(fpu); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index a451bc374b9b..cfe955d8d6b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -317,6 +317,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, if (sp) childregs->sp = sp; + /* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */ + if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) { + err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p); + if (err) + goto out; + } + err = -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) { p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr, -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-30 14:48 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 167+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-02 8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh 2018-09-02 8:13 ` Balbir Singh 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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