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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 15:16:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrV_aDasfkd6LD1cT11Hs1dO064uHjROLQPyhQfy_iuS8w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1535752180.31230.4.camel@intel.com>

On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 09:22 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 08:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >
>> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>> > wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 4:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.c
>> > > om
>> > > >
>> > > > wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > WRUSS is a new kernel-mode instruction but writes directly
>> > > > to user shadow stack memory.  This is used to construct
>> > > > a return address on the shadow stack for the signal
>> > > > handler.
>> > > >
>> > > > This instruction can fault if the user shadow stack is
>> > > > invalid shadow stack memory.  In that case, the kernel does
>> > > > fixup.
>> > > >
>> > > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>> > > [...]
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > +static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr,
>> > > > unsigned long val)
>> > > > +{
>> > > > +       int err = 0;
>> > > > +
>> > > > +       asm volatile("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
>> > > > +                    "2:\n"
>> > > > +                    _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b,
>> > > > ex_handler_wruss)
>> > > > +                    :
>> > > > +                    : "r" (addr), "r" (val));
>> > > > +
>> > > > +       return err;
>> > > > +}
>> > > What's up with "err"? You set it to zero, and then you return
>> > > it,
>> > > but
>> > > nothing can ever set it to non-zero, right?
>> > >
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > +__visible bool ex_handler_wruss(const struct
>> > > > exception_table_entry *fixup,
>> > > > +                               struct pt_regs *regs, int
>> > > > trapnr)
>> > > > +{
>> > > > +       regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
>> > > > +       regs->ax = -1;
>> > > > +       return true;
>> > > > +}
>> > > And here you just write into regs->ax, but your "asm volatile"
>> > > doesn't
>> > > reserve that register. This looks wrong to me.
>> > >
>> > > I think you probably want to add something like an explicit
>> > > `"+&a"(err)` output to the asm statements.
>> > We require asm goto support these days.  How about using
>> > that?  You
>> > won't even need a special exception handler.
>
> Maybe something like this?  It looks simple now.
>
> static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned
> long val)
> {
>         asm_volatile_goto("wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
>                      "jmp %l[ok]\n"
>                      ".section .fixup,\"ax\"n"
>                      "jmp %l[fail]\n"
>                      ".previous\n"
>                      :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
>                      :: ok, fail);
> ok:
>         return 0;
> fail:
>         return -1;
> }
>

I think you can get rid of 'jmp %l[ok]' and the ok label and just fall
through.  And you don't need an explicit jmp to fail -- just set the
_EX_HANDLER entry to land on the fail label.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redha>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 15:16:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrV_aDasfkd6LD1cT11Hs1dO064uHjROLQPyhQfy_iuS8w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1535752180.31230.4.camel@intel.com>

On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 09:22 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 08:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >
>> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>> > wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 4:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.c
>> > > om
>> > > >
>> > > > wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > WRUSS is a new kernel-mode instruction but writes directly
>> > > > to user shadow stack memory.  This is used to construct
>> > > > a return address on the shadow stack for the signal
>> > > > handler.
>> > > >
>> > > > This instruction can fault if the user shadow stack is
>> > > > invalid shadow stack memory.  In that case, the kernel does
>> > > > fixup.
>> > > >
>> > > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>> > > [...]
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > +static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr,
>> > > > unsigned long val)
>> > > > +{
>> > > > +       int err = 0;
>> > > > +
>> > > > +       asm volatile("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
>> > > > +                    "2:\n"
>> > > > +                    _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b,
>> > > > ex_handler_wruss)
>> > > > +                    :
>> > > > +                    : "r" (addr), "r" (val));
>> > > > +
>> > > > +       return err;
>> > > > +}
>> > > What's up with "err"? You set it to zero, and then you return
>> > > it,
>> > > but
>> > > nothing can ever set it to non-zero, right?
>> > >
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > +__visible bool ex_handler_wruss(const struct
>> > > > exception_table_entry *fixup,
>> > > > +                               struct pt_regs *regs, int
>> > > > trapnr)
>> > > > +{
>> > > > +       regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
>> > > > +       regs->ax = -1;
>> > > > +       return true;
>> > > > +}
>> > > And here you just write into regs->ax, but your "asm volatile"
>> > > doesn't
>> > > reserve that register. This looks wrong to me.
>> > >
>> > > I think you probably want to add something like an explicit
>> > > `"+&a"(err)` output to the asm statements.
>> > We require asm goto support these days.  How about using
>> > that?  You
>> > won't even need a special exception handler.
>
> Maybe something like this?  It looks simple now.
>
> static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned
> long val)
> {
>         asm_volatile_goto("wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
>                      "jmp %l[ok]\n"
>                      ".section .fixup,\"ax\"n"
>                      "jmp %l[fail]\n"
>                      ".previous\n"
>                      :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
>                      :: ok, fail);
> ok:
>         return 0;
> fail:
>         return -1;
> }
>

I think you can get rid of 'jmp %l[ok]' and the ok label and just fall
through.  And you don't need an explicit jmp to fail -- just set the
_EX_HANDLER entry to land on the fail label.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-31 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 167+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:39   ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-30 20:39     ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-30 22:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 22:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 22:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-03  2:56   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-03  2:56     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:01   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 15:01     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31 16:20     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:49   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 15:49     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:02       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:02       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:08     ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 16:08       ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 16:23       ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:23         ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 17:19         ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:19           ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:26           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:26             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:26             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:33             ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:33               ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 17:54               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:54                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:54                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 17:59                 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 17:59                   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:21                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:21                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:21                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:44                     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:44                       ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 20:52                       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:52                         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:52                         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 21:01                         ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 21:01                           ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 21:47                           ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 21:47                             ` Jann Horn
2018-08-31  9:53                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-31  9:53                               ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-31 14:33                               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 14:33                                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 14:33                                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 14:47                                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 14:47                                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 15:48                                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:48                                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:48                                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 15:58                                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 15:58                                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 16:29                                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-31 16:29                                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-14 20:39                                         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:39                                           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:39                                           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:46                                           ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 20:46                                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 20:46                                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 21:08                                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:08                                               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:08                                               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 21:33                                               ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 21:33                                                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-14 21:33                                                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31  1:23                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-31  1:23                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 17:34           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 17:34             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 18:55             ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 18:55               ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 17:46               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-31 17:46                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-31 17:52                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 17:52                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 17:52                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 19:59   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 19:59     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-08-30 20:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 20:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 16:29   ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-31 16:29     ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:10   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:10     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 16:20     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 15:39   ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 15:39     ` Jann Horn
2018-08-30 15:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 15:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-08-30 16:22       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:22         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 16:22         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 21:49         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 21:49           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 21:49           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-31 22:16           ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-08-31 22:16             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-14 20:46             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:46               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-14 20:46               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-08-30 14:39   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-02  8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh
2018-09-02  8:13   ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-04 14:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-04 14:47     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-04 14:47     ` Yu-cheng Yu

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