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From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
	jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 22:39:33 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180911223933.GA2638@alison-desk.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27768.1536703395@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 11:03:15PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> > +/* Key Service Command: Creates a software key and programs hardware */
> > +int mktme_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > +{
> > +	struct mktme_key_program *kprog = NULL;
> > +	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > +	char *options;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +		return -EACCES;
> > +
> > +	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 || !prep->data)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	options = kmemdup(prep->data, datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!options)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +	options[datalen] = '\0';
> > +
> > +	kprog = kmem_cache_zalloc(mktme_prog_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!kprog) {
> > +		kzfree(options);
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +	}
> > +	ret = mktme_get_options(options, kprog);
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		goto out;
> 
> Everything prior to here looks like it should be in the ->preparse() routine.
> I really should get round to making that mandatory.

Hi Dave,

If a preparse routine handles all the above, then if any of the
above failures occur, the key service has less backing out to do.
Is that the point?

How do I make the connection between the preparse and the instantiate? 
Do I just put what I need to remember about this key request in the
payload.data during preparse, so I can examine it again during
instantiate?

Thanks,
Alison

> 
> > +
> > +	mktme_map_lock();
> > +	ret = mktme_program_key(key->serial, kprog);
> > +	mktme_map_unlock();
> > +out:
> > +	kzfree(options);
> > +	kmem_cache_free(mktme_prog_cache, kprog);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> David

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: alison.schofield@intel.com (Alison Schofield)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 15:39:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180911223933.GA2638@alison-desk.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27768.1536703395@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 11:03:15PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> > +/* Key Service Command: Creates a software key and programs hardware */
> > +int mktme_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > +{
> > +	struct mktme_key_program *kprog = NULL;
> > +	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > +	char *options;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +		return -EACCES;
> > +
> > +	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 || !prep->data)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	options = kmemdup(prep->data, datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!options)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +	options[datalen] = '\0';
> > +
> > +	kprog = kmem_cache_zalloc(mktme_prog_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!kprog) {
> > +		kzfree(options);
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +	}
> > +	ret = mktme_get_options(options, kprog);
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		goto out;
> 
> Everything prior to here looks like it should be in the ->preparse() routine.
> I really should get round to making that mandatory.

Hi Dave,

If a preparse routine handles all the above, then if any of the
above failures occur, the key service has less backing out to do.
Is that the point?

How do I make the connection between the preparse and the instantiate? 
Do I just put what I need to remember about this key request in the
payload.data during preparse, so I can examine it again during
instantiate?

Thanks,
Alison

> 
> > +
> > +	mktme_map_lock();
> > +	ret = mktme_program_key(key->serial, kprog);
> > +	mktme_map_unlock();
> > +out:
> > +	kzfree(options);
> > +	kmem_cache_free(mktme_prog_cache, kprog);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> David

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
	jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 15:39:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180911223933.GA2638@alison-desk.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <27768.1536703395@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 11:03:15PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> > +/* Key Service Command: Creates a software key and programs hardware */
> > +int mktme_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > +{
> > +	struct mktme_key_program *kprog = NULL;
> > +	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > +	char *options;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +		return -EACCES;
> > +
> > +	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 || !prep->data)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	options = kmemdup(prep->data, datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!options)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +	options[datalen] = '\0';
> > +
> > +	kprog = kmem_cache_zalloc(mktme_prog_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!kprog) {
> > +		kzfree(options);
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +	}
> > +	ret = mktme_get_options(options, kprog);
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		goto out;
> 
> Everything prior to here looks like it should be in the ->preparse() routine.
> I really should get round to making that mandatory.

Hi Dave,

If a preparse routine handles all the above, then if any of the
above failures occur, the key service has less backing out to do.
Is that the point?

How do I make the connection between the preparse and the instantiate? 
Do I just put what I need to remember about this key request in the
payload.data during preparse, so I can examine it again during
instantiate?

Thanks,
Alison

> 
> > +
> > +	mktme_map_lock();
> > +	ret = mktme_program_key(key->serial, kprog);
> > +	mktme_map_unlock();
> > +out:
> > +	kzfree(options);
> > +	kmem_cache_free(mktme_prog_cache, kprog);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> David

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-11 22:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-07 22:23 [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API Alison Schofield
2018-09-08 18:44   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-10  1:28   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  1:28     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  1:28     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:13     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:13       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:13       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:33       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:33         ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:33         ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:45         ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:45           ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:45           ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  1:14           ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  1:14             ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  1:14             ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:14     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:14       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  0:14       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:32   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11  0:19     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:19       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:19       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 02/12] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 10:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11  0:34     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:34       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  0:34       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 03/12] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10  2:56   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  2:56     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  2:56     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:41       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41         ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41         ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:37   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 05/12] x86/mm: Add a helper function to set keyid bits in encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:57   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 06/12] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11  2:15     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:15       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:15       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 07/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to track encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10  3:17   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  3:17     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 08/12] mm: Track VMA's in use for each memory encryption keyid Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:20   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11  2:39     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:39       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:39       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:21   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:21     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:21     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:57     ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57       ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57       ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:07       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:09         ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09           ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09           ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a system-wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10  1:46   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  1:46     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 18:24   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24     ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11  2:46     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:46       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  2:46       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 14:31       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10  3:29   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  3:29     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  3:29     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 21:47     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15  0:06     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15  0:06       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15  0:06       ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-17 10:48       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48         ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48         ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34         ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34           ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34           ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:39 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10  1:10 ` [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Huang, Kai
2018-09-10  1:10   ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 19:10   ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11  3:15     ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  3:15       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11  3:15       ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 22:03 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03   ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03   ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:39   ` Alison Schofield [this message]
2018-09-11 22:39     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 22:39     ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 23:01   ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01     ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01     ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56   ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56   ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12   ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12   ` David Howells

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