From: "Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 18:21:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ae0288d5205a5c431e9a6bf0c9e68beded45e84b.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
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YXJra28
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com (Sakkinen, Jarkko)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 18:21:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ae0288d5205a5c431e9a6bf0c9e68beded45e84b.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
On Fri, 2018-09-07 at 15:37 -0700, Alison Schofield wrote:
> Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
> Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
> make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
>
> The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
> any VMA's if this check fails.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
> ---
> mm/mprotect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index 6c2e1106525c..3384b755aad1 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -311,6 +311,24 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct
> *vma, unsigned long start,
> return pages;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
> + * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
> + * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
> + */
kdoc
> +bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)
> +{
> + struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;
> +
> + do {
> + if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
> + return false;
> +
> + test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
> + } while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> int
> mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long
> newflags,
> @@ -491,6 +509,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t
> len,
> goto out;
> }
> }
> + if (keyid > 0 && !mem_supports_encryption(vma, end)) {
> + error = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> if (start > vma->vm_start)
> prev = vma;
>
/Jarkko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 18:21:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ae0288d5205a5c431e9a6bf0c9e68beded45e84b.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f69e3d4f96504185054d951c7c85075ebf63e47a.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
On Fri, 2018-09-07 at 15:37 -0700, Alison Schofield wrote:
> Memory encryption is only supported for mappings that are ANONYMOUS.
> Test the entire range of VMA's in an encrypt_mprotect() request to
> make sure they all meet that requirement before encrypting any.
>
> The encrypt_mprotect syscall will return -EINVAL and will not encrypt
> any VMA's if this check fails.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
> ---
> mm/mprotect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index 6c2e1106525c..3384b755aad1 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -311,6 +311,24 @@ unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct
> *vma, unsigned long start,
> return pages;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Encrypted mprotect is only supported on anonymous mappings.
> + * All VMA's in the requested range must be anonymous. If this
> + * test fails on any single VMA, the entire mprotect request fails.
> + */
kdoc
> +bool mem_supports_encryption(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long end)
> +{
> + struct vm_area_struct *test_vma = vma;
> +
> + do {
> + if (!vma_is_anonymous(test_vma))
> + return false;
> +
> + test_vma = test_vma->vm_next;
> + } while (test_vma && test_vma->vm_start < end);
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> int
> mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long
> newflags,
> @@ -491,6 +509,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t
> len,
> goto out;
> }
> }
> + if (keyid > 0 && !mem_supports_encryption(vma, end)) {
> + error = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> if (start > vma->vm_start)
> prev = vma;
>
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-10 18:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-07 22:23 [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:23 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API Alison Schofield
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 02/12] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 03/12] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 05/12] x86/mm: Add a helper function to set keyid bits in encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 06/12] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 07/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to track encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:17 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:17 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 08/12] mm: Track VMA's in use for each memory encryption keyid Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko [this message]
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a system-wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:46 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:46 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:38 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:39 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:10 ` [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 1:10 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 22:03 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:03 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` David Howells
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