* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes
@ 2019-02-02 9:09 Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
` (4 more replies)
0 siblings, 5 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe
Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit,
selinux, paul, ddutile
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Hi,
This is second version of previously sent patch "IB/core: Don't register
MAD agents for LSM notifications", due to the fact that we found extra
things to fix during the review, I grouped that patch together with
other fixes in that area.
Thanks
Daniel Jurgens (4):
IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security
IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents
IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct
IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier
drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h | 5 +++
drivers/infiniband/core/device.c | 1 +
drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++------------
include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 5 +--
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky ` (3 subsequent siblings) 4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> If the notifier runs after the security context is freed an access of freed memory can occur. Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams") Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 1efadbccf394..402449d4a888 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -727,9 +727,10 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) return; - security_ib_free_security(agent->security); if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); + + security_ib_free_security(agent->security); } int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) -- 2.19.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky ` (2 subsequent siblings) 4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> If the MAD agents isn't allowed to manage the subnet, or fails to register for the LSM notifier, the security context is leaked. Free the context in these cases. Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams") Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 402449d4a888..7662e9347238 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -710,16 +710,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, dev_name(&agent->device->dev), agent->port_num); if (ret) - return ret; + goto free_security; agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change; ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); if (ret) - return ret; + goto free_security; agent->smp_allowed = true; agent->lsm_nb_reg = true; return 0; + +free_security: + security_ib_free_security(agent->security); + return ret; } void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) -- 2.19.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe 4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Move the security related fields above the u8s to eliminate a hole in the struct. pahole before: struct ib_mad_agent { ... u32 hi_tid; /* 48 4 */ u32 flags; /* 52 4 */ u8 port_num; /* 56 1 */ u8 rmpp_version; /* 57 1 */ /* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ void * security; /* 64 8 */ bool smp_allowed; /* 72 1 */ bool lsm_nb_reg; /* 73 1 */ /* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct notifier_block lsm_nb; /* 80 24 */ /* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */ /* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */ ... }; pahole after: struct ib_mad_agent { ... u32 hi_tid; /* 48 4 */ u32 flags; /* 52 4 */ void * security; /* 56 8 */ /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ struct notifier_block lsm_nb; /* 64 24 */ /* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */ u8 port_num; /* 88 1 */ u8 rmpp_version; /* 89 1 */ bool smp_allowed; /* 90 1 */ bool lsm_nb_reg; /* 91 1 */ /* size: 96, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */ ... }; Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> --- include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h index fdef558e3a2d..1c0b914f199d 100644 --- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h @@ -616,12 +616,12 @@ struct ib_mad_agent { void *context; u32 hi_tid; u32 flags; + void *security; + struct notifier_block lsm_nb; u8 port_num; u8 rmpp_version; - void *security; bool smp_allowed; bool lsm_nb_reg; - struct notifier_block lsm_nb; }; /** -- 2.19.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky ` (2 preceding siblings ...) 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-06 21:52 ` Paul Moore 2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe 4 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-02 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled. Notifier chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With large numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously the CPUs spend too much time with interrupts disabled. Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification, maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this registration already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write mostly, so a normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents must be checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down per device. Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings when notified. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org CC: paul@paul-moore.com CC: ddutile@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h | 5 +++ drivers/infiniband/core/device.c | 1 + drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++------------- include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h index 616734313f0c..6fd3d3d06d18 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, enum ib_qp_type qp_type); void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent); int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index); +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void); #else static inline void ib_security_destroy_port_pkey_list(struct ib_device *device) { @@ -264,6 +265,10 @@ static inline int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, { return 0; } + +static inline void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void) +{ +} #endif struct ib_device *ib_device_get_by_index(u32 ifindex); diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c index 238ec42778ef..8c1d8ffb09e2 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int ib_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, return NOTIFY_DONE; schedule_work(&ib_policy_change_work); + ib_mad_agent_security_change(); return NOTIFY_OK; } diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 7662e9347238..a70d2ba312ed 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ #include "core_priv.h" #include "mad_priv.h" +static LIST_HEAD(mad_agent_list); +/* Lock to protect mad_agent_list */ +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mad_agent_list_lock); + static struct pkey_index_qp_list *get_pkey_idx_qp_list(struct ib_port_pkey *pp) { struct pkey_index_qp_list *pkey = NULL; @@ -676,19 +680,18 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev, return security_ib_pkey_access(sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); } -static int ib_mad_agent_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, - unsigned long event, - void *data) +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void) { - struct ib_mad_agent *ag = container_of(nb, struct ib_mad_agent, lsm_nb); - - if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE) - return NOTIFY_DONE; - - ag->smp_allowed = !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet( - ag->security, dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num); - - return NOTIFY_OK; + struct ib_mad_agent *ag; + + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ag, + &mad_agent_list, + mad_agent_sec_list) + WRITE_ONCE(ag->smp_allowed, + !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(ag->security, + dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num)); + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); } int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, @@ -699,6 +702,8 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) return 0; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list); + ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security); if (ret) return ret; @@ -706,22 +711,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, if (qp_type != IB_QPT_SMI) return 0; + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); ret = security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(agent->security, dev_name(&agent->device->dev), agent->port_num); if (ret) goto free_security; - agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change; - ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); - if (ret) - goto free_security; - - agent->smp_allowed = true; - agent->lsm_nb_reg = true; + WRITE_ONCE(agent->smp_allowed, true); + list_add(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list, &mad_agent_list); + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); return 0; free_security: + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); security_ib_free_security(agent->security); return ret; } @@ -731,8 +734,11 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) return; - if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) - unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); + if (agent->qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) { + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); + list_del(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list); + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); + } security_ib_free_security(agent->security); } @@ -743,7 +749,7 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) return 0; if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) { - if (!map->agent.smp_allowed) + if (!READ_ONCE(map->agent.smp_allowed)) return -EACCES; return 0; } diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h index 1c0b914f199d..79ba8219e7dc 100644 --- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h @@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ struct ib_mad_agent { u32 hi_tid; u32 flags; void *security; - struct notifier_block lsm_nb; + struct list_head mad_agent_sec_list; u8 port_num; u8 rmpp_version; bool smp_allowed; - bool lsm_nb_reg; }; /** -- 2.19.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-06 21:52 ` Paul Moore 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Paul Moore @ 2019-02-06 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Leon Romanovsky Cc: Doug Ledford, Jason Gunthorpe, Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, ddutile On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 AM Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> wrote: > From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> > > When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet > processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents > are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled. > Notifier chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With > large numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously > the CPUs spend too much time with interrupts disabled. > > Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification, > maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this > registration already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write > mostly, so a normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents > must be checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down > per device. > > Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of > similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings > when notified. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> > Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com> > CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org > CC: paul@paul-moore.com > CC: ddutile@redhat.com > Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> > --- > drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h | 5 +++ > drivers/infiniband/core/device.c | 1 + > drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++------------- > include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 3 +- > 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) This looks reasonable from a SELinux perspective. I would still be curious to see how this would compare to calling security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() directly in ip_mad_enforce_security(), but at least this patch should fix the problem you're seeing. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h > index 616734313f0c..6fd3d3d06d18 100644 > --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h > +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/core_priv.h > @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, > enum ib_qp_type qp_type); > void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent); > int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index); > +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void); > #else > static inline void ib_security_destroy_port_pkey_list(struct ib_device *device) > { > @@ -264,6 +265,10 @@ static inline int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, > { > return 0; > } > + > +static inline void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void) > +{ > +} > #endif > > struct ib_device *ib_device_get_by_index(u32 ifindex); > diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c > index 238ec42778ef..8c1d8ffb09e2 100644 > --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c > +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/device.c > @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int ib_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, > return NOTIFY_DONE; > > schedule_work(&ib_policy_change_work); > + ib_mad_agent_security_change(); > > return NOTIFY_OK; > } > diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c > index 7662e9347238..a70d2ba312ed 100644 > --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c > +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c > @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ > #include "core_priv.h" > #include "mad_priv.h" > > +static LIST_HEAD(mad_agent_list); > +/* Lock to protect mad_agent_list */ > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mad_agent_list_lock); > + > static struct pkey_index_qp_list *get_pkey_idx_qp_list(struct ib_port_pkey *pp) > { > struct pkey_index_qp_list *pkey = NULL; > @@ -676,19 +680,18 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev, > return security_ib_pkey_access(sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); > } > > -static int ib_mad_agent_security_change(struct notifier_block *nb, > - unsigned long event, > - void *data) > +void ib_mad_agent_security_change(void) > { > - struct ib_mad_agent *ag = container_of(nb, struct ib_mad_agent, lsm_nb); > - > - if (event != LSM_POLICY_CHANGE) > - return NOTIFY_DONE; > - > - ag->smp_allowed = !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet( > - ag->security, dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num); > - > - return NOTIFY_OK; > + struct ib_mad_agent *ag; > + > + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > + list_for_each_entry(ag, > + &mad_agent_list, > + mad_agent_sec_list) > + WRITE_ONCE(ag->smp_allowed, > + !security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(ag->security, > + dev_name(&ag->device->dev), ag->port_num)); > + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > } > > int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, > @@ -699,6 +702,8 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, > if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) > return 0; > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list); > + > ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security); > if (ret) > return ret; > @@ -706,22 +711,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, > if (qp_type != IB_QPT_SMI) > return 0; > > + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > ret = security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(agent->security, > dev_name(&agent->device->dev), > agent->port_num); > if (ret) > goto free_security; > > - agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change; > - ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); > - if (ret) > - goto free_security; > - > - agent->smp_allowed = true; > - agent->lsm_nb_reg = true; > + WRITE_ONCE(agent->smp_allowed, true); > + list_add(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list, &mad_agent_list); > + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > return 0; > > free_security: > + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > security_ib_free_security(agent->security); > return ret; > } > @@ -731,8 +734,11 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) > if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) > return; > > - if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) > - unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); > + if (agent->qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) { > + spin_lock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > + list_del(&agent->mad_agent_sec_list); > + spin_unlock(&mad_agent_list_lock); > + } > > security_ib_free_security(agent->security); > } > @@ -743,7 +749,7 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) > return 0; > > if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) { > - if (!map->agent.smp_allowed) > + if (!READ_ONCE(map->agent.smp_allowed)) > return -EACCES; > return 0; > } > diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h > index 1c0b914f199d..79ba8219e7dc 100644 > --- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h > +++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h > @@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ struct ib_mad_agent { > u32 hi_tid; > u32 flags; > void *security; > - struct notifier_block lsm_nb; > + struct list_head mad_agent_sec_list; > u8 port_num; > u8 rmpp_version; > bool smp_allowed; > - bool lsm_nb_reg; > }; > > /** > -- > 2.19.1 > -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky ` (3 preceding siblings ...) 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky @ 2019-02-08 23:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe 4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2019-02-08 23:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Leon Romanovsky Cc: Doug Ledford, Leon Romanovsky, RDMA mailing list, Daniel Jurgens, Parav Pandit, selinux, paul, ddutile On Sat, Feb 02, 2019 at 11:09:41AM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote: > From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> > > Hi, > > This is second version of previously sent patch "IB/core: Don't register > MAD agents for LSM notifications", due to the fact that we found extra > things to fix during the review, I grouped that patch together with > other fixes in that area. > > Thanks > > Daniel Jurgens (4): > IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security > IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents > IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct > IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Applied to for-next Thanks, Jason ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-02-08 23:50 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2019-02-02 9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-02 9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky 2019-02-06 21:52 ` Paul Moore 2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe
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