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From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	yhs@fb.com, lkp@01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 22:58:01 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190305225801.a63ac8712105ab2e673be1bc@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190305090729.GF32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Tue, 5 Mar 2019 10:07:29 +0100
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 11:36:35AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> > I think the better way to do this is allowing strncpy_from_user()
> O
> > if some conditions are match, like
> > 
> >  - strncpy_from_user() will be able to copy user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
> >  - strncpy_from_user() can copy kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
> >  - strncpy_from_user() can access unsafe memory in IRQ context if
> >    pagefault is disabled.
> > 
> > This is almost done, except for CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y on x86.
> > 
> > So, what about adding a condition to WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() like below
> > instead of introducing user_access_ok() ?
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index 780f2b42c8ef..ec0f0b74c9ab 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un
> >  })
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
> > -# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) 
> > +# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(pagefault_disabled() && !in_task())
> 
> That doesn't make any kind of sense to me; see faulthandler_disabled().
> IOW. interrupt (and any atomic context really) won't take faults anyway.

Hmm, I thought CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y tries to detect that some operations
which can sleep in atomic, like IRQ context, doesn't it?
(note that above should be !pagefault_disabled() anyway) 

So I guessed WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() intended to detect the access_ok() was used
in atomic, because it might follow some copy_from_user() like operation
which can sleep when it hits a pagefault. Is my guess wrong?

If correct, I think if pagefault is disabled, the caller never sleep,
so we don't need to take care of that.

Could you tell me why WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) is needed in access_ok()?

> 
> I dislike that whole KERNEL_DS thing, but obviously that's not something
> that's going away.
> 
> Would something like:
> 
> 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(in_task || segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)))
> 
> Work? Then we allow KERNEL_DS in task context, but for interrupt and
> others require USER_DS.

But what would this mean? I can't understand why we limit using
access_ok() so strictly and narrow the cases.

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: lkp@lists.01.org
Subject: Re: [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x
Date: Tue, 05 Mar 2019 22:58:01 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190305225801.a63ac8712105ab2e673be1bc@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190305090729.GF32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2492 bytes --]

On Tue, 5 Mar 2019 10:07:29 +0100
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 11:36:35AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> > I think the better way to do this is allowing strncpy_from_user()
> O
> > if some conditions are match, like
> > 
> >  - strncpy_from_user() will be able to copy user memory with set_fs(USER_DS)
> >  - strncpy_from_user() can copy kernel memory with set_fs(KERNEL_DS)
> >  - strncpy_from_user() can access unsafe memory in IRQ context if
> >    pagefault is disabled.
> > 
> > This is almost done, except for CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y on x86.
> > 
> > So, what about adding a condition to WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() like below
> > instead of introducing user_access_ok() ?
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index 780f2b42c8ef..ec0f0b74c9ab 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, un
> >  })
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
> > -# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) 
> > +# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()      WARN_ON_ONCE(pagefault_disabled() && !in_task())
> 
> That doesn't make any kind of sense to me; see faulthandler_disabled().
> IOW. interrupt (and any atomic context really) won't take faults anyway.

Hmm, I thought CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y tries to detect that some operations
which can sleep in atomic, like IRQ context, doesn't it?
(note that above should be !pagefault_disabled() anyway) 

So I guessed WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() intended to detect the access_ok() was used
in atomic, because it might follow some copy_from_user() like operation
which can sleep when it hits a pagefault. Is my guess wrong?

If correct, I think if pagefault is disabled, the caller never sleep,
so we don't need to take care of that.

Could you tell me why WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task()) is needed in access_ok()?

> 
> I dislike that whole KERNEL_DS thing, but obviously that's not something
> that's going away.
> 
> Would something like:
> 
> 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(in_task || segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)))
> 
> Work? Then we allow KERNEL_DS in task context, but for interrupt and
> others require USER_DS.

But what would this mean? I can't understand why we limit using
access_ok() so strictly and narrow the cases.

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-05 13:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-28 16:02 [PATCH v5 0/6] tracing/probes: uaccess: Add support user-space access Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:02 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] uaccess: Add user_access_ok() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] uaccess: Use user_access_ok() in user_access_begin() Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-03 17:39   ` [uaccess] 780464aed0: WARNING:at_arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:#strnlen_user/0x kernel test robot
2019-03-03 17:39     ` kernel test robot
2019-03-03 19:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-03 19:53       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  1:14       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  1:14         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  2:37         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  2:37           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04  9:06           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  9:06             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:16             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:16               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04 15:58               ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 15:58                 ` Jann Horn
2019-03-04 18:59             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-04 18:59               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-05  2:36               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  2:36                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  8:22                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  8:22                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:01                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:01                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05  9:07                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05  9:07                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 13:58                   ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2019-03-05 13:58                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 14:53                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 14:53                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-05 15:18                       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-05 15:18                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-04  3:20       ` [LKP] " Rong Chen
2019-03-04  3:20         ` Rong Chen
2019-02-28 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 22:49   ` Yonghong Song
2019-03-01  2:29     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-01  6:30       ` Yonghong Song
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] tracing/probe: Add ustring type for user-space string Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:04 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] tracing/probe: Support user-space dereference Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 16:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests/ftrace: Add user-memory access syntax testcase Masami Hiramatsu

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