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From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	peterx@redhat.com, Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>,
	Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>,
	Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 17:36:58 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190311093701.15734-1-peterx@redhat.com> (raw)

Hi,

(The idea comes from Andrea, and following discussions with Mike and
 other people)

This patchset introduces a new sysctl flag to allow the admin to
forbid users from using userfaultfd:

  $ cat /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd
  [disabled] enabled kvm

  - When set to "disabled", all unprivileged users are forbidden to
    use userfaultfd syscalls.

  - When set to "enabled", all users are allowed to use userfaultfd
    syscalls.

  - When set to "kvm", all unprivileged users are forbidden to use the
    userfaultfd syscalls, except the user who has permission to open
    /dev/kvm.

This new flag can add one more layer of security to reduce the attack
surface of the kernel by abusing userfaultfd.  Here we grant the
thread userfaultfd permission by checking against CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability.  By default, the value is "disabled" which is the most
strict policy.  Distributions can have their own perferred value.

The "kvm" entry is a bit special here only to make sure that existing
users like QEMU/KVM won't break by this newly introduced flag.  What
we need to do is simply set the "unprivileged_userfaultfd" flag to
"kvm" here to automatically grant userfaultfd permission for processes
like QEMU/KVM without extra code to tweak these flags in the admin
code.

Patch 1:  The interface patch to introduce the flag

Patch 2:  The KVM related changes to detect opening of /dev/kvm

Patch 3:  Apply the flag to userfaultfd syscalls

All comments would be greatly welcomed.  Thanks,

Peter Xu (3):
  userfaultfd/sysctl: introduce unprivileged_userfaultfd
  kvm/mm: introduce MMF_USERFAULTFD_ALLOW flag
  userfaultfd: apply unprivileged_userfaultfd check

 fs/userfaultfd.c               | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/sched/coredump.h |   1 +
 include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h  |   5 ++
 init/Kconfig                   |  11 +++
 kernel/sysctl.c                |  11 +++
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c            |   7 ++
 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+)

-- 
2.17.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	peterx@redhat.com, Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>,
	Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>,
	Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, "Dr . Davi
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 17:36:58 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190311093701.15734-1-peterx@redhat.com> (raw)

Hi,

(The idea comes from Andrea, and following discussions with Mike and
 other people)

This patchset introduces a new sysctl flag to allow the admin to
forbid users from using userfaultfd:

  $ cat /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd
  [disabled] enabled kvm

  - When set to "disabled", all unprivileged users are forbidden to
    use userfaultfd syscalls.

  - When set to "enabled", all users are allowed to use userfaultfd
    syscalls.

  - When set to "kvm", all unprivileged users are forbidden to use the
    userfaultfd syscalls, except the user who has permission to open
    /dev/kvm.

This new flag can add one more layer of security to reduce the attack
surface of the kernel by abusing userfaultfd.  Here we grant the
thread userfaultfd permission by checking against CAP_SYS_PTRACE
capability.  By default, the value is "disabled" which is the most
strict policy.  Distributions can have their own perferred value.

The "kvm" entry is a bit special here only to make sure that existing
users like QEMU/KVM won't break by this newly introduced flag.  What
we need to do is simply set the "unprivileged_userfaultfd" flag to
"kvm" here to automatically grant userfaultfd permission for processes
like QEMU/KVM without extra code to tweak these flags in the admin
code.

Patch 1:  The interface patch to introduce the flag

Patch 2:  The KVM related changes to detect opening of /dev/kvm

Patch 3:  Apply the flag to userfaultfd syscalls

All comments would be greatly welcomed.  Thanks,

Peter Xu (3):
  userfaultfd/sysctl: introduce unprivileged_userfaultfd
  kvm/mm: introduce MMF_USERFAULTFD_ALLOW flag
  userfaultfd: apply unprivileged_userfaultfd check

 fs/userfaultfd.c               | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/sched/coredump.h |   1 +
 include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h  |   5 ++
 init/Kconfig                   |  11 +++
 kernel/sysctl.c                |  11 +++
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c            |   7 ++
 6 files changed, 156 insertions(+)

-- 
2.17.1

             reply	other threads:[~2019-03-11  9:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-11  9:36 Peter Xu [this message]
2019-03-11  9:36 ` [PATCH 0/3] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:36 ` [PATCH 1/3] userfaultfd/sysctl: introduce unprivileged_userfaultfd Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:36   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12  6:58   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-12  6:58     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-12 12:26     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 12:26       ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 13:53       ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-12 13:53         ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-11  9:37 ` [PATCH 2/3] kvm/mm: introduce MMF_USERFAULTFD_ALLOW flag Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:37   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:37 ` [PATCH 3/3] userfaultfd: apply unprivileged_userfaultfd check Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:37   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:58   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-11  9:58     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12  7:01 ` [PATCH 0/3] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users Mike Rapoport
2019-03-12  7:01   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-12 12:29   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 12:29     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12  7:49 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-03-12  7:49   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-03-12  7:49   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-03-12 12:43   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 12:43     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 12:43     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-12 19:59 ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-12 19:59   ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-13  6:00   ` Peter Xu
2019-03-13  6:00     ` Peter Xu
2019-03-13  8:22     ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-13  8:22       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-13 18:52       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-13 18:52         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-13 19:12         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-13 19:12           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-13 19:12           ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-13 23:44           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-13 23:44             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-14 10:58             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-14 10:58               ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-14 15:23               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-03-14 15:23                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-03-14 15:23                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-03-14 16:00                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-14 16:00                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-14 16:16               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-14 16:16                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-15 16:09                 ` Kees Cook
2019-03-15 16:09                   ` Kees Cook
2019-03-15 16:09                   ` Kees Cook
2019-03-13 20:01         ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-13 23:55           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-13 23:55             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-14  3:32             ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-14  3:32               ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-13 17:50     ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-13 17:50       ` Mike Kravetz
2019-03-15  8:26       ` Peter Xu
2019-03-15  8:26         ` Peter Xu

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