From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: juergh@gmail.com, tycho@tycho.ws, jsteckli@amazon.de, ak@linux.intel.com, liran.alon@oracle.com, keescook@google.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>, deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com, chris.hyser@oracle.com, tyhicks@canonical.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, jcm@redhat.com, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, joao.m.martins@oracle.com, jmattson@google.com, pradeep.vincent@oracle.com, john.haxby@oracle.com, tglx@linutronix.de, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, hch@lst.de, steven.sistare@oracle.com, labbott@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, aaron.lu@intel.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com, amir73il@gmail.com, andreyknvl@google.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com, anthony.yznaga@oracle.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, arnd@arndb.de, arunks@codeaurora.org, ben@decadent.org.uk, bigeasy@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, brgl@bgdev.pl, catalin.marinas@arm.com, corbet@lwn.net, cpandya@codeaurora.org, daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch, dan.j.williams@intel.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, guro@fb.com, hannes@cmpxchg.org, hpa@zytor.com, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, james.morse@arm.com, jannh@google.com, jgross@suse.com, jkosina@suse.cz, jmorris@namei.org, joe@perches.com, jrdr.linux@gmail.com, jroedel@suse.de, keith.busch@intel.com, khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru, logang@deltatee.com, marco.antonio.780@gmail.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, mgorman@techsingularity.net, mhocko@suse.com, mhocko@suse.cz, mike.kravetz@oracle.com, mingo@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, npiggin@gmail.com, osalvador@suse.de, paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pavel.tatashin@microsoft.com, rdunlap@infradead.org, richard.weiyang@gmail.com, riel@surriel.com, rientjes@google.com, robin.murphy@arm.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com, sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com, serge@hallyn.com, steve.capper@arm.com, thymovanbeers@gmail.com, vbabka@suse.cz, will.deacon@arm.com, willy@infradead.org, yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com, yaojun8558363@gmail.com, ying.huang@intel.com, zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 19:01:39 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190404170139.GA4038@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw) In-Reply-To: <b414bacc-2883-1914-38ec-3d8f4a032e10@oracle.com> On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 09:15:46AM -0600, Khalid Aziz wrote: > Thanks Peter. I really appreciate your review. Your feedback helps make > this code better and closer to where I can feel comfortable not calling > it RFC any more. > > The more I look at xpfo_kmap()/xpfo_kunmap() code, the more I get > uncomfortable with it. As you pointed out about calling kmap_atomic from > NMI context, that just makes the kmap_atomic code look even worse. I > pointed out one problem with this code in cover letter and suggested a > rewrite. I see these problems with this code: Well, I no longer use it from NMI context, but I did do that for a while. We now have a giant heap of magic in the NMI path that allows us to take faults from NMI context (please don't ask), this means we can mostly do copy_from_user_inatomic() now. > 1. When xpfo_kmap maps a page back in physmap, it opens up the ret2dir > attack security hole again even if just for the duration of kmap. A kmap > can stay around for some time if the page is being used for I/O. Correct. > 2. This code uses spinlock which leads to problems. If it does not > disable IRQ, it is exposed to deadlock around xpfo_lock. If it disables > IRQ, I think it can still deadlock around pgd_lock. I've not spotted that inversion yet, but then I didn't look at the lock usage outside of k{,un}map_xpfo(). > I think a better implementation of xpfo_kmap()/xpfo_kunmap() would map > the page at a new virtual address similar to what kmap_high for i386 > does. This avoids re-opening the ret2dir security hole. We can also > possibly do away with xpfo_lock saving bytes in page-frame and the not > so sane code sequence can go away. Right, the TLB invalidation issues are still tricky, even there :/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org> To: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Cc: catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org, will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org, steven.sistare-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, hch-jcswGhMUV9g@public.gmane.org, tycho-E0fblnxP3wo@public.gmane.org, ak-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org, aneesh.kumar-tEXmvtCZX7AybS5Ee8rs3A@public.gmane.org, jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, rientjes-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, anthony.yznaga-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, riel-ebMLmSuQjDVBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org, npiggin-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org, rppt-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org, luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org, gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, rdunlap-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, jrdr.linux-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org, jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org, joe-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org, arunks-sgV2jX0FEOL9JmXXK+q4OQ@public.gmane.org, akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org, dwmw-vV1OtcyAfmbQXOPxS62xeg@public.gmane.org, mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org, linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, keith.busch-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org, joao.m.martins-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org, brgl-ARrdPY/1zhM@public.gmane.org, konrad.wilk-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, jsteckli-ebkRAfMGSJGzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org, jroedel-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org, keescook-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, zhangshaokun-C8/M+/jPZTeaMJb+Lgu22Q@public.gmane.org, boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, chris.hyser-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org, linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 19:01:39 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190404170139.GA4038@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw) In-Reply-To: <b414bacc-2883-1914-38ec-3d8f4a032e10-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 09:15:46AM -0600, Khalid Aziz wrote: > Thanks Peter. I really appreciate your review. Your feedback helps make > this code better and closer to where I can feel comfortable not calling > it RFC any more. > > The more I look at xpfo_kmap()/xpfo_kunmap() code, the more I get > uncomfortable with it. As you pointed out about calling kmap_atomic from > NMI context, that just makes the kmap_atomic code look even worse. I > pointed out one problem with this code in cover letter and suggested a > rewrite. I see these problems with this code: Well, I no longer use it from NMI context, but I did do that for a while. We now have a giant heap of magic in the NMI path that allows us to take faults from NMI context (please don't ask), this means we can mostly do copy_from_user_inatomic() now. > 1. When xpfo_kmap maps a page back in physmap, it opens up the ret2dir > attack security hole again even if just for the duration of kmap. A kmap > can stay around for some time if the page is being used for I/O. Correct. > 2. This code uses spinlock which leads to problems. If it does not > disable IRQ, it is exposed to deadlock around xpfo_lock. If it disables > IRQ, I think it can still deadlock around pgd_lock. I've not spotted that inversion yet, but then I didn't look at the lock usage outside of k{,un}map_xpfo(). > I think a better implementation of xpfo_kmap()/xpfo_kunmap() would map > the page at a new virtual address similar to what kmap_high for i386 > does. This avoids re-opening the ret2dir security hole. We can also > possibly do away with xpfo_lock saving bytes in page-frame and the not > so sane code sequence can go away. Right, the TLB invalidation issues are still tricky, even there :/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-04 17:02 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 202+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-04-03 17:34 [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/13] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/13] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 1:42 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 1:42 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 4:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 4:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 15:47 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 15:47 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 16:23 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 2019-04-04 16:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-04 16:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-04 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/13] mm: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 7:21 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 7:21 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 14:48 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 14:48 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-04 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 15:15 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 15:15 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 17:01 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message] 2019-04-04 17:01 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 16:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 16:49 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:09 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:26 ` Ingo Molnar 2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 17:44 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 21:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-17 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-18 4:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook via iommu 2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-18 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-18 14:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-22 19:30 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook via iommu 2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook via iommu 2019-04-22 22:23 ` Kees Cook 2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-18 6:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 17:33 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-17 19:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-17 19:52 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-17 20:12 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long 2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long 2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long 2019-05-01 14:49 ` Waiman Long 2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-05-01 15:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/13] xpfo, x86: Add support for XPFO for x86-64 Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 7:52 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 7:52 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 15:40 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 15:40 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/13] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/13] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/13] arm64/mm: Add support " Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/13] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/13] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/13] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/13] xpfo, mm: optimize spinlock usage in xpfo_kunmap Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 7:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 7:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 16:06 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 16:06 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/13] xpfo, mm: Defer TLB flushes for non-current CPUs (x86 only) Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 4:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 4:10 ` Andy Lutomirski [not found] ` <CALCETrXMXxnWqN94d83UvGWhkD1BNWiwvH2vsUth1w0T3=0ywQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2019-04-04 22:55 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 7:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-05 7:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-04-05 14:44 ` Dave Hansen 2019-04-05 14:44 ` Dave Hansen 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Tycho Andersen 2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:56 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen 2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen 2019-04-05 16:01 ` Dave Hansen 2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 16:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-05 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 17:35 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:44 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-05 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-04 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-04 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-04-03 17:34 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/13] xpfo, mm: Optimize XPFO TLB flushes by batching them together Khalid Aziz 2019-04-03 17:34 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 16:44 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/13] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Nadav Amit 2019-04-04 16:44 ` Nadav Amit 2019-04-04 17:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-04 17:18 ` Khalid Aziz 2019-04-06 6:40 ` Jon Masters 2019-04-06 6:40 ` Jon Masters 2019-04-06 6:40 ` Jon Masters
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