From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v7 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 13:06:34 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190606200646.3951-16-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated for the child. This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK. A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty. This dirty bit requirement is used to effect the copying. In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access. At that time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++++ mm/memory.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c index 1f67b1e15bf6..c2d754a780b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c @@ -891,3 +891,18 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr) #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK) + return pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte); + else + return pte; +} + +inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ + return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */ diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h index 75d9d68a6de7..ffcc0be7cadc 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h @@ -1188,4 +1188,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) #define mm_pmd_folded(mm) __is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED) #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK +#define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte +#define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false +#else +pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags); +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */ diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index ddf20bd0c317..51c97294f00f 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -777,7 +777,8 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm, * If it's a COW mapping, write protect it both * in the parent and the child */ - if (is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) { + if ((is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) || + arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags)) { ptep_set_wrprotect(src_mm, addr, src_pte); pte = pte_wrprotect(pte); } @@ -2312,6 +2313,7 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf) flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte)); entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte); entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1)) update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte); pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); @@ -2387,6 +2389,7 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf) flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte)); entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); /* * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition @@ -2910,6 +2913,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot); if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page, NULL)) { pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma); + pte = pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma); vmf->flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE; exclusive = RMAP_EXCLUSIVE; @@ -3052,6 +3056,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot); if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry)); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl); -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v7 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 13:06:34 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190606200646.3951-16-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated for the child. This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK. A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty. This dirty bit requirement is used to effect the copying. In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access. At that time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++++ mm/memory.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c index 1f67b1e15bf6..c2d754a780b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c @@ -891,3 +891,18 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr) #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER +inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK) + return pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte); + else + return pte; +} + +inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ + return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */ diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h index 75d9d68a6de7..ffcc0be7cadc 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h @@ -1188,4 +1188,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) #define mm_pmd_folded(mm) __is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED) #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK +#define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte +#define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false +#else +pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags); +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */ diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index ddf20bd0c317..51c97294f00f 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -777,7 +777,8 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm, * If it's a COW mapping, write protect it both * in the parent and the child */ - if (is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) { + if ((is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) || + arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags)) { ptep_set_wrprotect(src_mm, addr, src_pte); pte = pte_wrprotect(pte); } @@ -2312,6 +2313,7 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf) flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte)); entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte); entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1)) update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte); pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); @@ -2387,6 +2389,7 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf) flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte)); entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); /* * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition @@ -2910,6 +2913,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot); if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page, NULL)) { pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma); + pte = pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma); vmf->flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE; exclusive = RMAP_EXCLUSIVE; @@ -3052,6 +3056,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot); if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry)); + entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma); vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl); -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-06 20:16 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 161+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-06-06 20:06 [PATCH v7 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 21:18 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-06 21:18 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-06 22:04 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-06 22:04 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-06 22:08 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-06 22:08 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-06 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 1:54 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-07 1:54 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 7:07 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:07 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 16:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 12/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 13/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 14/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 7:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 16/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 17/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 18/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 16:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 22/27] binfmt_elf: Extract .note.gnu.property from an ELF file Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 7:58 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:58 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 16:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 16:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 18:01 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-07 18:01 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-10 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-10 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-10 16:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-10 16:57 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-10 16:57 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-10 17:24 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-10 17:24 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-10 17:24 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-11 11:41 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-11 11:41 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-11 19:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-11 19:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-11 19:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-12 19:04 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-12 19:04 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-12 19:04 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-13 13:26 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-13 13:26 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-17 11:08 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-17 11:08 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-17 11:08 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-17 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-06-17 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-06-17 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 12:47 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 12:47 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 12:47 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 12:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 12:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 13:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 13:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 13:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 13:32 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 15:49 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 15:49 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 15:49 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 15:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 15:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 15:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 16:05 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:05 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:05 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 16:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-18 16:20 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 16:20 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 16:25 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:25 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:25 ` Florian Weimer 2019-06-18 16:50 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-18 16:50 ` Dave Martin 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-07 7:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-07 7:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-11 17:55 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-11 17:55 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-11 19:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-11 19:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-11 19:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-11-01 14:03 ` Adrian Hunter 2019-11-01 14:03 ` Adrian Hunter 2019-11-01 14:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-11-01 14:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2019-11-01 14:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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