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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V35 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190715195946.223443-21-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
depending on local policy.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c  | 5 +++++
 include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c b/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
index 0881e1ff1e58..a8bd952e136d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 static unsigned long mmio_address;
 module_param_hw(mmio_address, ulong, iomem, 0);
@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ static void do_test_bulk_ioremapping(void)
 static int __init init(void)
 {
 	unsigned long size = (read_far) ? (8 << 20) : (16 << 10);
+	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	if (mmio_address == 0) {
 		pr_err("you have to use the module argument mmio_address.\n");
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 43fa3486522b..3f7b6a4cd65a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS,
 	LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL,
 	LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS,
+	LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 065432f9e218..e725f63c29d2 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
 	[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
 	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
-- 
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-15 20:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-15 19:59 [PATCH V35 00/29] Kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16  2:59   ` Dave Young
2019-07-16 20:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:26   ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 22:54   ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-07-16 20:32     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:17   ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16 23:14   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-16 23:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett

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