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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2019 13:32:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuudpnaQ5YUhoxmxNWVdRB6v0u0Bf2O6NmYOXjp8_govyg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5d363f09-d649-5693-45c0-bb99d69f0f38@iogearbox.net>

On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 3:54 PM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
> Hmm, does security_locked_down() ever return a code > 0 or why do you
> have the double check on return code? If not, then for clarity the
> ret code from security_locked_down() should be checked as 'ret < 0'
> as well and out label should be at the memset directly instead.

It doesn't, so I'll update. Thanks!

  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-16 20:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-15 19:59 [PATCH V35 00/29] Kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16  2:59   ` Dave Young
2019-07-16 20:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:26   ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 22:54   ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-07-16 20:32     ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:17   ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16 23:14   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-16 23:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett

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