From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
--
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Dave Young <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: Dave Young <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
cc: kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
--
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 12:59:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190715195946.223443-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190715195946.223443-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
--
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-15 20:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-15 19:59 [PATCH V35 00/29] Kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16 2:59 ` Dave Young
2019-07-16 20:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:26 ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 22:54 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-07-16 20:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 23:17 ` James Morris
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-16 23:14 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-16 23:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-15 19:59 ` [PATCH V35 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
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