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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	x86-patch-review@intel.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Date: Wed,  5 Feb 2020 10:19:12 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200205181935.3712-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.

The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.

v9:
- Add Shadow Stack pointer to the fault printout.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 76942cbd95a1..6ca77312d008 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug		do_spurious_interrupt_bug	has_error_code=0
 idtentry coprocessor_error		do_coprocessor_error		has_error_code=0
 idtentry alignment_check		do_alignment_check		has_error_code=1
 idtentry simd_coprocessor_error		do_simd_coprocessor_error	has_error_code=0
-
+idtentry control_protection		do_control_protection		has_error_code=1
 
 	/*
 	 * Reload gs selector with exception handling
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index ffa0dc8a535e..7ac26bbd0bef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
 asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
 asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
 asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
+asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
 asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
 void __init trap_init(void);
 #endif
 dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address);
 dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
@@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ enum {
 	X86_TRAP_AC,		/* 17, Alignment Check */
 	X86_TRAP_MC,		/* 18, Machine Check */
 	X86_TRAP_XF,		/* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
+	X86_TRAP_CP = 21,	/* 21 Control Protection Fault */
 	X86_TRAP_IRET = 32,	/* 32, IRET Exception */
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 87ef69a72c52..8ed406f469e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
 	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		control_protection),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 05da6b5b167b..99c83ee522ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -570,6 +570,65 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
 
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application.  Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode.  This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+dotraplinkage void
+do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
+	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+		       error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+		return;
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    printk_ratelimit()) {
+		unsigned int max_err;
+		unsigned long ssp;
+
+		max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+		if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+			error_code = 0;
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+		pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+			tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+			control_protection_err[error_code]);
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
+	}
+
+	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
+			(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
+
 dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..693071dbe641 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ACCADI	5	/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
 #define SEGV_ADIDERR	6	/* Disrupting MCD error */
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	7
+#define SEGV_CPERR	8
+#define NSIGSEGV	8
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.21.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Date: Wed,  5 Feb 2020 10:19:12 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200205181935.3712-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.

The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.

v9:
- Add Shadow Stack pointer to the fault printout.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 76942cbd95a1..6ca77312d008 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug		do_spurious_interrupt_bug	has_error_code=0
 idtentry coprocessor_error		do_coprocessor_error		has_error_code=0
 idtentry alignment_check		do_alignment_check		has_error_code=1
 idtentry simd_coprocessor_error		do_simd_coprocessor_error	has_error_code=0
-
+idtentry control_protection		do_control_protection		has_error_code=1
 
 	/*
 	 * Reload gs selector with exception handling
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index ffa0dc8a535e..7ac26bbd0bef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
 asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
 asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
 asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
+asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
 asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
 asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
 void __init trap_init(void);
 #endif
 dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address);
 dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
@@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ enum {
 	X86_TRAP_AC,		/* 17, Alignment Check */
 	X86_TRAP_MC,		/* 18, Machine Check */
 	X86_TRAP_XF,		/* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
+	X86_TRAP_CP = 21,	/* 21 Control Protection Fault */
 	X86_TRAP_IRET = 32,	/* 32, IRET Exception */
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 87ef69a72c52..8ed406f469e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
 	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		control_protection),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 05da6b5b167b..99c83ee522ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -570,6 +570,65 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
 
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application.  Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode.  This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+dotraplinkage void
+do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
+	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+		       error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+		return;
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    printk_ratelimit()) {
+		unsigned int max_err;
+		unsigned long ssp;
+
+		max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+		if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+			error_code = 0;
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+		pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+			tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+			control_protection_err[error_code]);
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
+	}
+
+	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
+			(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
+
 dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..693071dbe641 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ACCADI	5	/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
 #define SEGV_ADIDERR	6	/* Disrupting MCD error */
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	7
+#define SEGV_CPERR	8
+#define NSIGSEGV	8
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.21.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-02-05 18:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 264+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06  0:16     ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:57     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:21         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:35             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:16                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 20:59                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:02                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 22:19                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11                           ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11                           ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:20                             ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51                               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51                               ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  0:08                                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  0:08                                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  1:21                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  2:13                                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  2:13                                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:04     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:06     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:10     ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:03     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57     ` Pavel Machek
2020-02-26 19:57       ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:05     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16       ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:16         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11         ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27  3:57             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03             ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 18:03               ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 19:02         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:07     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:11     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:17     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 21:35     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:22         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:02     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:13     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:04     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:14     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:16     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:47     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:20     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:08     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 22:21         ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:59     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:34     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  0:55     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:10     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:17     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:18     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:20     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:22     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:31   ` Kees Cook

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